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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation is a study of the ambit of the right to food as it is contained in the South 
African Bill of Rights and the steps needed to realise the right. Existing and potential food 
insecurity, hunger and malnutrition provide the social context for this research. 
 
The rationale for conducting the research is primarily two-fold. Firstly, the access to 
sufficient food is an indispensable right for everyone living in this country. Secondly, the 
right to food in South Africa has not been subject to extensive academic study to date. 
 
Socio-economic rights are fully justiciable rights in this country, equally worthy of protection 
as civil and political rights. Furthermore, socio-economic rights (like the right to food) are 
interdependent with civil and political rights: neither category can meaningful exist without 
realisation of the other. 
 
The right to sufficient food is found in section 27(1)(b) of the South African Constitution. 
Children have the additional right to basic nutrition in terms of section 28(1)(c). The right to 
sufficient food is subject to the internal limitation of section 27(2) that the state must take 
reasonable measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the right. Furthermore, as with all rights in the Bill of Rights, both these rights are subject to 
the general limitations clause found in section 36. There is international law authority in 
various human rights instruments for the protection of the right to food and what the right 
entails. In accordance with section 39 of the Constitution, such international law must be 
considered when interpreting the right to food. It is argued that a generous and broad 
interpretation of food rights in the Constitution is called for. 
 
Existing legislation, state policies and programmes are analysed in order to gauge whether 
the state is adequately meeting its right to food obligations. Furthermore, the state’s food 
programmes must meet the just administrative action requirements of lawfulness, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness of section 33 of the Constitution and comply with the 
Promotion of Just Administrative Justice Act. The dissertation analyses the disparate and 
unco-ordinated food and law policies in existence, albeit that the National Food Security 
Draft Bill offers the hope of some improvement. Particular inadequacies highlighted in the 
 v
state’s response to the country’s food challenges are a lack of any feeding schemes in high 
schools and insufficient food provision in emergency situations. Social assistance grants 
available in terms of the Social Assistance Act are considered due to their potential to make 
food available to grant recipients. On the one hand there is shown to be a lack of social 
assistance for unemployed people who do not qualify for any form of social grant. On the 
other hand, whilst presently underutilised and not always properly administered, social relief 
of distress grants are shown to have the potential to improve access to sufficient food for 
limited periods of time. Other suggested means of improving access to sufficient food are 
income generation strategies, the introduction of a basic income grant and the creation of 
food framework legislation. When people are denied their food rights, this research calls for 
creative judicial remedies as well as effective enforcement of such court orders. However, it 
is argued that education on what the right to food entails is a precondition for people to seek 
legal recourse to protect their right to food. 
 
Due to a lack of case authority on food itself, guidance is sought from the findings of South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court in analogous socio-economic rights challenges. Through this 
analysis this dissertation considers the way forward, either in terms of direct court action or 
via improved access to other rights which will improve food access. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE, EXTENT AND STRUCTURE OF 
THE STUDY 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
 
The father of democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela said: 
 
“We do not want freedom without bread, nor do we want bread without freedom. We must 
provide for all the fundamental rights and freedoms associated with a democratic society …”1
 
Poverty is a reality for a large percentage of the South African population.2 This research 
focuses on one aspect of poverty, namely hunger and malnutrition, from a legal perspective. 
It has been said that “the idea of social security is that of using social means to prevent 
deprivation and vulnerability”.3 In accepting this definition of social security, it is submitted 
that food provision for those in need forms a crucial part of a state’s social security law 
obligations. This dissertation will attempt to establish the ambit of the right to food as it is 
contained in the Bill of Rights and the steps needed to realise the right. The key provisions 
are sections 27(1)(b) and 27(2) of the Constitution.4 Section 27(2) read with section 7(2) of 
the Constitution clearly indicate that the state must respect, protect and promote socio-
economic rights. However, there is the caveat in section 27(2) in that the state’s obligation to 
provide the listed socio-economic rights (including food) is subject to its available resources. 
Although this research will focus primarily on the right to food as contained in section 27, the 
                                                 
1  Mandela “Address: on the occasion of the ANC’s Bill of Rights Conference”. Quoted in Nthai 
“Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa” (1999) De Rebus 41. 
2  May Poverty and Inequality in South Africa (1998) defines poverty as: 
“the inability to attain a minimal standard of living, measured in terms of basic consumption needs 
or the income required to satisfy them”. 
In terms of this government report, in 1998 just under 50% of South Africa’s population fell below a 
poverty line of a monthly household expenditure level of R353 per adult equivalent. Accessed at 
http://www.polity.org.za/html/ govdocs/reports/ poverty.html on 5 June 2005. According to the so-called 
Taylor Commission the number of South Africans living in poverty depends on the poverty line used and 
on that basis between 20 and 28 million people are living in poverty.  Taylor, V et al Transforming the 
Present – Protecting the Future (2002) at 28-29.  Although there may be debate as to the yardstick for 
measuring poverty in South Africa, it is not debatable that poverty is a reality for a large percentage of 
South Africans.  
3  Dreze & Sen “Hunger and Public Action” (1989) 15 cited in Olivier, Okpaluba, Smit and Thompson 
(eds) Social Security Law - General Principles (1999) 21 footnote 1. 
4  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
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right of children to basic nutrition in section 28(1)(c) will also be considered. The right of 
prisoners to adequate nutrition in section 35(2)(e) falls beyond the scope of this research.5 
There are various other constitutionally protected socio-economic rights,6 but these fall 
outside the proposed direct scope of this work. Due to the interrelatedness of socio-economic 
rights, this dissertation will not, however, consider the right to food in isolation. For example, 
there is a clear link between the provision of social assistance grants and the ability of hungry 
people to eat.  
 
During the course of this research the terms “right to food” and “right to nutrition” will be 
used interchangeably. It is submitted that Olivier et al are correct to argue that to debate the 
distinction serves little purpose as both food and nutrition are necessary for all human 
beings.7
 
While the focus of this research is what constitutes the right to food and the corresponding 
duties needed to meet those rights, it is necessary to some degree to discuss what government 
is currently doing to alleviate hunger in South Africa in order to assess compliance with its 
constitutional obligations. De Vos highlights that the duties imposed by economic, social and 
cultural rights are to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights.8 There is no point in 
having a mere paper right without the obligation to enforce or implement that right. It is for 
this reason that the duties incumbent on the state to meet the right to food will be considered. 
The state will have failed in its right to food obligations if its duties are not converted into 
reasonable and effective policies. A discussion of current government policies and 
programmes accords with Engh’s argument that one must understand what currently exists in 
order to establish what has to be developed to better realise socio-economic rights.9  
                                                 
5  The logic for the exclusion of the food rights of prisoners from this study is that the rights of prisoners in 
general forms an area worthy of research on its own. The peculiar needs and circumstances of all 
detained persons make their socio-economic needs and the provision thereof distinctly distinguishable 
from the provision of socio-economic rights for the general population. 
6  Rautenbach; Jansen van Rensburg and Venter (eds) Politics, Socio-economic Issues and Culture in 
Constitutional Adjudication (November 2004) 64. These authors indicate that the rights to education, 
food, land, housing, health care, water, social security and welfare are all examples of justiciable socio-
economic or second-generation rights. 
7  Olivier, Smit and Kalula Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 545. 
8  De Vos “A New Beginning? The Enforcement of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” Law Democracy & Development Vol 8 (2004) (1) 19. In 
this regard De Vos is focusing on s 7(2) of the Constitution in so far as it relates to all rights in the Bill of 
Rights. 
9  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” ESR Review Vol 5 No 3 (2004) 3. 
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1.2  EXTENT OF THE STUDY 
 
It is necessary to define what the right to food means before one can logically discuss the 
extent of a study on the right to food. A useful definition of realisation of the right to food is 
given in General Comment 12 of the United Nations Economic and Social Rights 
Committees which says: 
 
“The right to food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with 
others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its 
procurement.”10
 
The concept of food security is often used interchangeably with the concept of realising the 
right to food. The Rome Declaration on Food Security explains food security in the following 
terms: 
 
“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.”11  
 
The main purpose of this research is to discuss the constitutional obligations of the state in 
relation to the right to food in South Africa.  
 
In attempting to meet the aforementioned objective, this research aims to answer the 
following key questions. What does the right to food in terms of the South African 
Constitution entail, and what corresponding duties are imposed on government in terms of 
the right? Is the state meeting its constitutional obligations in this regard? 
 
The research is undertaken in the field of constitutional law with a focus particularly on the 
right to food and, to a lesser extent, just administrative action.  
 
In attempting to answer the stated key questions, the status of the right to food in terms of 
international law is considered.12 Malherbe highlights the usefulness of considering 
international law sources in the context of socio-economic rights by arguing that: 
                                                 
10  United Nations Economic and Social Rights Committee General Comment 12 The Right to Adequate 
Food UN Doc E/C/12/1999/5 (1999) para 6. 
11  The Rome Declaration on Food Security. Cited in Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: 
Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework Legislation” (2004) Vol 20 SAJHR 670. 
12  S 39(1)(b) of the Constitution prescribes the use of International law as an interpretative tool. 
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“The dearth of local jurisprudence on social security rights makes it inevitable that 
international and comparative standards will be used to offer guidance on the interpretation of 
national legislation.”13
 
1.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
It is submitted that there are few challenges, if any, as crucial to post-apartheid South Africa 
as that of poverty alleviation.14 May’s 1998 Summary Report on Poverty and Inequality notes 
that most South African households either live in poverty or are continually vulnerable to 
being poor.15
 
It has been averred that the study of social security as a human right is worthy of continued 
research.16 Taking this viewpoint further, it is argued that a study of the right to sufficient 
food and adequate nutrition, which is one of the most basic of all human needs, warrants 
further study. The importance of food security is heightened by the ravages of the HIV/ Aids 
pandemic in South Africa, in that a loss of part of the agricultural labour force due to the 
disease is very likely to reduce the country’s ability to ensure that everyone in the country is 
adequately fed.17 Furthermore, time and money spent on HIV/ Aids reduces peoples’ ability 
to feed themselves. Conversely, food insecurity and poor nutrition increase peoples’ 
susceptibility to contracting HIV and the more rapid development of Aids from HIV.18 The 
clear link between food security and HIV/ Aids means that workable solutions for properly 
                                                 
13  Malherbe “The Co-ordination of Social Security Rights in Southern Africa: Comparisons With (and 
Possible Lessons to be Learnt From) the European Experience” Law Democracy & Development Vol 8 
2004(1) 80. 
14  Because poverty is undeniably linked with hunger and malnutrition, it is apposite to note the estimated 
extent of poverty in South Africa. According to Aliber, between 45% and 55% of South Africans are 
estimated to be poor, while about 70% of rural South Africans live in poverty. Aliber “Chronic Poverty 
in South Africa” (2003) 31(3) World Development. Cited in Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the 
Right to Food- An International and South African Perspective” (2004) 4 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 29. 
15  May Poverty and Inequality in South Africa. Accessed at http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/reports/ 
poverty .html on 5 June 2005. 
16  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India (2005) 2, unpublished, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University LLD thesis. 
17  Engh indicates that the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation has estimated that 4% of 
South Africa’s agricultural labour force has been lost to Aids by 2000 and that this figure could rise to 
20% by 2020.  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of 
HIV/Aids and the Right to Food in South Africa” 3. 
18  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 3. 
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meeting everyone’s right to food will have positive spin-offs in attempting to minimise the 
harm of HIV- Aids.    
 
The significance of this study becomes more apparent when one considers available statistics 
on the extent of malnutrition and food insecurity in South Africa. It has been estimated that 
36%19 of the South African population (which equates to more than 14 million people) are 
vulnerable to food insecurity.20 Food insecurity and malnutrition are geographically and 
demographically unevenly distributed, with food insecurity highest in provinces with large 
rural populations21 and amongst black households.22 Food insecurity and malnutrition in 
particular areas prompted the holding of two national food security workshops in 2002.23 The 
elderly, women and children24 are the most vulnerable to these food problems.25 According 
to Engh’s research, about 20 to 25% of South African pre-school children and 20% of 
primary school learners are chronically malnourished.26  
 
Coomans and Yapko see the right to food as having keys links with another controversial 
issue in modern South Africa, namely land reform.27 In the context of the relatively slow 
pace of land reform since the dawning of the democratic era in this country, the need to 
effectively realise the right to food might provide a basis for a more effective agricultural 
land reform process. Whilst not wanting to get into the merits of this argument at this 
                                                 
19  The Integrated Food Security Strategy for South Africa places this figure at between 35% and 39%. 
Accessed at www.nda.agric.za/docs/Foodsecurity/FinalIFSS on 25 February 2006. 
20  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone - A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 664. This figure was also cited by Brand in noting a 1998 report of the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation. Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic 
Rights in South Africa (2005) 153.  
21  The Limpopo Province, for example, has been identified as an area with widespread malnutrition and 
food insecurity. Khoza “Workshop on the Right to Food Security” 23. See also Statistics South Africa 
Rural Survey (1999) at 15, which note this unevenness of development. 
22  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 664. Again, see also Statistics South Africa Rural Survey (1999) at 15, which also reflects 
this phenomenon. 
23  Ibid. 
24  21.6% of children under nine years are stunted, 10.3% underweight and 3.7% experience wasting. Brand 
“The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 153 citing 
research by Labadarios (ed) The National Food Consumption Survey (1999). 
25  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 265. 
26  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 5. 
27  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 29. 
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introductory stage, it is sufficient to note that the right to food is inextricably linked with 
various other vital challenges in our society today. 
 
The right to social security has already been the subject of much research.28 However, there 
has been surprisingly little research into the right to food in South Africa, especially 
compared to various other socio-economic rights like access to health care or housing. When 
one considers that food is one of the most crucial and immediate of human needs, a legal 
analysis of the right to food in South Africa would appear to be called for. The importance of 
the study is heightened by the constitutional right to food not yet having been tested before 
our courts. Brand considers the constitutional right to food as a potentially significant way for 
the poor of South Africa to ensure access to their food needs.29  This untested and somewhat 
uncharted nature of the right in South African jurisprudence makes this research all the more 
exciting and worthwhile. 
 
1.4  STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In terms of content analysis, the focus of the research is on the relevant rights and duties 
contained in the Constitution. A large range of literature from articles, textbooks, cases, 
reports and the Internet is used to inform this research. Whilst no empirical research is 
undertaken, a conscious effort is made to produce a relevant study, rather than merely an 
academic exercise. 
 
Critical analysis in this study focuses on court decisions and existing government projects 
and programmes. The analysis of state projects and programmes considers the policies as 
contained in policy documents and academic critique of the implementation of the projects 
and programmes. 
 
This study begins with the justiciability of socio-economic rights generally,30 which places 
the right to food in its proper context. Thereafter the right to food and supporting, interrelated 
                                                 
28  For example, Olivier et al provide authority for the fact that it is now trite that socio-economic rights in 
South Africa are justiciable.  Olivier; Smit and Kalula Social Security: A Legal Analysis 545. 
29  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 153. 
30  Pieterse “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” (2004) Vol 20 SAJHR 
384 cites the Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744, Government of the Republic of 
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constitutional rights are examined.31 International law is considered in so far as it sheds light 
on the content of the right to food.32 The international law study focuses on international 
human rights instruments. As state provision of food and adequate nutrition is an 
administrative action, an analysis of the right to just administrative action is also made.33  
 
The next section analyses what government is currently doing to alleviate hunger in South 
Africa in order to assess compliance with its constitutional obligations. Part of this process 
considers whether there is just administrative action in relation to its food and nutrition 
programmes.34
 
The research then shifts towards an analysis of the enforcement of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa by the courts and the South African Human Rights Commission. The majority 
of the Chapter focuses on the major South African court decisions in the area of the provision 
of social and economic rights. It is worth reiterating that this dissertation aims to focus on the 
right to food, not other forms of social security and social assistance, such as the right to 
health care. However, the right to food has yet to come authoritatively before our courts. 
Hence, leading court decisions relating to the provision of other socio-economic rights are 
discussed due to the interrelatedness of the provision and enforcement of different socio-
economic rights.35 Attempts are then made to draw parallels between these cases and a 
hypothetical right to food challenge as well as the implications of these decisions for 
government’s food policies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC) and 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) judgments as authority for the fact that 
socio-economic rights are now clearly justiciable. The earlier debate as to whether socio-economic rights 
should be enforced by South Africa’s courts has therefore now been replaced with the pressing question 
of how such enforcement should occur. 
31  For example, s 28(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that “every child has the right to … basic nutrition 
…”. 
32  In relation to the interpretation of the right to social security in s 27 of the Constitution (and all other 
rights in the Bill of Rights), s 39 (1)(b) requires consideration of international law. 
33  S 33 of the Constitution provides for the right to just administrative action. 
34  The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 and the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
2 of 2000, which promote proper administrative action in general, will be considered in so far as they 
relate to the right in question. 
35  For example, Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) and 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (1) 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC). These decisions will be 
discussed later in this dissertation. 
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Finally, the discussions are concluded and proposals made concerning improving the current 
provision of adequate food within South Africa’s available resources.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE JUSTICIABLITY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 
 
The Constitution is supreme and contains justiciable rights.36  The focus of the Chapter is the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights. This will include the issues of limitations of rights as 
well as constitutional jurisdiction, access to court and locus standi. The right to food and 
interconnected rights will be analysed in the next Chapter.  
 
2.2 CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY AND THE JUSICIABILITY OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS  
 
Section 2 of the Constitution clearly indicates the supremacy of the Constitution.37 
Furthermore, Section 7(1) points to the Constitution’s role as the fulcrum around which the 
new wheel of democratic South Africa turns.38 Section 7(2) requires the state to: 
 
“respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”. 
 
Before the adoption of the Final Constitution, there was much debate as to whether socio-
economic rights should be included in the Bill of Rights. Writers like Haysom argued for the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution on the basis that having first generation 
rights, like the right to vote, without second generation rights, like the right to food, would 
provide a hollow constitutional democracy.39 Haysom pointed out that the recognition of the 
indivisibility and interdependence of socio-economic rights had already been recognised in 
                                                 
36  S 2 of the Constitution. 
37   S 2 states: 
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.” 
38  S 7(1) states: 
“The Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.” 
39  Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarianism Democracy and Socio-economic Rights” (1992) Vol 8 
SAJHR 451. 
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international law.40 There is recognition in international human rights law of the equal status 
of socio-economic rights with civil and political rights and the intimate linkages which exist 
between these two categories of rights.41 Nthai’s rationale for the inclusion of socio-
economic rights in a constitution was that the enforcement of first generation rights only gave 
an appearance of equality and justice, whilst impliedly socio-economic inequality were 
entrenched.42 Against the aforementioned viewpoints, Davis and others argued that the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution (which are not accepted worldwide as 
justiciable rights) would result in the inclusion of unenforceable rights in the Bill of Rights 
and would blur the separation of powers doctrine.43
 
The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution makes it clear that socio- 
economic rights are now justiciable.44 The Constitutional Court has on a number of occasions 
held socio-economic rights to be genuine and enforceable rights.45  The clear justiciability of 
socio-economic rights in the Constitution is further emphasised by there being no hierarchy 
of rights in the Bill of Rights: these second-generation rights stand side by side in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution with first-generation rights. Heyns and Brand argue that this structure of 
how rights are listed in the Bill of Rights illustrates the indivisibility and interdependence of 
first-, second- and third-generation rights.46 The earlier debate as to whether socio-economic 
                                                 
40  This recognition was to be found in the United Nations Centre for Human Rights’ Right to Adequate 
Food as a Human Right (1989) 50. Cited by Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarianism Democracy 
and Socio-economic Rights” 451. 
41  Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarianism Democracy and Socio-economic Rights” 451. 
42  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa.” 4. 
43  Davis “The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as 
Directive Principles” (1992) Vol 8 Part 4 SAJHR 475.  
44  Rautenbach; Jansen van Rensburg and Venter (eds) Politics, Socio-economic Issues and Culture in 
Constitutional Adjudication 64. These authors indicate that the rights to education, food, land, housing, 
health care, water, social security and welfare are all examples of socio-economic or second-generation 
rights. 
45  Pieterse “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” 384 cites the Ex Parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744, Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) 
BCLR 1169 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (1) and (2) 2002 (5) SA 703 
(CC) and 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) judgments as authority for the fact that socio-economic rights are now 
clearly justiciable. Yacoob sums up the clear status of socio-economic rights as justiciable in Grootboom 
by holding (at paragraph 20) that: 
“[w]hile the justiciability of socio-economic rights has been the subject of considerable 
jurisprudential and political debate, the issue of whether socio-economic rights are justiciable at all 
in South Africa has been put beyond question by the text of our Constitution as construed in the 
Certification judgment.”  
46  Heyns and Brand “Introduction to Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution” in Bekker 
(ed) A Compilation of Essential Documents on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Economic and 
Social Rights Series Vol 1 (June 1999) 2.  
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rights should be enforced by South Africa’s courts has therefore now been replaced with the 
pressing question of how such enforcement should occur. The question of how such 
enforcement should occur will thus be this writer’s focus, rather than reopening a debate 
which is essentially of historic interest only.  
 
Whilst not revisiting the old debate as to the justiciability of socio-economic rights, a 
consideration of some of the main arguments made in favour of their justiciability is relevant 
in so far as they may suggest ways of better realising socio-economic rights (in particular the 
right to food) today. Haysom correctly argues that a constitutional democracy needs both 
political/ civil rights and socio-economic rights.47 Taking this point further, it is submitted 
that the type of constitutional democracy Haysom advocates requires all categories of 
constitutionally protected rights to be accessible to the people and to make a tangible 
difference in their everyday lives. There is a need for all rights in the Constitution to have 
substance. If this is not the case then the constitutional democracy which was so hard-fought 
to achieve in South Africa provides little more than rhetoric. Therefore proposals to better 
realise socio-economic rights in South Africa need to focus on changing the lives of those 
who live in South Africa for the better. This argument accords with Haysom’s widely 
accepted view that: 
 
“for a constitution to have a meaningful place in the hearts and minds of the citizenry, it must 
address the pressing needs of ordinary people.”48  
 
Haysom penned these words in the pre-constitutional era when inclusion of socio-economic 
rights in a supreme constitution was his aim. Now that South Africa has a well established 
constitutional dispensation with clearly justiciable socio-economic rights, the challenge shifts 
towards translating rights into reality. Along similar lines, Haysom highlights the link 
between the realisation of socio-economic rights and realising core first generation rights like 
equality and dignity.49 In other words, without access to socio-economic rights like food and 
health care, the value of first generation rights like dignity and equality is questionable. 
                                                 
47  Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarianism Democracy and Socio-economic Rights” 452. Haysom also 
argues for a minimum core of rights to be provided for all citizens.  Haysom “Constitutionalism, 
Majoritarianism Democracy and Socio-economic Rights” 461. However, as will be seen later in this 
dissertation, a minimum core approach has not found favour with our courts. 
48  Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarianism Democracy and Socio-economic Rights” 452. In making 
this statement Haysom makes a telling comment that the people of a country and not its judiciary are the 
real guardians of its constitution. Ibid. 
49  Haysom “Constitutionalism, Majoritarianism Democracy and Socio-economic Rights” 460 to 461. 
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Taking this point even further, it is submitted that in the absence of such essential socio-
economic rights, the aforementioned first generation rights cannot be said to exist at all. The 
next Chapter looks in much more detail at the submitted interconnectedness of a whole series 
of constitutional rights with the right to food.        
 
It is submitted that the justiciability of socio-economic rights (which were not fundamentally 
protected rights before the 1996 Constitution) is a move towards the espoused transformative 
aims of the Constitution as contained in its Preamble.50 In interpreting both the Interim and 
Final Constitutions our courts have frequently interpreted the Constitution as an attempt to 
redress the gross injustices of the past.51  
 
The need for real and effective enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa, and 
not merely ineffective rights on paper, has been raised on a number of occasions. Nthai 
highlights the need to deal properly with poverty, need, deprivation and inequality. Nthai 
argues that the provision of first generation rights, like the right to vote, without core socio-
economic rights, like food, is to use first generation rights as a “smoke-screen” to hide the 
underlying forces which deprive people of their humanity.52 Olivier et al argue that it is 
counter-productive to try to achieve adequate social security for all in isolation from other 
types of Constitutional rights.53 Khoza adds to this by submitting that for those facing 
poverty, hunger and malnutrition, socio-economic rights remain a pipedream and simply 
aspirations.54 The need for effective provision of socio-economic rights, including food, 
rather than notional rights without any real substance, is a key thread running through the 
fabric of this research.  
 
                                                 
50  The transformative aims of the Constitution are reflected in the following parts of its Preamble: 
“We therefore, … adopt this Constitution… so as to- 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social 
justice and fundamental human rights;  
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; …” 
51  For example, Mahomed held in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) that: 
“The South African Constitution ... retains from the past only what is defensible and 
represents a break from … the past”. 
52  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa.” 41. 
53  Olivier; Smit and Kalula Social Security: A Legal Analysis v. 
54  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 664. 
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2.3 LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 
 
Notwithstanding the justiciability of socio-economic rights in the Constitution, these rights 
are not unlimited.  There are in-built limitations within certain sections of the Bill of Rights, 
as well as the general limitations clause in section 36 to consider. The internal limitations 
indicate that there is merely a right of access to these rights and that they are subject to 
progressive realisation within available resources.55 Engh argues that the issue of available 
resources requires an assessment of financial, human and physical resources available to the 
state.56 In terms of financial resource limitations, Olivier et al argue that a major problem 
with the South African social security system is that South Africa has a large population with 
a relatively small tax base, which results in limited tax income having to support many 
people.57  
 
Section 36(1) provides that: 
 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including –  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
All rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the general limitations in section 36. Applicable 
rights limitations in the Constitution are delineated in section 7(3) as read with section 
36(2).58  The internal limitations together with the general limitations clause lessen, to an 
extent, the obligations on the state in terms of the given rights. It is submitted that the extra 
limitations applicable to socio-economic rights recognise the substantial challenges facing the 
                                                 
55  These internal limitations are found in ss 26(2), relating to housing, and s 27 (2) relating to health care, 
food, water and social security. 
56  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 5. 
57  Olivier; Okpaluba; Smit and Thompson (eds) Social Security Law - General Principles 122. 
58  S 7(3) says: 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or 
elsewhere in the Bill.” 
S 36 (2) states: 
“Except as provided for in subsection (1) or in any other provisions of the Constitution, no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
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state in providing for such rights. The constitutional provisions applicable to the right to food, 
including the applicable limitations, will be analysed in the next Chapter. 
 
Now that the applicable limitations of socio-economic rights have been delineated, it is 
necessary to outline how these limitations operate as a whole. Our courts59 have adopted a 
two-stage approach to constitutional adjudication.60 Firstly, the applicant bears the initial 
onus of proving that an infringement of a fundamental right has occurred due to law or 
conduct of the respondent. Once the applicant has successfully completed the first stage, the 
onus moves onto the respondent (which is normally the state) to endeavour to justify the 
infringement by way of section 36.61 However, where a right is further limited by an internal 
limitation (as is the case in subsections 2 of both sections 26 and 27, relating to various types 
of socio-economic rights), an intermediary step is required after the completion of the first 
step before the second step is called for. In terms of these internal limitations the state must 
prove that it has made every attempt to meet these rights within the limits of its resources.  
 
2.4  THE AMBIT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that socio-economic rights, subject to specific 
legitimate limitations, are enforceable. The next logical step is to discuss the extent of the 
state’s duties in respect of rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution indicates the state’s obligations pertaining to all rights in the 
Bill of Rights. Section 7(2) requires the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil these 
rights. Each part of the state’s section 7(2) duties will now be discussed. This discussion will 
be based primarily on the South African Human Rights Commission’s (SAHRC) 
interpretation of these obligations.62 This brief analysis will focus on generic socio-economic 
obligations of the state in terms of section 7(2). The next Chapter will focus specifically on 
the state’s obligations vis- a-vis the right to food.   
                                                 
59  For example, Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
60  There is also much academic authority for this two-stage approach. See, for example, Currie & De Waal 
The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 5th ed 165 to 168. 
61  Pieterse “Towards a Useful Role for Section 36 of the Constitution in Social Rights Cases? Residents of 
Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council” (2003) Vol 120 Part 1 SALJ 42.   
62  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food  Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 1 to 6. See also the SAHRC (2003) 5th Economic and Social Rights 
Protocols.  Accessed at www.sahrc.org.za/protocols on 10 February 2006. 
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 The state’s duty to respect a right is a negative duty.63 What is meant by a negative duty is 
that the state is obliged to prevent the denial of the right in question. The state would not be 
respecting the right to water, for example, if it cut off water supply to a household.  A 
positive duty, on the other hand, requires active state intervention. 
 
Protection, although essentially also imposing negative duties, requires limited positive steps 
in that the state must prevent individuals or organisations from denying the rights of others.64 
For example, the state must protect individuals from being unlawfully evicted.  
 
It could be argued that in the pre-constitutional era there was no clear obligation on the state 
to do anything more than respect and protect socio-economic rights. However, the shift in 
South Africa towards clear justiciability of socio-economic rights, together with the 
additional directives in section 7(2) of the Constitution to promote and fulfil all rights in the 
Bill of Rights, means that socio-economic rights now require far more than mere respect and 
protection for the rights to be realised.    
   
The SAHRC has indicated that the promotion of a right includes widespread education of 
what the right entails.65 There is a clear need for education on the ambit of all rights, because 
there can be no meaningful enjoyment of any rights without knowledge of their existence and 
understanding of their implementation. In addition, the Commission calls for state monitoring 
of the effectiveness of the state’s ability to progressively realise the right.66 This last point 
will be taken much further later in this research, when repeated calls will be made for the 
conversion of theoretical rights into actual service delivery.   
 
Fulfilling a right requires active government programmes and initiatives to ensure provision 
of rights. In its 4th Economic and Social Rights Report, the SAHRC indicates that the state 
                                                 
63  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food  Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 6. 
64  Ibid. 
65  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food  Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 2 and 6. 
66  Ibid. 
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must urgently step in to fill the need in desperate situations.67 The words of Yacoob J in the 
Grootboom case support this view by saying: 
 
“The state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme 
conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing.”68
 
The Treatment Action Campaign case mirrors this idea by holding that the state must take 
sound steps progressively to eradicate or lessen the widespread severe lack of resources 
which is an everyday reality for many people in South Africa.69 Vulnerable groups like 
children, those with disabilities and the elderly are likely to be in most need of active state 
assistance in such emergency situations. 
 
The fulfilment of socio-economic rights is subject to the internal limitations on such rights, 
discussed above. However, notwithstanding the caveats of progressive realisation and 
resource limitations, Liebenberg argues that this does not limit the state’s obligations.70 This 
is understood to mean that the state must fulfil constitutionally protected socio-economic 
rights, but the extent to which it is able to do so may be limited by resource constraints. The 
state has the onus of proving that it has made every attempt realise these rights within the 
resources it has available. Liebenberg argues further that a country’s available resources 
should be understood as its “real resources” and not the budgetary allocations of 
government.71 Liebenberg’s conception of available resources as real resources is a sensible 
one, as it prevents states from avoiding their constitutional duties under the guise of a lack of 
resources when in fact their budgetary allocation may be totally unreasonable.  
 
From the aforementioned discussion of state responsibility in respect of socio-economic 
rights, it would appear that Engh is correct to argue that South Africa’s highly progressive 
Constitution is a positive indicator of its capacity to realise social and economic rights.72
                                                 
67  The South African Human Rights Commission, The Right to have Access to Sufficient Food, in 4th 
Economic and Social Rights Report 2001/2002 (2003) 7. 
68  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) [Paragraph 24]. 
The link between this dictum and the right to food will be considered later in this research. 
69  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) [para 99]. The link 
between this dictum and the right to food will be considered later in this research. 
70  Liebenberg “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications 
for South Africa” (1995) 11 SAJHR 366. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 3. 
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2.5  CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 
 
Section 172 of the Constitution indicates the powers of courts with constitutional 
jurisdiction.73 This section should be read together with sections 167, 168 and 169 of the 
Constitution which give the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court (CC), Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) and High Courts respectively, and the rules of each of these courts. 
 
The Constitutional Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Courts and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in most constitutional matters.74 However, in terms of section 172(2)(a), an 
order of constitutional invalidity by the SCA or High Court must be confirmed by the CC. 
 
In the ordinary course of events, a constitutional challenge will first be brought to the High 
Court with jurisdiction over the matter. However, rule 18 of the Constitutional Court Rules75 
and section 167(6)(a) of the Constitution allow applicants to seek relief directly from the 
Constitutional Court in restricted circumstances. Currie and De Waal point out that the 
Court’s rules allow for direct access to the CC in the interests of justice in matters where the 
court has concurrent jurisdiction and the case is sufficiently urgent or important to the 
public.76   
                                                 
73   S 172: 
 (1) “When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court –  
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including –  
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to 
allow the competent authority to correct the defect.” 
(2) (a)  The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may make an order 
concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct 
of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court. 
(b) A court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary interdict or 
other temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the proceedings, pending a decision of the 
Constitutional Court on the validity of that Act or conduct. 
(c)  National legislation must provide for referral of an order of constitutional invalidity to the 
Constitutional Court. 
(d)  Any person or organ of state with a sufficient interest may appeal, or apply, directly to the 
Constitutional Court to confirm or vary an order of constitutional invalidity by a court in 
terms of this subsection.” 
74  Hopkins and Franca “In Which Forum to Litigate?” (September 2004) De Rebus 31. 
75  GN R1675, published in Government Gazette 25726/21-10-2002. 
76  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 132. 
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 In terms of section 172(1), there are basically two categories of constitutional orders which 
any of the three courts can make. Firstly, any unconstitutional law or conduct may be 
declared invalid in so far as the unconstitutionality goes.77 This duty to strike down offending 
legislation and to allow the legislature to amend or repeal the law in question has been held to 
be the primary duty of courts with constitutional jurisdiction.78  In making such invalidity 
orders it is clear that the court in question is performing a judicial rather than political 
function.79 Plasket astutely comments that the constitutional provisions providing for 
constitutional supremacy depend on the independence and impartiality of the courts required 
by section 165.80   This extensive power of judicial review is essentially what distinguishes 
our current system of constitutional supremacy from the prior system of parliamentary 
supremacy.81  
 
An example of the use of the first-mentioned category of power is the Constitutional Court’s 
declaration of certain parts of the Criminal Procedure Act 55 of 1977 unconstitutional in 
denying various constitutional rights, including the right to life, in S v Makwanyane.82 A 
declaration of unconstitutional invalidity is easy to understand and does not warrant further 
discussion.   
 
Secondly, there is a broad power for a court with constitutional jurisdiction to make any order 
that is just and fair or equitable.83 It is not surprising that the very broad and unspecific power 
to make just and equitable orders has been harder for our courts to interpret. Section 38 of the 
Constitution, which allows courts to grant “appropriate relief” for a threat to or actual 
infringement of a fundamental right, is equally lacking in clarity. Justice Ackermann in Fose 
v Minister of Safety and Security, elucidates this judicial power as follows: 
 
                                                 
77  This is directly stated in s. 172(1)(a). In addition, this constitutional power of these superior courts is 
implied by the supremacy of the constitution provided for in ss 1(c), 2, 7(2) and 8(1). Plasket “Enforcing 
Judgments Against the State” (2003) Speculum Juris 4.  
78  Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1996 (4) SA 965 (Nm SC) at 974 D to F. 
79  S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC). 
80  Plasket “Enforcing Judgments Against the State” 4. 
81  For more on this fundamental change to our legal system see Plasket “Enforcing Judgments Against the 
State” 3 to 4. 
82  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). Section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which authorised 
the death penalty for certain offences, was held to be unconstitutional.  
83  S 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
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“Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the 
Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a 
declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure 
that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced.” 84
 
However, despite this finding in Fose and the whole line of Constitutional Court decisions 
recognising the clear justiciability of socio-economic rights, there remains a lack of effective 
judgments to give real meaning to the concept of “appropriate relief”.85 Trengrove submits 
that appropriate relief within the context of socio-economic rights would include an order 
directing the legislature and executive to bring about modification defined in terms of their 
aims and then to retain a supervisory jurisdiction to supervise the implementation of those 
changes.86 The final Chapter of this dissertation will consider these and other proposed 
judicial remedies. 
 
Whilst the courts need to come up with effective remedies to effectively realise socio-
economic rights, the danger of ignoring the separation of powers doctrine remains ever 
present.  In warning against the blurring of the separation of powers, it was held in Minister 
of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1) that: 
  
“Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple social 
and economic consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a 
restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to meet 
its constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. 
Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in 
themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive 
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.”87
 
Pieterse could be said to be impliedly critical of this part of the TAC judgment, when he 
argues for more creative court remedies concerning the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights. He argues that the Constitution requires a reconception of the separation of powers 
doctrine wherein the judiciary must play a more pro-active role and that it is possible to 
                                                 
84  1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
85  Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: Constitutional Law (2001) Vol 1 
399. Earlier in this Chapter it was indicated that Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In 
Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744, Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) and Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC) and 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) are all authority for the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights. 
86  Trengrove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights” (1999) 1 (4) ESR Review 8 at 9.  
87  2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) Para. 38. 
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maintain a balance between judicial vigilance and deference in socio-economic rights 
adjudication.88 This submission of Pieterse is in accordance with Scott and Alston’s 
argument that the adjudication of constitutional rights involves a choice as to the extent and 
type of the involvement of a court.89 More creative judicial remedies are also called for by 
Beutz90 who argues that to legitimise the use of state power in a democracy, 
constitutionalism must not only distinguish the extent of state power, but also create ways of 
ensuring that those who exercise the power are held accountable.91 All the submissions cited 
in this paragraph are calling for a greater and more creative role of our courts to better realise 
socio-economic rights. In later Chapters of this dissertation, arguments will be made for such 
robust adjudication of the right to food.    
 
2.6  LOCUS STANDI AND ACCESS TO COURT 
 
In terms of section 34 of the Constitution, everyone has the right of access to court. In Chief 
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank Justice Mokgoro described access to justice as: 
  
“foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and 
institutionalized mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting to self-help. The right of 
access to court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy which it 
causes”.92  
 
Applying section 34 to socio-economic rights, it is clear that litigants have the right to 
approach the appropriate court to enforce a socio-economic right which has been allegedly 
breached.93
 
It is submitted that access to court is intrinsically linked with locus standi, the power to bring 
a matter to court. Limitations as to who has locus standi to bring an action for an alleged 
breach of a constitutional right could serve as an indirect limitation of such a right. However, 
                                                 
88  Pieterse “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” 383. 
89  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) Vol 16 Part 2 SAJHR 216. 
90  Beutz “Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability” (2003) 44 Harvard 
International Law Journal 387. Cited in Pieterse “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socio-
economic Rights” 385. 
91  Beutz’s call for greater state accountability also has the potential to be improved by the workings of the 
South African Human Rights Commission, which is discussed in Chapter 6. 
92  2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) para 22.  
93  The constitutional jurisdiction of various South African courts will be discussed in a later Chapter.  
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it is submitted that section 38 of the Constitution casts the locus standi net very wide as to 
who may bring a matter to court. 
 
In terms of section 38 persons who may approach a court alleging an infringement of a right 
in the Bill of Rights are the following: 
 
“(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
  (b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
  (c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
  (d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
  (e) an association acting in the interest of its members.” 
 
Scott and Alston argue that the broad locus standi provisions of section 38 accord with the 
interrelatedness of all types of human rights.94 The inclusion of a wide locus standi provision 
makes a great deal of sense as it would be pointless to provide rights without allowing all 
affected parties to protect those rights. It is therefore submitted that this wide locus standi 
provision is a significant tool for the enforcement of socio-economic rights. As illustrated by 
leading socio-economic rights cases to be discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, class 
actions and public interest interest litigation, for example, are key tools for the meaningful 
justiciability of these rights. Furthermore, as will also become apparent from those case 
discussions, enforcement of judgments is an equally essential part of access to courts and a 
just society. It has been held that access to court would be an illusion without adequate 
enforcement of judgments. 95   
  
An aspect of socio-economic rights enforceability which can still be discussed a great deal 
further is the aforementioned possible blurring of the doctrine of separation of powers 
through socio-economic rights justiciablity. When courts in enforcing socio-economic rights 
essentially step into the shoes of what should ordinarily be a function of the executive 
(through judgments which have the effect of deciding how state money should be spent) it 
can be argued that the courts have overstepped their allocated powers. The criticism of such 
judicial involvement is that judges, unlike the legislative and indirectly the executive, are 
appointed not elected. In addition to judges not being elected, it has correctly been said that 
                                                 
94  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 214. This issue of interrelated rights will be 
elaborated upon in the next Chapter. 
95  Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (4) SA 446 (Tk) 453C. 
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they are not best qualified to make such policy-making decisions.96 Fabre argues that such a 
situation, where unelected judges make policy decisions, can severely erode democracy.97 
However, quite to the contrary, in the course of this research it will be argued that whilst 
courts need to take cognizance of their designated judicial role, the enforcement of socio-
economic rights by the courts is not only permissible but absolutely necessary to give real 
meaning to these rights in the Bill of Rights. Along the same lines as this submission, 
Pieterse argues that the Constitution requires a reconception of the separation of powers 
doctrine and the role of judiciary therein.98 The Constitution in making socio-economic rights 
justiciable clearly moved the boundaries of the separation of powers doctrine. To give real 
meaning and effectiveness to socio-economic rights in the lives of people requires judicial 
enforcement of these rights, which implicitly requires the judiciary to make policy decisions 
to some degree.99 The Certification judgment provides authority for our courts to sometimes 
move beyond their traditional confines in terms of the separation of powers doctrine to decide 
issues traditionally within the realm of other government branches.100
 
 
                                                 
96  Fabre Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life (2000) 2. 
97  Fabre Social Rights under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life 146. 
98  Pieterse “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” 384. Pieterse submits 
that our courts must give meaning to socio-economic rights through their interpretation thereof, their 
evaluation of government compliance with their decisions, adjudicate the validity of government 
legislation and policy and remedy any state non-compliance. 
99  See the discussion later in this thesis of various cases where our superior courts have taken just such a 
proactive approach; perhaps the locus classicus in this regard is Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC).     
100  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 78. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
 
The previous Chapter has shown that socio-economic rights are justiciable. This Chapter 
analyses what the constitutional right to food entails in South Africa. The right to food for 
particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, will also be considered. A brief analysis of 
the right to socio-economic rights in international law, focusing on the right to food, will also 
be made. As state provision of food and adequate nutrition is an administrative action, an 
analysis of the right to just administrative action will also be explored in a later Chapter. In 
this Chapter only brief reference will be made to court interpretations of the right to social 
and economic rights, as a detailed analysis of key judgments in the area will follow in 
Chapter 6.    
 
3.2  DIRECT PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 
There are three direct references to food and nutrition in the Bill of Rights. Firstly, section 
27(1)(b), the right to sufficient food, is listed as part of the state’s socio-economic 
obligations. Secondly, section 28(1)(c), dealing with various rights of children, provides for 
basic nutrition for all children. Finally, dealing with the rights of people in prison, section 
35(2)(e) guarantees them the right to adequate nutrition too.101  The right to food in terms of 
sections 27 and 28 will be discussed in turn.  
 
3.2.1 SECTION 27(1)(B)- THE RIGHT TO SUFFICIENT FOOD 
 
The constitutional right to food is found in section 27 of the Constitution.102 The relevant 
parts of section 27 declare: 
                                                 
101  It was indicated in the introductory Chapter that prisoners’ right to nutrition falls beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
102  The SAHRC designed its 5th Sufficient Food Protocol based on s 27(1)(b). This was sent to the 
Department of Agriculture for their response. The Right to Food in The South African Human Rights 
Commission Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) Footnote 1. 
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 “27(1) Everyone has the right to have access to - 
(b) sufficient food and water; … 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights.” 
 
Sections 27(1)(b) and 27(2) read with section 7(2) of the Constitution clearly indicate that the 
state must ensure, within its available resources, that everyone has sufficient food.103  Khoza 
correctly notes that the measures envisaged by section 27(2) include the development and 
implementation of policies and programmes, as well as enacting legislation.104  The South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) put forward what it perceives to be the 
meanings of each aspect of the state’s duty in terms of section 27(1)(b) in light of the 
directives in section 7(2) to respect, protect, promote and fulfil rights.105 In the previous 
Chapter the parameters of the state’s section 7(2) obligations in relation to generic socio-
economic obligations in the Bill of Rights were explored. Each part of the state’s section 
27(1)(b) duties will now be discussed.  
 
The duty to respect the right to food is a negative duty whereby the state should not itself 
deny anyone access to food or limit equal access to the right to food.106 The fair allocation of 
fishing quotas is an example of the state’s obligation to respect the right.107 An example of a 
state not respecting the right to food through intentional state action to worsen existing access 
to food is the African Human Commission case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre 
(SERAC) and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria.108 In this case the state 
was held duty-bound to not interfere with access to food. The case arose out of Nigerian 
military personnel destroying crops and livestock in certain villages as part of a political 
                                                 
103  S 7(2) of the Constitution provides that: 
“The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.” 
104  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 665. 
105  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food  Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 1 to 6. See also the SAHRC (2003) 5th Economic and Social Rights 
Protocols.  www.sahrc.org.za/protocols (accessed on 10 February 2006. 
106  By way of comparison, Currie and De Waal indicate that negative protection is the usual form of judicial 
protection given to civil and political rights, meaning that the courts can prevent the State denying these 
rights to those in the country. Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 567. 
107  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food  Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 6. Brand notes that in apartheid South Africa the state failed to respect 
the right to food through effectively prohibiting subsistence fishing.  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand 
and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 168. 
108  Communication 155/96. 
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strategy to quash political opposition.109 Kallman notes how the duty to respect the right to 
food was denied in apartheid South Africa through forced removals of people away from 
agriculturally productive land to land unsuitable for agriculture.110 The state’s duty to respect 
the right to food dovetails with the obligation on individuals to feed themselves, in so far as 
they are able, by buying or producing food from the land. Kallman notes that the duty to feed 
yourself and your family is a primary duty.111 When considering the state’s obligations in 
terms of the right to food, it is important to remember this primary duty of individuals. 
However, it is submitted that this duty on individuals is only applicable to those capable of 
feeding themselves and their dependants. Someone who is able to provide himself and his 
family with sufficient food will not be able to escape their own responsibility and shift this 
task onto the state.  However, it is possible for the state to fail indirectly to respect the right to 
food through making it virtually impossible for people to produce adequate food- as in the 
above example of forced removals in apartheid South Africa.  
 
Brand correctly notes that despite the duty to respect the right to food, it is possible for the 
right to be interfered with for the sake of a significant public purpose.112 For example, a 
person’s ability to produce crops is significantly eroded if they are evicted from the land they 
occupy. The state would have to be to show a clear link between the proposed eviction and 
the meeting of a considerable public purpose. Brand argues that in such a scenario the state is 
duty-bound to mitigate the impact of such interferences on the affected people, for example 
through the implementation of laws which require courts to consider the availability of 
alternative land before granting an eviction.113
 
Mashava v The President of the Republic of South Africa is authority for saying that the state 
fails to respect the right to food if through its own actions it effectively prevents people 
accessing food or improving their access thereto.114 In this case the Constitutional Court 
decided that a proclamation by the State President that social grants would be administered at 
                                                 
109  Supra. 
110  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food (December 2004) 6. 
111  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 5. 
112  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 168. 
113  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 169. This 
issue will be revisited in Chap 7 when suggestions are made as to how to uphold the right to food through 
land reform in terms of ESTA and PIE.  
114  2004 (12) BCLR 1243 (CC). 
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a provincial level was unconstitutional in failing to respect the right to food.115 Albeit an 
obiter finding (as the decision was reached on a technical basis related to powers granted 
under the Interim Constitution), Brand notes that the Mashava decision requires the state to 
respect the right to food by removing obstacles to the right being properly met, for example 
through the removal of administrative inefficiency.116 The link between the need for just 
administrative action as a means of achieving the right to food will be explored in more detail 
in the next Chapter. 
 
Protection, although basically also imposing negative duties, requires some positive steps in 
that the state must prevent individuals or organisations from denying the food rights of 
others. For example, the state would be failing to protect the right to food if it allowed a 
business to pollute a river which was the only source of water for an individual or community 
to produce crops.117
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food correctly notes that section 8(2) of the 
South African Constitution118 ensures that the Bill of Rights applies horizontally: 
 
“which means that a transnational corporation (or domestic business) could be held liable for 
violation of the right to food”.119
 
The right to food obligations on the private sector apply largely to food manufacturers and 
traders who must not collude or engage in unfair business practices which cause unfairly high 
prices.120 Private manufacturers in South Africa have also fairly recently been forced to 
fortify certain basic types of foods.121 Brand argues that protection of the right to food 
requires effective state regulation of the food market to guarantee that basic food 
                                                 
115  Mashava, who qualified for a disability grant, had an unacceptably long delay in having his grant 
application processed by the Limpopo Provincial government. Supra. Para 9. 
116  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 169. 
117  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 6. 
118  S 8 (2) says: 
“A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed by the 
right.” 
119  UN General Assembly, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 5 August 2003, para 39. Cited in The 
Right to Food. South African Human Rights Commission.  Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) Footnote 4. 
120  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 7 - 8. 
121  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 171. 
 26
commodities are affordable for the poor.122 It is submitted that price fixing of food products 
which amounts to uncompetitive practice would be the sort of unacceptable behaviour that 
the state is duty-bound to prevent. The private sector is also duty-bound not to produce 
dangerous food-stuffs.123 There is an obvious link between the negative duties placed on non-
state entities in relation to the right to food, and the state’s obligations to ensure that the 
private sector complies with these duties. The state must therefore counter fraud, unethical 
trade behaviour and contractual relations and stop dangerous food entering the market.124  
 
The state must also protect against localised violations of the right to food, such as the actions 
of farmers who deny workers and tenants on their farms rightful access to grazing and land 
for crops, or deny food and water as a way of strategically evicting such people.125 Such 
behaviour by farmers can cause a sequence of negative social consequences for the affected 
workers or tenants and hence demands urgent state protection. For example, farm workers 
who leave farms under such circumstances could, as a result, face a lack of housing and other 
service provision. In Chapter 7, where concluding comments and suggestions are made, the 
interpretation of existing land tenure legislation, in particular the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 
will be considered as a way to protect the right to food.  
 
The SAHRC has indicated that the state’s duty to promote the right to food includes 
widespread education on the ambit of the right to food.126 The Commission also calls for 
state monitoring of whether the state is progressively realising the right to food.127 It is 
submitted that, while monitoring of progressive realisation of the right to food is both 
advisable and necessary, such monitoring should be done by a qualified non-state 
organisation. The rationale for this proposal is quite simply that an outside body is far more 
                                                 
122  Brand The Rights to Food and Nutrition in the South African Constitution (July 2000). Quoted in The 
South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 2. 
123  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 8. 
124  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 6. 
125  South African Human Rights Commission, Final Report on the Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in 
Farming Communities, August 2003. Cited in The South African Human Rights Commission The Right 
to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 7. 
126  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 7.   
127  Ibid.   
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likely to provide an impartial assessment of state performance than the state assessing itself. 
In addition, such non-state assessment would be more credible in terms of the appearance of 
impartiality.   
  
Fulfilling the right to food requires active government feeding programmes and initiatives to 
ensure that peoples’ nutritional needs are met. The SAHRC’s 4th Economic and Social Rights 
Report says that urgent state intervention is required in severe situations.128 It is submitted 
that, in relation to food crises, times of drought, flooding, famine and other natural or man-
made disasters which limit the availability of adequate food are the types of emergencies 
where urgent state assistance is called for. Kallman argues that the state’s duty to fulfil the 
right to food includes the creation of agricultural support programmes to ensure that people 
who are able to feed themselves can carry on doing so. He further submits that proper 
agricultural production and trade policies are required to ensure the continued availability of 
food.129 On the basis of international law authority, Brand indicates that fulfilment of the 
right to food requires the state to come up with multi-faceted measures (including legislation, 
administrative and judicial responses) to ensure that any current denial of access to food can 
be remedied and shortcomings lessened.130     
 
The ambit of what the state is required to do in relation to the fulfilment of socio-economic 
rights has been judicially considered in relation to access to adequate housing, health care and 
social assistance.  131 The ratio decidendi of each of these decisions will be applied to the right 
to food in Chapter 6 of this dissertation to indicate the ambit of the state’s likely fulfilment 
obligations in relation to the right to food.   
 
It will be submitted that state assistance in times of food shortages could take the form of 
feeding schemes or adequate social assistance grants which would allow the affected parties 
to buy food.132  In relation to both these mechanisms, in terms of the Constitution, the state 
                                                 
128  The South African Human Rights Commission, The Right to have Access to Sufficient Food, in 4th 
Economic and Social Rights Report 2001/2002 (2003) 7. 
129  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 7. 
130  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 178: Citing 
Committee on ESCR- General Comment No 14. 
131  The judgments in question are Soobramoney, Grootboom, TAC and Khosa. 
132  Chapter 5 will discuss the current South African implementation programmes in place to meet the right 
to food and nutrition. 
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must progressively realise the right to food and social security (which in this context would 
take the form of social assistance): 
 
“within its available resources.”133
 
The state must prove that it has made every attempt to meet these rights within the limits of 
its resources. Liebenberg’s submission that a country’s available resources should be 
understood as its “real resources” and not the budgetary allocations of government, has 
already been noted in the previous Chapter.134 It was also argued in the last Chapter that this 
interpretation of available resources as real resources is correct, as a narrow interpretation 
would unacceptably allow the state to avoid its constitutional obligations without adequate 
cause.  
 
Mubangizi correctly argues that sufficiency and accessibility are the two core components of 
the right to food.135 In relation to sufficiency, the food must be culturally sensitive, 
nutritionally sufficient in terms of quantity and quality and safe for consumption.136 
Examples of culturally sensitive food are Kosher food for Jewish people and Halaal food for 
Islamic people: the provision of food not meeting these requirements for these groups cannot 
be considered to meet their needs. Food of a nutritiously adequate quality and quantity will 
clearly meet the nutritional requirements of a person to operate at their optimum physically 
and mentally. Practical examples of unsafe food are food-stuffs containing poisons and food 
that has become rotten because of a lack of refrigeration.137
 
In relation to accessibility, once all the sufficiency requirements have been met, that food 
must be both available and affordable.138 Kallman argues that there is a requirement of 
physical accessibility to food; which means that food must at all times be within reach of 
people.139 For example, there is no physical accessibility if a food source cannot be accessed 
by people due to a lack of transport to get to the food source. Mubangizi’s research indicates 
                                                 
133  S 27(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
134  Liebenberg “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its Implications 
for South Africa” 366. 
135  Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide (2004) 137. 
136  Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 499.  
137  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 4. 
138  Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 137. 
139  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 5. 
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that there is sufficient food of a satisfactory quality in South Africa to adequately feed all 
living here, but unaffordability means that the right to food is denied to many. Mubangizi 
therefore argues for state price regulation to ensure affordability.140 Vidar puts forward a 
contrasting view that there are numerous instruments in place to ensure the realisation of the 
right to food without interfering in the free market, market liberalisation and principles of 
efficiency.141  
 
It is worth noting that there was no equivalent right to adequate food for people over 18 under 
the Interim Constitution.142 The reason for pointing out the change in the final Constitution is 
to highlight the legislature’s clear realisation of the importance of ensuring that all people in 
South Africa have access to their basic food requirements. 
 
On the basis of this discussion of section 27(1)(b), it would appear as if the right to food is 
realised when everyone has physical or economic access to sufficient food at all times.143 
Other aspects of the right to food will be considered in Chapter 6 when key constitutional 
judgments on other socio-economic rights will be considered. The rationale of these decisions 
has a clear bearing on how the right to food should be interpreted.  
 
3.2.2 SECTION 28(1)(C)- CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO BASIC NUTRITION 
 
Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution says that:  
 
“Every child has the right-  
to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;” (own emphasis 
added).” 144
 
Virtually all aspects of the right to food in section 27(1)(b), as discussed above, apply mutatis 
mutandis to children’s nutritional rights. But the existence of special protection for children 
in section 28(1)(c) also requires analysis.145 In other words, children have all the right to food 
                                                 
140  Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 137. 
141  However, Vidar fails to elaborate what instruments he has in mind. Vidar “Towards Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Right to Food” ESR Review Vol 5 No 1 (2004) 14. 
142  Cockrell “The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (1999) 3E-15. 
143  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 4. 
144  Other parts of s 28(1) provide for other specific rights accorded to children. 
145  The South African Human Rights Commission’s 5th Basic Nutrition Protocol, based on s 28 (1)(c), was 
sent to the National Department of Health and provincial Departments of Health. The Right to Food in 
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rights of adults plus additional measures applicable to them only. Kallman puts forward a 
sensible argument that the inability of children to feed themselves is what warrants the extra 
Constitutional protection for these vulnerable groups, over and above the general right to 
food in section 27.146 The special social security protection provided to children in the 
Constitution is called for when one considers that research has shown that approximately two 
thirds of South African children continue to live in poverty.147 I deal with the link between 
the right to food, social assistance and social grants later in this Chapter. In relation to these 
interconnected rights, it is sufficient to note at this point that the provision of adequate social 
security, such as social assistance grants, can allow for adequate feeding of children.  
 
Cockrell notes that the duty imposed on the state by section 28(1), to provide for the needs of 
children, is controversial in so far as it is questionable whether the courts are best equipped to 
allocate scarce economic resources.148 Parallel to the duty imposed by section 28(1) is the 
primary parental duty of care as contained in common law and reinforced by the Child Care 
Act.149  
 
Cockrell notes two further aspects of section 28(1) which are worth considering.150 Firstly, 
the use of the word “basic” in the section indicates that the state’s obligation would seem to 
provide for the needs of children in extreme situations. Secondly, whilst other 
constitutionally protected socio-economic rights applicable to all age groups provide for mere 
“access” to the listed rights, there is no such caveat to the rights of children in 28(1). It is 
possible that section 28(1) differs from other socio-economic rights provisions in the 
Constitution because a child’s vulnerability means that certain rights must be provided to him 
or her and that mere access thereto will not suffice. However, as will be seen from the case 
discussion of Grootboom later in this dissertation, this last point is contentious.151
 
                                                                                                                                                        
The South African Human Rights Commission Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report Series, 
2002/2003 (2004) Footnote 1. 
146  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 4. 
147  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 
(2004) 6. 
148  Cockrell “The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights” (1999) 3E-15. In Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (2004).   
149  In particular, s 50(2) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983. 
150  Cockrell “The Law of Persons and the Bill of Rights” (1999) 3E-15. 
151  Grootboom supra. 
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In addition to section 28(1) requiring more than mere access to the given rights for children, 
there are also no internal limitations on these rights. This differs from the rights to housing in 
section 26 and various other socio-economic rights in section 27 which are resource 
dependent and subject to progressive realisation. It is submitted that the lack of any internal 
limitation to section 28 provides the state with an increased obligation to ensure that all 
children benefit from the listed rights, including food. As children are not required (and 
subject to very limited exceptions, should not be permitted) to work, they find themselves in 
a vulnerable position in relation to feeding themselves. This provides a likely justification for 
the lack of internal limitation to the rights of children (including the right to basic nutrition) 
in section 28. Brand argues that it will be harder for the state to justify not meeting children’s 
nutritional needs (under section 28) than the right of everyone to food in section 27.152 Unless 
somehow saved by the general limitations clause in section 36, and it is very hard to envisage 
a reasonable and justifiable law of general application legitimately limiting a child’s right to 
basic nutrition, the state is bound to ensure immediately that all children in South Africa are 
receiving adequate nutrition.  
 
3.3  RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  
 
Govindjee correctly argues that various constitutional rights are intrinsically interconnected 
with one another.153 In the last Chapter the link between the realisation of first generation and 
second generation rights was briefly discussed.  It is submitted that the right to food clearly 
affects and is affected by other Constitutional rights.154 Brand astutely comments that the 
right to food is in a way “embedded” in related rights.155 The denial of an interrelated right 
may therefore result in a denial of the right to food and vice versa. Thus an examination of 
provisions in the Constitution which entrench the right to sufficient food must include both 
the direct provisions in sections 27 and 28 and these interconnected and supporting rights.  
 
It is submitted that the main interconnected and supporting constitutional rights to the right to 
food are the rights to life, equality, dignity, property, social security (including social 
                                                 
152  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 163. 
153  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 2.  
154  Later in this Chapter in the discussion of international law the interconnectedness of the right to food 
with other rights will be stressed again. 
155  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 164. 
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assistance), water, health care and education.156 Protection of each of these core rights assists 
in protecting other related rights. Each one of these rights will be briefly discussed in so far 
as they impact upon the right to sufficient food. The relevance of discussing connected rights 
is supported by Vidar’s suggestion that access to food depends on land rights, the production 
of food, income security and proper education, whilst good nutrition is reliant upon access to 
good health care, sanitation and safe water.157 Vidar also submits that enjoyment of the right 
to food depends on a number of factors and requires various institutions to be working 
properly. Food production, distribution, pricing and consumer knowledge all have a role to 
play: a weakness anywhere along the line may negatively affect one’s right to food.158 Khoza 
writes that the right to food is a precondition for the enjoyment of all other rights.159 
Violating the right to food amounts to the denial of various other rights.  
 
The analysis of interconnected rights will begin with the rights to dignity, life and equality 
because these rights have been identified in the Constitution160 itself and case law161 as core 
constitutional rights. These rights reflect the key values of the Constitution and guide the 
judiciary’s adjudication of all constitutional matters. It is therefore not surprising that strong 
arguments can be made that when people are denied access to adequate food they are denied 
their rights to dignity, life and equality. The judgments of Grootboom162 and Khosa163 
recognise that a society built upon the principles of dignity, equality and freedom works 
towards ensuring that the basic necessities of life are provided to everyone. It is submitted 
that the provision of basic necessities must include adequate food, one of the most 
fundamental of human needs. 
 
                                                 
156  The relevant interconnected sections are found in the following sections of the Constitution: The right to 
dignity: s 10; life: s 11; equality: s 9; social security including social assistance: s 27 (1)(c) water:  
s 27(1)(b); health care: s 27(1)(a) and education: s 29. 
157  Vidar “Towards Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food” 13. 
158  Ibid. 
159  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 666. 
160  S 7(1) of the Constitution lists dignity and equality (together with freedom) as cornerstone rights in the 
Bill of Rights. 
161  See the discussion later in this Chapter of the recognition in S v Makwanyane of life and dignity as the 
most important fundamental rights as well as the sources of all other rights in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution. S v Makwanyane Para. 144. A similar sentiment is expressed in Grootboom para 44 and 
Khosa 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) para 52.  
162  Grootboom para 44. 
163  Khosa para 52. 
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3.3.1  THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY 
 
Arthur Chaskalson, then President of the Constitutional Court, described the right to dignity 
as a founding constitutional value which must enlighten all facets of our legal system.164 
Similarly, it was held in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Salabi 
and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Thomas and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others that: 
 
“dignity … informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels.  It is a 
value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights.” 165  
 
The aforementioned interpretations of the ambit of the right to dignity highlight its intrinsic 
linkage with many, if not all, other rights. In the same Dawood judgment, Justice Chaskalson 
points out that socio-economic rights are rooted in a respect for human dignity because a lack 
of basic necessities like food, health care and others will invariably mean that a person 
deprived of such basic needs is denied a dignified existence.166   
 
The interconnectedness of the right to dignity with the right to food is, it is submitted, clear. 
Someone who does not have adequate food to meet their basic human needs is being denied 
their right to dignity. For example, Kallman points out that someone without food is subject 
to the indignity of having to beg for food or to be dependent on others.167 The Constitutional 
Court was quick to point out in the Dawood case that in terms of section 10 of the 
Constitution, human dignity is a valid, enforceable and justiciable right (own emphasis 
added) not simply an intangible value.168 Cheadle indicates that the Constitution recognises 
the absolute need to secure nutritional welfare which is required for a dignified existence.169
 
It is thus submitted that the existence of the constitutional right to dignity provides indirect 
constitutional backing for the right to food. 
                                                 
164  Chaskalson “The Third Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our 
Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 SAJHR 193 195. 
165  Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, Salabi and Another v Minister of Home   
Affairs and Others, Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 
2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) para 35. 
166  Supra. 
167  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 2. 
168  Supra. 
169  Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 498. 
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3.3.2  THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
 
The link between the right to life and the right to food is less documented jurisprudentially. 
However, Dobbert finds the link self-evident when he asserts that: 
 
“To claim the right to food as a natural right, inseparably connected with the right to life, seems 
self-evident. And since physical survival of man has at all times been dependent on food, one 
would assume that this right should have been recognised as soon as man began to indulge in 
the luxury of philosophical thought and reflections on law.”170
 
Life should be interpreted more broadly than simply living to include a reasonable quality of 
life. For those suffering under the yoke of severe poverty, the lack of sufficient food results in 
their not having a reasonable quality of life. Justice O’Regan in S v Makwanyane recognised 
that the right to life is not mere existence, but includes the “right to share in the experience of 
humanity”.171 It would appear trite that having access to adequate food is a significant part of 
being human. The argument that the right to life requires a reasonable standard of living has 
been raised at other times in both court decisions and academic writing. For example, the 
above view of O’Regan J was approved by the majority in Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(Kwazulu-Natal).172 Khoza argues that those without food are denied life in its real sense.173 
Currie and de Waal’s seminal discussion of the Bill of Rights considers this aspect of the 
right to life as the entitlement to an existence worth living.174      
 
It is necessary to add a word of caution to the previous paragraph which calls for the right to 
food to be protected as part of the right to life. Currie and de Waal indicate that under the 
South African Bill of Rights it is almost always possible to deal with the state’s socio-
economic rights obligations in terms of the specific duties in the Bill of Rights as contained 
in sections 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution.175 However, it is submitted that an 
                                                 
170  Dobbert in Dupuy (ed) The Right to Health as a Human Right (1979) 185.  
171  S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras 326 to 327. A similar sentiment was expressed by 
Mokgoro in the same case at para 311. Sachs J held that the right to life may require the state to create 
conditions which allow everyone to enjoy human existence. Para 353. 
172  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) para 31. 
173  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 666. In slightly different terms Khoza submits that people denied adequate food are denied 
leading a life worthy of its name. Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy 
Alone- A Need for Framework Legislation” 667. 
174  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 289. 
175  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 290. 
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interpretation of the right to life which encompasses more than merely being alive and 
extends the concept towards an acceptable standard of being is in accordance with the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Constitution as a whole. In support of this submission I would 
draw an analogy with rationale for the decision in the Makwanyane case. In this case the 
death penalty was found to be unconstitutional on the basis of it being a cruel, inhumane and 
degrading punishment, rather than the perhaps more obvious denial of the right to life.176 
Similarly, in a right to food challenge, whilst the state’s right to food obligations in terms of 
section 27 would be a key consideration, it might be that the court relies on alleged 
infringements of other rights (like the right to life) in coming to its decision. The court could 
even go so far as to make its decision on the basis of infringements of interconnected rights 
rather than (or at least in addition to) an infringement of section 27. Unquestionably, having 
access to adequate food is a fundamental part of an acceptable standard of existence.    
 
On a more simplistic level, being denied sufficient food may lead to starvation which is 
clearly a denial of the right to life. The importance of the right to life cannot be 
overemphasised, as without life no other rights can be enjoyed. It is along these lines of 
argument that the Constitutional Court in Makwanyane found the rights of life and dignity to 
be the most important fundamental rights as well as the source of the other rights in the Bill 
of Rights.177 The Makwanyane judgment is also authority for the right to life being 
unqualified within section 11 itself.178 The fact that the right to life may only be limited 
through the provisions of the limitations clause (section 36) provides stronger protection to 
the right than would exist were the right to be subject to textual qualification.  Whilst few 
statistics on malnutrition and hunger in South Africa179 indicate the number of deaths caused 
by these problems, research has shown that deaths from hunger and malnutrition do occur in 
this country.180 It is submitted that anyone in South Africa who dies due to malnutrition or 
hunger has been denied their constitutional right to life.  
 
A more debatable link between the right to food and life was introduced earlier in this 
dissertation. The introductory Chapter pointed out the well-known link between poor 
                                                 
176  S v Makwanyane para 137. 
177  S v Makwanyane para 144. 
178  S v Makwanyane para 85. 
179  See Chapter 1 where hunger and malnutrition statistics for South Africa are provided. 
180  See Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in 
South Africa” (2001) Vol 17 Part 2 SAJHR 236 and 245. 
 36
nutrition and food insecurity and HIV/ Aids susceptibility. Engh’s research shows that food 
insecurity and malnutrition increase the susceptibility of contracting HIV and the more rapid 
development of HIV into Aids.181 Notwithstanding improved medical treatment being 
available for those living with HIV and Aids, the Aids pandemic remains a major killer in 
South Africa and world-wide. According to research, an estimated 600 people die daily of 
Aids-related illnesses in South Africa.182 It is therefore submitted that a failure to introduce 
satisfactory means to improve food security and nutrition can be said to infringe the right to 
life of those who are at a greater risk of contracting HIV and the onset of Aids from HIV due 
to adequate food being denied to them.     
 
3.3.3  THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY 
 
It is arguable that the right to equality is tied in with the right to sufficient food for all 
residents of South Africa. Chaskalson P held in the Soobramoney case that: 
 
“We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people are living 
in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, 
inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health 
services. These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a 
commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be 
human dignity, freedom, and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional order. For as 
long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.”183
 
The ratio decidendi of Chaskalson P in the Soobramoney is echoed in the sentiments of 
Yacoob who argues that there can be no equality without socio-economic upliftment.184 The 
apartheid era was a time of gross inequality between racial groups. Now that South Africa 
has moved on to a period of formal equality, where a universal franchise and other aspects of 
equality and other core rights are espoused in our Constitution, Justice Chaskalson would 
appear to be correct in holding these first generation rights to have questionable value in a 
society of gross socio-economic inequality. The existence of extreme socio-economic 
inequality is evidenced in research showing that food insecurity and malnutrition is 
                                                 
181  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 3. 
182  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 5. 
183  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at para 8. This case is 
discussed more fully in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
184   In Jagwanth and Kalula Equality Law: Reflections from South Africa and Elsewhere (2003) 7. 
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geographically and demographically unevenly distributed, with food insecurity highest in 
areas with big rural populations185 and amongst black households.186   Ensuring that 
everyone has enough food and adequate nutrition would go some way towards closing the 
gap between the so-called “haves” and “have-nots”. 
 
Govindjee argues that equality in respect of access to all socio-economic rights187 is implied 
by section 27 indicating that “everyone” is entitled to access to the rights therein (own 
emphasis added).188 Khoza shows the link between the rights of equality and social assistance 
by indicating that those who are unable to survive without social assistance are equally 
desperate and equally in need of such assistance.189 It is submitted that these compelling 
arguments are equally applicable in showing the interrelatedness of equality and the right to 
food in that those who are unable to adequately feed themselves are equally desperate and 
equally in need of assistance from the state to be properly fed. 
 
3.3.4  THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
In terms of section 25(5) of the Constitution, the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other steps, subject to resource limitations, to promote conditions for equitable land access.190 
Having access to land can be said to be closely linked to the right to food. This submission is 
made on the basis that having access to land, particularly arable land, provides people with 
the potential to feed themselves.191  
 
                                                 
185  The Limpopo Province, for example, has been identified as an area with widespread malnutrition and 
food insecurity. Khoza “Workshop on the Right to Food Security” 23. 
186  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 664. 
187   This would include food. 
188  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 99. 
189   Khoza “Protecting the Right to Food in South Africa: The Role of Framework Legislation” (2004) Vol 5 
No 1 ESR Review 3 para 42. 
190  A related sub-section of the Property provision is s 25 (8) which says: 
“No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions 
of section 36(1).”   
191  According to the South African Human Rights Commission Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004), in terms of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development sub-
programme, during the reporting period only 103 682 hectares of land was delivered, benefiting just 6170 
people.   
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As of 2002 approximately only 1.2% out of the government’s espoused 30% post-apartheid 
land redistribution had taken place and approximately 80% of the best agricultural land was 
still owned by white commercial farmers192. This scenario is aggravated by the vestiges of 
the apartheid government’s homelands- and separate development-policies being evident in a 
disproportionately high number of black South Africans living on poor agricultural land in 
the former homelands.193 It was noted in the statistics on hunger and food insecurity in the 
introductory Chapter that white South Africans also happen to be the race group with the 
greatest food security and smallest food shortage.194 The slow pace of land reform in South 
Africa does appear to be negatively affecting the ability of previously disadvantaged South 
Africans to adequately feed themselves. Improving access to land suitable for food 
production to those susceptible to food insecurity and hunger would appear to be an obvious 
way of improving access to adequate food in South Africa. However, merely having access to 
agricultural land without having both the requisite agricultural training or expertise and 
technology is of little value. This research does not aim to debate at any length whether the 
speed of land restitution and redistribution is too slow (which it would appear to be), instead 
the link between the right to land and food is noted. Government’s land reform and 
agricultural development polices and programmes will be considered in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation. 
 
3.3.5  THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
In terms of section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution: 
  
“Everyone has the right to have access to- 
social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, 
appropriate social assistance.”   
 
The provision of social security,195 particularly in the form of social assistance, is 
undoubtedly closely connected with the right to food. This submission is made on the basis 
that hungry people receiving social grants are more likely to be able to adequately feed 
                                                 
192  Coomans and Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 29. Coomans and Yapko are citing 2002 figures provided by the Department of Land 
Affairs.  
193  Ibid. The same source indicates that as of 2002 approximately 14 million black South Africans were 
living in the infertile former homelands. 
194  See footnote 22 in Chapter 1. 
195  S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
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themselves than those without grants.196 The provision of adequate social grants for those in 
special need should also go a long way towards significantly reducing the “deplorable 
conditions” and “great poverty” referred to in the aforementioned extract from the judgment 
of Chaskalson P in the Soobramoney case.197
 
The seminal Grootboom decision, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, ruled that 
the state must take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme poverty, 
homelessness or intolerable housing.198 Similar parts of the Court’s decision held that people 
in urgent and desperate need or a significant segment of society may not be ignored in the 
interests of a general programme concentrating on medium and long-term aims.199 
Notwithstanding the constitutionally required state action, the court did acknowledge the 
limitations on the state’s duties contained in section 26(2) as well as the general limitations 
clause.200  In applying these court directives to social security and social assistance, subject to 
defined limitations, the Constitutional Court seems to have interpreted the Constitution as 
requiring a more comprehensive social security system than currently exists, and more 
specifically social assistance in crisis situations, in order to deal with the extreme situations it 
has identified. A widening of the social security “safety-net” and provision of emergency 
relief in crisis situations would also improve access to adequate food for those in great need.   
 
Various aspects of the existing social security system in South Africa, including the various 
social assistance grants available, and proposed new social security projects and programmes 
are discussed at some length in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
196  In this regard, see the discussion on the Basic Income Grant (BIG) in Chapter 5. BIG aims to provide a 
small monetary grant to all South Africans to assist in meeting the most basic of human needs. BIG 
Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 7. 
197  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) at para 8. 
198  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 
(CC) at para 24. 
199  Grootboom paras 43, 44 and 66. 
200  Grootboom para 38. 
 40
3.3.6  THE RIGHT TO WATER 
 
The links between the right to water and food are fairly self-explanatory and so will not be 
dealt with in any great detail. Brand notes that access to water is both a pre-requisite for food 
production and forms a key part of a healthy diet.201  
 
3.3.7  HEALTH CARE 
 
Brand highlights that a person’s status of health determines their nutritional needs and 
likewise their nutritional status is a big factor affecting health.202 This argument has been 
elaborated upon elsewhere in this research in relation to the food needs of those suffering 
from HIV and Aids.  
 
3.3.8  EDUCATION 
 
By creating greater capacity to earn a reasonable income, education can be said to promote 
the right to food in that the money earned can be used to buy adequate food. In addition to 
this, Brand points out that education allows a person to eat more nutritiously by knowing the 
nutritional value of particular foodstuffs as well as how to store and prepare the food so as to 
maximise the nutritional value received.203 Being properly fed is also necessary for creating 
an environment conducive to learning. A hungry or malnourished child, if attending school at 
all, is unlikely to learn properly. 
 
3.4  LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
The right to food in section 27(1)(b) may be limited in terms of its own in-built limitations (in 
section 27(2)) or in terms of the more generic limitation requirements of section 36(1). Much 
of the discussion in the previous Chapter on internal limitations of all socio-economic rights 
in the Constitution and the application of section 36 thereto apply mutatis mutandis to the 
                                                 
201  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 163. 
202  Brand considers the rights to health care and education as of particular importance to the right to food. 
Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 164. 
203  Ibid. 
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right to food specifically. Rather than repeating the discussion here, this section will focus on 
possible limitations peculiar to the right to food. 
 
In relation to internal limitations of a right, Engh highlights the need to distinguish between a 
lack of willingness by a government to provide a right on the one hand and the inability or 
incapacity to do so on the other.204 There is more than sufficient food in South Africa to 
adequately feed everyone living here205; the problem is the allocation of resources, not a lack 
of resources.206 South Africa, with an estimated gross national per capita income of 3 200 
American dollars, has been called the richest country in Africa.207 However, directly 
mirroring the provision of food, it is not the existence of sufficient financial capital which is 
the key challenge, but rather its highly skewed distribution. Hence it is submitted that the 
normal internal limitations (of progressive realisation subject to available resources) 
applicable to socio-economic rights are less of an issue in relation to the right to food in 
South Africa.208  
 
It is submitted that both section 27(2) and section 36(1) provide a very limited ambit in which 
the right to food may be justifiably limited. It is suggested, for example, that no limitation of 
the right to food which would allow for anyone living in South Africa to die of starvation or 
even suffer from severe hunger or malnutrition could ever pass the constitutional muster. 
Following the two-stage approach to constitutional adjudication mentioned in the previous 
Chapter, this argument is made on the following basis in relation to someone who is facing 
death due to starvation. Firstly, the starving applicant is undoubtedly being denied the right to 
adequate food as contained in section 27(1)(c). It is submitted that the applicant would be 
able to prove that the infringement of section 27(1)(c) is not legitimised by the internal 
limitation of section 27(2). This last submission is made on the basis that due to the 
availability of sufficient food to adequately feed everyone in South Africa (as illustrated in 
                                                 
204  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 3. 
205  Brand “Food Security, Social Security and Grootboom” ESR Review Vol 3 No 1 July 2002. 
206  This situation is confirmed by a relatively recent case study of the United Nation’s Food and Agricultural 
Organisation that South Africa has been producing enough food at a national level for the last 20 years to 
feed its whole population. Cited by Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The 
Example of HIV/Aids and the Right to Food in South Africa” 4. 
207  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 4. 
208  The Soobramoney case relating to the right to health care, in which a kidney dialysis machine was denied 
to Mr Soobramoney on the basis of insufficient resources, is thus distinguishable from the right to food.  
1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). This case will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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the previous paragraph), reasonable state measures would not allow someone to die of 
starvation. Finally, it is suggested that the state would be unable to prove that the 
infringement is permitted in terms of section 36 in that it cannot be conceived how a law of 
general application which could allow for such a situation could be found to be reasonable 
and justifiable.  
 
It could be argued that limitations as to who has locus standi in terms of an alleged breach of 
section 27(1)(b) could serve as an indirect limitation of the right. However, I have already 
argued in the previous Chapter that the locus standi provision as contained in section 38209 of 
the Constitution casts the locus standi net very wide as to who may bring a matter to court 
when alleging the infringement of a fundamental right. On this basis it is suggested that the 
broad provisions of section 38 provide hungry and malnourished people every opportunity to 
seek the assistance of the courts. 
 
It has already been noted that the right to food has yet to be tested before our courts. 
However, the qualification as to what it means for the state to take reasonable measures 
within its available resources to achieve progressive realisation of a right has already been 
considered by the Constitutional Court in relation to adequate housing, health care and social 
assistance.210 This same caveat or qualification applies to the right to food in section 
27(1)(b). In Chapter 6 when these analogous constitutional challenges are examined parallels 
will be drawn as to what they indicate about a qualification on the right to food.   
 
The right of children to basic nutrition in section 28(1)(c) is not subject to any internal 
limitations and can thus only be limited in terms of section 36. It is submitted that children 
can be considered vulnerable groups in that they do not ordinarily have the means to feed 
themselves and are under the control and protection of others. Bearing in mind their 
vulnerable status and section 36’s requirements of a reasonable and justifiable law of general 
application to limit a right, it is hard to conceive of any scenario in which these rights could 
be legitimately limited by the state.  
 
                                                 
209  The exact provisions of s 38 were quoted earlier in this dissertation.  
210  The cases in question were respectively Grootboom (supra), TAC (supra) and Khosa (supra). 
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3.5  TAKING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD FURTHER 
 
In being guided by the Preamble, it is submitted that in a democratic and just society where 
basic human rights are both valued and protected and improved standards of living for all are 
sought, a generous interpretation needs to be given to the right to food as found in the 
Constitution. For it is surely perverse for there to be people suffering from hunger and 
malnutrition in a country where there is such strong protection of fundamental rights.      
  
Stryker argues that improved medical care and provision of food are the aspects of social 
security which are able to provide the most striking improvement in improving the quality of 
life of those suffering from poverty.211 It is agreed that health care and sufficient and 
adequate food are key ingredients of a reasonable standard of living.  However, the link 
between these two key socio-economic challenges can be taken further. It has already been 
argued that the right to food in the South African Constitution takes on a growing 
significance in light of the considerable implications of HIV/ Aids for realising the right to 
food.212 The link between these two key challenges facing contemporary South Africa was 
the subject of a workshop held in the Limpopo Province in June 2002 into the impact of food 
insecurity in the light of the HIV- Aids crisis.213 It is submitted that the apparent link between 
these two crucial socio-economic challenges can be justifiably extended in that improved 
provision of sufficient food to all people living in South Africa will invariably have positive 
health implications. 
 
One way of ensuring that people have sufficient food is to ensure that they have the means to 
properly feed themselves. Various types of poverty alleviation may have the positive result of 
reducing hunger and malnutrition. Whilst poverty alleviation may take many forms, such as 
employment creation schemes, this research will focus on the provision of direct assistance to 
those with the greatest food needs. This is not to say that feeding schemes and other direct 
assistance should operate in isolation. On the contrary, it is submitted that economic 
upliftment and particularly job creation are necessary for building a better life for all South 
Africans. However, if the economy cannot create sufficient jobs to enable people to support 
                                                 
211  Stryker “Common Diagnostic Framework for Poverty Reduction” in Middleton, O’Keefe and Visser 
(eds) Negotiating Poverty: New Directions, Renewed Debate (2001) 78. 
212  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 4. 
213  Khoza “Workshop on the Right to Food Security” 23. 
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themselves and their dependants (which would include having sufficient food), then clearly 
direct assistance is called for.214 Furthermore, it is not acceptable for people in great food 
need to continue to go hungry or malnourished whilst waiting for (often slow) economic 
development to ease their plight. The most “food-vulnerable” members of society require 
immediate and direct assistance, because they are likely to lack the capacity to adequately 
help themselves and their needs are critically urgent.  
 
3.6  INTERNATIONAL LAW POSITION 
 
In relation to the interpretation of all rights in the Bill of Rights, including the right to food, 
section 39(1)(b) requires consideration of international law. Importantly, however, our courts 
will not apply any principle of international law unless such a principle is applicable within 
the context of this country.215 In addition, the weight of such principle or rule of international 
law for South African law varies.216
 
Section 232 of the Constitution provides that customary international law applies to South 
Africa unless in conflict with a parliamentary statute or the Constitution itself.  Section 233 
requires reasonable interpretation of South African legislation consistent with international 
law over a different interpretation not in accordance with international law. International law 
authority on the right to food is therefore relevant to this dissertation both as a possible 
source of law and as an aid to statutory interpretation. 
 
Malherebe notes that a shortage of local jurisprudence on social security rights makes it 
predictable that international and comparative law will be used to assist in  interpretation of 
national law.217 Since the provision of food and food security form key parts of a state’s 
social security responsibility, it is argued that Malherbe’s call for the need to consider 
international and foreign law directives is highly applicable. However, it is worth reiterating 
the comments made earlier in this Chapter that the right to food is inextricably linked with 
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other rights. Eide points out that although rights are always linked, this is particularly the case 
with the right to food in international law.218
  
A useful starting point in relation to the provision of sufficient food is an exposition of what 
sufficient food entails. The United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Cultural and 
Social Rights provides a useful starting point by stating that everyone has the right to:  
 
“physical and economic access to adequate food or means for its  procurement.”219  
 
The Committee went on to stress that the right to food should not be interpreted narrowly in 
that states have a core duty to take the requisite action to mitigate and reduce hunger even in 
times of natural and man-made disasters.220 Although the Committee’s comments provide a 
useful starting point, it remains to be established what exactly is required to have adequate or 
sufficient food. The General Comment of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food is 
more specific in providing a comprehensive and satisfactory definition of the right to food as: 
 
“The right to have regular, permanent and unobstructed access, either directly or indirectly by 
means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food 
corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which 
ensures a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free from 
anxiety.”221
 
The next part of this Chapter will seek guidance from particular international human rights 
instruments which impact on the right to food.  
 
3.6.1  THE UN DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS222
 
Liebenberg notes that whilst the Declaration is not in itself a legally-binding document, it has 
a very high status as both a benchmark of achievement worldwide and as an authoritative 
guide to the interpretation of the UN Charter. Furthermore, various rights in the Declaration 
                                                 
218  Eide The Right to Adequate Food and to be Free from Hunger (1999). Cited in Brand “The Right to 
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220  Ibid. 
221  The Right to Food, Report by the UN Special Rapporteur 2000/10, 7 February 2001.  
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are now considered to have become customary international law.223 Leading international law 
academic, Dugard, adds that the Declaration has had a huge impact on the development of 
human rights around the world. For example, he notes that it inspired various international 
and regional instruments which followed it (such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) as well as serving as a model for numerous national Bills of Rights.224
 
It is logical to start this analysis of international human rights instruments with the UN 
Declaration due to its status as the foundation upon which so many other instruments have 
been built. The usefulness of studying the Declaration in this research is apparent in that it 
fits perfectly into the aforementioned aims of using international law as both an interpretative 
tool and as a source of customary international law. Dugard highlights the particular value of 
the Declaration in a post-apartheid South Africa committed to human rights.225 He argues 
that the Declaration was inspirational to the drafters of the South African Bill of Rights and 
has a constructive role to play as a guide to our courts in their interpretation of laws affecting 
human rights. Dugard indicates that courts in other jurisdictions have used the Declaration for 
this purpose.226  
 
The key articles of the Declaration applicable to this research are articles 22 and 25.  Article 
22 applies to social security generally and says: 
 
“Everyone … has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation through national effort 
and international co-operation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each 
State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality.”227
 
Article 25 of the Declaration provides, amongst other things, for an adequate standard of 
living for everyone including their family. Article 25 specifically provides for the right to 
food, social services and social security for vulnerable persons.228
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The Declaration thus provides for the right to food in international law. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that articles 22 and 25 are useful for interpretation of, in particular, section 
27(1)(b) of the Constitution. In relation to the meaning of “sufficient food” in section 27, it is 
submitted that this can be understood in light of article 25 to mean an entitlement to the food 
necessary for an adequate standard of living. For example, a child who is not properly fed 
and as a result is not able to concentrate at school is not receiving “sufficient food” as basic 
education is needed for an adequate standard of living. In addition, article 22 supports the 
submission made earlier in this Chapter of the interconnectedness of the right to food and the 
right to dignity. This last submission is made on the basis that applying article 22 of the 
Declaration to section 27 of the Constitution, everyone in South Africa has the right to the 
food necessary to maintain their “dignity and the free development of (their) personality”. 
 
3.6.2  INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS (ICESCR) 
 
The ICESCR of 1966 was drafted to give effect to the socio-economic rights contained in the 
U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. South Africa is a signatory thereto but has not yet ratified 
the Covenant. Engh points out that despite South Africa’s non-ratification of the Covenant to 
date, many of the socio-economic rights in the Constitution are the same as those in the 
Covenant.229  
 
In terms of article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, a state must 
not commit acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. As a signatory to the 
ICESCR, South Africa must therefore not commit acts which would go against the object and 
purpose of the ICESCR.230 For example, article 9 of the ICESCR expresses the clear aim of 
recognising the right to social security, incorporating social assistance. 
 
The wording of section 27(2) of the South African Constitution is extremely close to that of 
article 2(1)231 of the ICESCR.232 Because of this very close similarity, interpretations of 
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article 2(1) by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are 
valuable when interpreting the ambit and meaning of section 27. The Committee’s definition 
(in its General Comment 12) of what realising the right to adequate food means, has already 
been discussed earlier in this Chapter. However, Govindjee correctly points out that the 
Committee’s findings are general comments unencumbered by the budgetary constraints of 
particular countries.233 As will be seen in much more detail in Chapter 6, South African court 
decisions have sometimes incorporated the Committee’s comments in their judgments and at 
other times rejected them.234  
 
Other provisions relating to food and nutrition in the ICESCR are to be found in article 11 
thereof. Article 11(1) provides that: 
  
“State parties recognise the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement 
of living conditions.”235 (own emphasis added) 
 
Coomans and Yakpo regard article 11 as being the key provision governing the right to food 
in international law.236 Assistance with the interpretation of article 11 has been provided by 
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ General Comment 12 of May 1999 
on the right to adequate food.237 Further clarity as to the positive and negative duties on states 
to respect, protect and fulfil the rights in Article 11 have been provided by the UN’s Special 
Rapporteurs on the Right to Food.238  
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Article 11(1) clearly recognises the right to food as an international human right. 
Furthermore, the right to continuous improvement of living conditions links with the need for 
progressive realisation of the right to food as espoused in section 27(2) of the South African 
Constitution. Article 11(1) therefore iterates the contents of section 27(2) rather than 
providing any new guidelines for its interpretation. 
 
Article 11(2) provides that state parties recognise more urgent steps may be needed to 
guarantee the right to be free from hunger and malnutrition.239 Article 11(2), it is submitted, 
provides extremely helpful insight into how the right to food in the South African 
Constitution should be interpreted in times of emergency. In times of natural or man-made 
emergency or crisis, such as droughts and wars respectively, susceptibility to food shortages 
and malnutrition will increase. It is submitted that the right to food in section 27(1)(b) should 
be understood in light of article 11(2) of the ICESCR to include the right to emergency food 
aid when the need arises. As a corollary thereto, the South African government must put into 
place adequate emergency feeding measures for such crisis situations. 
 
3.6.3  THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
 
Due to our location on this continent, one should not rely only on international instruments 
without due consideration of relevant African human rights instruments applicable to South 
Africa. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter) serves as a 
leading instrument in this regard. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is 
intrinsically linked to the African Charter and interprets its provisions and thus its findings 
should also be considered.  
 
The African Charter contains economic, social and cultural rights. De Vos notes that as in the 
South African Bill of Rights, socio-economic rights in the African Charter are not contained 
in their own separate section which indicates the relatedness and interdependence of these 
and other rights. 240 Similarly, Odinkalu, commenting on the African Charter, observes that: 
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“economic, social and cultural rights are placed on the same footing as all other rights in the 
Charter.”241
 
It can be argued that the Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria242 
case provides authority for arguing that the state should ensure that everyone in their country 
has access to sufficient food. The case held that the right to food is implicitly protected in the 
African Charter because it is indivisibly linked to human dignity and is therefore needed for 
the realisation of such other rights as health, education, work and political participation.243 
The Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project case is also backing for the 
earlier argument that the existence of the right to dignity in the South African Constitution 
indirectly promotes the right to adequate food for all.244  
  
State parties are required to realise rights in the African Charter immediately, without any 
progressive realisation proviso.245 Whilst section 27 of the South African Constitution does 
allow for progressive realisation of the listed socio-economic rights, it is argued that the 
African Charter is authority for arguing that the rights of children to adequate nutrition must 
be immediately met. The logic for this submission is that in the absence of any internal 
limitation on a right (as is the case with sections 28), the African Charter’s requirement of 
immediate realisation is apposite. 
 
De Vos notes that the African Commission has indicated a requirement of reasonableness in 
relation to states implementing socio-economic rights.246 This international authority aligns 
with our Constitutional Court’s finding in the Grootboom case that steps will be reasonable 
where they are based on coherent and comprehensive policies and programmes, reasonable in 
conception and implementation.247 A programme excluding a significant segment of society 
is not reasonable and to be reasonable measures must consider the degree and extent of any 
                                                 
241  Quoted in De Vos “A New Beginning? The Enforcement of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights Under 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 16. 
242  Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria 12th Activity Report 1998-1999.  
243   Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria para. 64.  
244  Supra. 
245   De Vos “A New Beginning? The Enforcement of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights Under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 20. 
246   De Vos “A New Beginning? The Enforcement of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights Under the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 22. 
247  Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at para. 42. The 
South African government’s hunger relief programmes are considered in Chapter 5. 
 51
right which is denied.248 As the Grootboom decision and other leading South African 
constitutional decisions are analysed in Chapter 6, it suffices at this stage to point out the link 
between the findings of the African Commission and our Constitutional Court. 
 
3.6.4  SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) TREATY 
AND THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
 
Article 5 of the SADC Treaty provides for regional integration to: 
 
“support sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development that will 
ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication, enhance the standard 
and quality of life of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged.”249
 
The Charter of Fundamental Social Rights reiterates these calls for regional development. In 
article 10 thereof it provides for adequate social protection for all workers in the region. It 
also provides for social assistance for those unable to support themselves.250
 
Both the SADC Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights would appear to 
support meaningful realisation of the right to food in South Africa as part of the region’s 
poverty alleviation and social protection programmes. This submission is grounded in article 
5 of the SADC Treaty and article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights themselves. 
In relation to the SADC Treaty, means which promote economic growth and socio-economic 
development for poverty alleviation would logically include improved food security and 
nutrition. Similarly, in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, social assistance 
for those unable to support themselves would provide better means for such vulnerable 
people to adequately feed themselves. 
 
3.6.5  VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE PROGRESSIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD  
 
The latest development coming from the United Nations has been the Voluntary Guidelines 
for the Progressive Implementation of the Right to Food (which I will call the Voluntary 
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Guidelines).251 The U.N.’s Food and Agricultural Organisation, through the 
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Right to Food (IGWG), started formulating the 
Voluntary Guidelines in March 2003.252 The Voluntary Guidelines built upon the earlier 
Rome Declaration on World Food Security. The Rome Declaration confirmed the right to 
adequate food and to be free from hunger. The Declaration further recognised that a 
democratic dispensation and a culture of human rights create the requisite environment for 
achieving food security.253
 
Windfuhr sees the formulation of the Voluntary Guidelines as a major step forward in the 
protection of socio-economic rights at an international level in that for the first time such a 
document is the product of inter-governmental negotiation rather than merely the work of a 
U.N. expert committee.254 It is fair to assume that such a consultative process is more likely 
to result in voluntary compliance from states who themselves were directly part of creating 
the Voluntary Guidelines. Vidar believes that the Voluntary Guidelines should help states 
review their strategies, plans, institutions and legislation pertaining to the right to food.255
 
Windfuhr highlights a number of other perceived strengths of the Voluntary Guidelines.256 
For example, the definition of the right to food in the Voluntary Guidelines goes beyond 
mere access to food to include access by individuals and groups to productive resources. 
Furthermore, the text reaffirms that states must continue to respect existing access to food 
and protect people from being deprived of food by others. States must use their available 
resources to progressively realise the right to food and take immediate steps to start the 
process. This last-mentioned aspect of the Voluntary Guidelines accords with the 
interpretation of section 27 given earlier in this Chapter. Finally, Windfuhr indicates that in 
terms of the Voluntary Guidelines groups which are vulnerable to food shortages and 
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malnutrition must be given special help.257 It will be seen in Chapter 6 that the need to make 
special socio-economic provision for particularly vulnerable groups has been recognised by 
the Constitutional Court.258  
 
Despite its perceived strengths, the Voluntary Guidelines are not above criticism. As the 
standards it sets are merely guidelines not law, there is no legal obligation to follow them. 
The Voluntary Guideline’s lack of a legal basis links with a critique by Windfuhr that much 
of its language is too weak, which allows too much room for discretion when it comes to the 
Voluntary Guideline’s requirements.259
 
Notwithstanding any weaknesses, the Voluntary Guideline’s provision of a framework for the 
right to food for the various members of the U.N.’s Food and Agricultural Organisation 
appears to be a positive development. However, Windfuhr astutely points out that the 
ultimate worth of the Guidelines will depend on the political will of governments to properly 
implement its provisions and the effective monitoring of realisation of the right to food.260
 
3.6.6  SELECTED INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS WHICH PROTECT 
PARTICULAR VULNERABLE GROUPS 
3.6.6.1  CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD261
 
Article 24 thereof provides that every state shall take appropriate measures:  
 
“to combat disease and malnutrition … and … the provision of adequate nutritious foods”. 
 
South Africa both signed and ratified this Convention and is hence bound by its 
provisions.262 Article 24 provides international law authority for the contents of section 
28(1)(c) of the Constitution, as well as providing guidance as to the ambit of the right.  
Article 26 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for every child to benefit 
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from social security. As has already been argued early in this Chapter, the provision of food 
and basic nutrition, especially for children, is a core part of a state’s social security 
responsibility. 
 
Sloth-Nielsen highlights the duties placed on the state by article 19(2) of the Convention, 
which requires effective procedures for establishing programmes to provide the necessary 
support for children and their care-givers.263 It is argued that the type of necessary support 
envisaged by article 19(2) must incorporate measures for adequate feeding of children.   
 
Article 27 of the Convention provides for the right to an adequate standard of living for all 
children. Although the primary duty for a child’s development rests with his or her guardian, 
this article requires states to take proper measures to assist therein. It is submitted that the 
drafters of the Convention clearly had in mind sufficient food and basic nutrition amongst the 
bundle of rights needed to provide for an “adequate standard of living for all children”.  
 
3.6.6.2  THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WOMEN  
 
This Convention, ratified by South Africa, indicates that in situations of poverty women are 
more vulnerable than men to food shortages and other problems.264 In recognition of this 
vulnerability, Article 12(2) of the Convention dictates that: 
 
“State parties shall ensure to women … adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.” 
 
It is notable that the South African Constitution fails to identify the particular nutritional 
needs of women. However, the equality clause expressly forbids discrimination on the 
grounds of gender.265 It is therefore submitted that the right to food in section 27(1)(b) of the 
Constitution should be read in such a way as to meet the particular dietary needs of women as 
the bearers of children, as highlighted in Article 12(2). Furthermore, government measures to 
counter food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition in South Africa need to take cognisance of 
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past discrimination against women. This last submission is supported by research into food 
problems in South Africa which confirms that women are more vulnerable than men to food 
insecurity and malnutrition.266    
 
3.6.6.3  THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION’S SOCIAL 
SECURITY (MINIMUM STANDARDS) CONVENTION267
 
The International Labour Organisation’s Social Security Convention aims to set a basic level 
of social security to be progressively attained world-wide.268 The Convention refers to nine 
branches of social security, some of which relate to social assistance for sickness, invalidity, 
old age and unemployment. The link between social assistance and the right to food as a way 
of allowing hungry people to feed themselves has already been made earlier in this Chapter 
and will therefore not be repeated here.269 It is argued that the progressive realisation of 
social assistance to vulnerable groups, required in terms of the International Labour 
Organisation’s Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, provides further indirect 
international law authority for the South African government to ensure that the right to food 
is properly met. However, it should be noted that South Africa has yet to ratify the Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Convention.270
 
3.6.6.4  INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION ON AGEING AND RELATED 
ACTIVITIES 
 
The UN General Assembly’s 74th Plenary Meeting met to discuss the Implementation of the 
International Plan of Action on Ageing and Related Activities.271 Although the Plan of 
Action does not have the weight of binding law, it is of persuasive authority in interpreting 
the meaning of rights at a national and international level. In this regard the Plan states: 
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“Older persons should have access to adequate food, water, shelter, clothing and health care 
…”272 (own emphasis added) 
 
As with gender, age is a prohibited ground of unfair discrimination in terms of section 7 of 
the South African Constitution. Whilst section 27(1) does not specifically mention additional 
food rights for older persons, it is submitted that it is a reasonable interpretation thereof that 
older persons, as a vulnerable group, should benefit from focused state assistance to ensure 
their right to food is met. 
 
3.7  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter has attempted to show the broad ambit of the right to food as it is contained in 
the South African Constitution. Furthermore, it has been shown that the right to food is 
intrinsically related to other rights in the Bill of Rights with the result that to realise the right 
to food invariably involves a realisation of these connected rights too. 
 
In relation to the aforementioned international law recognition of the right to social security 
and specifically the right to food, it is argued that Scheinin is correct to note the recognition 
in international law of the various aspects of social security as:  
 
“genuine human right(s)”.273
 
However, Vidar wisely notes that recognition of the right to food in international law is not 
enough in itself. She argues that the right to food needs to be properly understood and the 
corresponding duties on states put into place and enforced.274 Much of the remainder of this 
dissertation will consider how well the South African government has understood its right to 
food obligations, in light of our Constitutional imperatives, and its policy implementation. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 
 
4.1  RATIONALE FOR DISCUSSION OF THE RIGHT TO JUST 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
 
It is not enough for the state to have in place adequate measures to ensure all in South Africa 
are adequately fed. In addition, in terms of section 33 of the Constitution, the just 
administrative action provision, the administration of state programmes must be lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. As state provision of food and adequate nutrition is an 
administrative action, an analysis of the right to just administrative action will also be 
explored. Administrative justice is considered important as the way in which state 
functionaries need to go about administering the right to food is as crucial as the content of 
the right to food itself. Stated another way, the right to administrative justice and the 
entitlement to various socio-economic rights, including food, should work together to ensure 
that everyone has lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair access to the socio-economic right 
in question. In this succinct analysis of section 33 and its implications for the right to food, I 
will firstly outline the administrative justice requirements and then apply these to the right to 
food.   
 
4.2  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE REQUIREMENTS 
 
According to the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v South 
African Rugby Football Union, section 33 serves to regulate how the public administration is 
run, particularly the required procedures for just administrative action when individual rights 
are threatened or affected by the action.275 Similarly, when Arthur Chaskalson was head of 
the Legal Resources, he indicated that the everyday lives of ordinary people are greatly 
affected by the manner in which those who hold power over their lives use that authority.276
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 The importance of just administrative action was also stressed by the Constitutional Court in 
the South African Rugby Football Union case in holding that: 
 
“The Constitution is committed to establishing and maintaining an efficient, equitable and 
ethical public administration which respects fundamental rights and is accountable to the 
broader public. The importance of ensuring that the administration observes fundamental rights 
and acts both ethically and accountably should not be understated.”277  
 
It has been argued by Mureinik that the incorporation of the right to just administrative action 
as a constitutional right in South Africa serves to avoid a repeat of abuse of administrative 
authority as occurred in apartheid South Africa.278 Furthermore, people affected by 
administrative action have the right to go to court to review the reasonableness of the action 
taken. Judicial review of administrative action promotes the requisite checks and balances as 
part of a desirable system of separation of powers.279   Plasket argues that administrative law 
is the key way of protecting those whose rights to social assistance have been adversely 
affected by administrative action.280  
 
On the basis of the aforementioned authority, it is submitted that a discussion of the 
constitutional right to food would be incomplete without some consideration of the 
administrative justice requirements of any actual or planned implementation programme. As 
was stated in Chapter 3, due to a lack of a specific constitutional challenge relating to the 
right to food to date, analogies must be drawn from constitutional challenges relating to other 
related rights. In this Chapter constitutional challenges relating mainly to unjust 
administrative action in the context of social grants are cited.    
 
4.3  ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE REQUIREMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Particular requirements of administrative justice existed in common law in the pre-
constitutional era.281 These common law requirements were adapted and developed in the 
                                                 
277  2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 133. 
278  Mureinik “A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights.” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. 
279  Pieterse “Coming to Terms With Judicial Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” 386. 
280  Plasket “Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” (2003) Vol 120 (3) SALJ 497. 
281  Plasket “Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” 496. 
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Constitution and further in terms of the Promotion of Just Administrative Justice Act 
(PAJA).282  
 
It has already been stated that section 33(1) of the Constitution requires lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair administrative action. Section 33(2) provides for the right to written 
reasons to be received when an administrative action negatively affects a person.283 In line 
with section 33(3), PAJA provides for the review of particular administrative action and the 
correct procedures to be followed for acceptable administrative action.284 Now that PAJA is 
in place, judicial review of just administrative action is largely in terms of that Act rather than 
directly in terms of section 33 of the Constitution.285 The Act fleshes out the requirements of 
just administrative action in significantly more detail, as well as the remedies in the event of 
alleged breach. However, section 33 retains an important role as a means of interpreting 
PAJA.286 It is submitted that a similar argument could be made as to the interpretative value 
of the rules of just administrative action under common law. On the basis of these 
developments, this Chapter will focus on the main requirements of PAJA rather than 
administrative action in terms of the common law or section 33 directly. 
 
Currie and De Waal indicate that interpretation of PAJA involves two stages. Firstly, it must 
be determined that the action in question falls within the ambit of the Act. Secondly, it must 
be established what rights and duties are imposed by the Act.287 This suggested two-stage 
approach will be considered in the following section of this Chapter. 
 
4.3.1  THE AMBIT OF PAJA 
 
The scope of an administrative action is contained in section 1 of PAJA as read with related 
sections. PAJA applies to the use of public power.  More specifically, in terms of section 1 of 
                                                 
282  Promotion of Just Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
283  Related constitutional provisions which can be said to directly promote administrative justice include: 
access to information in terms of s 32(1) as expanded upon by the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (PAIA) 2 of 2000; the creation of institutions to protect constitutional democracy in s 181(1), in 
particular the Public Protector, Human Rights Commission and Auditor-General; and the right in terms 
of s 34 to proper adjudication of rights before a court or tribunal (the latter would include an 
administrative tribunal).     
284  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 644. 
285  Ibid. 
286  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 649. 
287  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 650. 
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the Act, an administrative action, unless expressly excluded in the section,288 is any 
administrative decision or proposed decision made in terms of an empowering law by a state 
organ, or individual exercising public power,289 with a (generally) negative, direct, external 
legal effect.290 In a whole line of decisions, the Constitutional Court has held that 
administrative action relates to most, but not all, conduct of the administration.291 Thus 
applicable administrative action under PAJA relates to decisions connected with routine 
governance, that being policy-making in accordance with sovereign legislation (as opposed to 
direct policy-making) and administering legislative policy.292 Applicable administrative 
action in terms of PAJA therefore involves the implementation of existing laws.       
 
4.3.2  THE REQUIREMENTS OF PAJA 
 
Section 6(2) of PAJA mirrors and expands upon the requirements of administrative justice in 
section 33 of the Constitution, namely lawfulness, reasonableness and procedurally fairness. 
In addition, section 5 of PAJA gives effect to the right to reasons as contained in section 
33(2) of the Constitution. It is submitted that the right to reasons can be considered as part of 
the right to procedural fairness and will be analysed as such in this Chapter. Each of these 
administrative justice requirements will be discussed in turn. 
 
4.3.2.1  LAWFULNESS 
 
Administrators must act in terms of a law for their decision to be acceptable. Thus in 
determining the lawfulness of an administrative decision or action the court in question must 
assess if the decision-maker had the authority to take the decision or act as they did. In 
                                                 
288  The exceptions are contained in s 1(b)(aa) to (ii) of PAJA. For example, executive actions of the National 
and Provincial Executive and judicial and legislative functions are excluded. 
289  In President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
at para 141 it was held that the determination of whether something is classed as an administrative action 
is dependent on what type of power is being used. In other words, it is the character of the power being 
exercised rather than whom or what is exercising the power that is determinative. 
290  Paraphrased from summary of Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 654 
291  For example, Permanent Secretary, Department of Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-
College (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 21 held that a decision of the education MEC 
relating to a formula for allocating subsidies to private schools is an administrative action. In contrast 
thereto, in President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) SA 
1 (CC) it was held that the State President’s appointment of commissions of enquiry was not an 
administrative action. 
292  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 655. 
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addition to a general ground of unlawfulness, section 6 of PAJA provides specific grounds of 
unlawfulness.293 Currie and De Waal astutely point out that section 33 of the Constitution 
prevent ouster clauses which aim to prevent courts from reviewing particular actions.294 The 
result of the preclusion of ouster clauses in relation to judicial review of administrative 
action, in section 33 and PAJA, is that a law cannot justify or allow unlawful administrative 
action. 
 
There have been a number of reported judgments in which administrative action was found to 
be unlawful in relation to the denial of social assistance grants. For example, in both the cases 
of Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government)295 and Kate v MEC for 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape296 it was held that the grant applicants had been 
unlawfully denied pension arrears owing to them. In addition, section 6(2)(g) of PAJA 
provides that inaction may also amount to unlawfulness in terms of PAJA. Case authority for 
such unlawfulness is Mbanaga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and another,297 where the 
court held a delay of two and a half years to pay an old age pension was unlawful.298
 
4.3.2.2  REASONABLENESS  
 
In relation to reasonableness, section 6(2) of PAJA requires administrative decisions to be 
rational, and objectively speaking, reasonable. In paraphrasing various parts of section 6(2) of 
PAJA, Plasket comprehensively indicates that a reasonable administrative act has various 
elements, the key ones being: good faith; justifiability and rationality; equitable and certain 
consequences and proportionality.299 It is submitted that these identified aspects of 
reasonableness can be elaborated upon and understood as follows. In relation to the good 
faith requirement, proper consideration must have been taken of relevant considerations and 
irrelevant factors ignored. The justifiability and rationality requirements are linked with good 
faith in that the administrator must be able to substantiate the action taken on logical and fair 
                                                 
293  For example, an administrator may not have made a decision in bad faith in terms of s 6(e)(v). 
294  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 672. 
295   [1998] 1 All SA 525 (E). 
296  2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA) para [22] at 489E - G. 
297  2002 (1) SA 359 (SE). 
298  For a more in-depth discussion of the aforementioned cases and others and other aspects of 
administrative justice see Plasket “Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” 496. 
299  Plasket “Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” 508. 
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grounds. The rationality element is expanded upon in the next paragraph. Equitable and 
certain consequences mean that the administrative action should not result in unfair 
discrimination in terms of those affected by the action and furthermore the likely result of the 
action should be apparent to the affected parties. Finally, the proportionality requirement 
seeks to avoid unduly harsh consequences for those affected by the administrative act in 
comparison with the advantages gained by the act. In short, a reasonable administrative act is 
one based upon adequate reasons for the decision made.    
  
Section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA provides for courts to be able to review the rationality of an 
administrative decision. Currie and De Waal describe this ground of review as a 
 
“means-end model of rational action”.300
 
It is submitted that this so-called means-end model means that the choice of the administrator 
is rational if it has been chosen because it is an efficient way of achieving the intended 
outcome. In interpreting the requirements of section 6(2)(f), O’Regan J in Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism simplified the concept by holding 
that an administrative decision may be reviewed if it is a choice that a reasonable decision-
maker could not reach.301 The need for rational administrative decision making was also 
highlighted by Chaskalson P in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 
and another: In re ex parte application of the President of the Republic of South Africa when 
it was held that the rule of law necessitates that the use of public power by the executive and 
other functionaries should not be arbitrary. Decisions must have a rational connection with 
the purpose for which the power was granted, failing which they are in effect arbitrary and 
will not be reasonable.302
 
Section 6(2)(h) of PAJA provides for what I would term an objective standard of 
reasonableness by outlawing administrative action which is so unreasonable that no 
reasonable person could have exercised the power or performed the administrative function 
in such a way. It is apparent that section 6(2)(h) is very similar in effect to section 6(2)(f) as 
discussed in the previous paragraph and therefore needs to be taken no further.  
                                                 
300  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 676. 
301  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at 
para 44.  
302  2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para 85. 
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 According to De Ville, administrative decisions impacting on fundamental rights require a 
proportionality test in relation to the reasonableness enquiry. This test would involve a 
consideration of the proportionality between positive and negative results of the action and 
whether less restrictive means could have been taken to achieve the desired result.303 This 
envisaged test will be applied to the right to food later in this Chapter.  
 
Whilst the provision of reasons for an administrative action taken clearly forms part of the 
procedural fairness of the action,304 it is submitted that there is also a link between the 
provision of reasons for an administrative action taken and both the rationality and 
objectively reasonableness requirement of a just administrative action. The reason for saying 
this is that the justification for the action taken, apparent from the reasons, may show the 
action to be rational and objectively reasonable. The relevance of arguing there to be such a 
link is that an administrative decision taken without adequate reasons could affect the 
prospects of such action being successfully challenged in court both on the basis of 
procedural unfairness and unreasonableness. If this submission is correct it would open up 
another avenue for those affected by an administrative action to argue such an action to be 
unreasonable. 
 
It is interesting to note that in a long series of cases surveyed by Plasket in which 
administrative justice was held to have been repeatedly denied in relation to social assistance 
grants, none of the judgments Plasket analysed were decided on the basis of 
reasonableness.305 However, within other spheres of administrative action the reasonableness 
of particular administrative conduct has been the focus of litigation. For example, although its 
application to review the administrative conduct failed, the case of Kemp NO v van Wyk 
considered, amongst other aspects, the reasonableness of an administrator’s actions.306 In this 
case the first respondent was found to have been entitled to evaluate the application (to 
import antelope) in terms of existing policy. In exercising a discretion the court found the 
administrative action to have been made lawfully and reasonably.307 However, in Kotze v 
                                                 
303  De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 215. Cited in Currie & De 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 677. 
304  In terms of s 5 of PAJA. 
305  Plasket “Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” 497 - 514. 
306  2005 (6) SA 519 (SCA). 
307  Supra at (para [10] at 525E - H). 
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Minister of Health and another,308 the administrative decision by the Director-General of 
Health in refusing to approve the retirement of an injured employee was found to be 
unreasonable. The rationale for the latter decision was that the administrator made incorrect 
and unjustified assumptions in coming to their decision which was unreasonable in that she 
had not adequately applied her mind to the facts in casu.309  
 
4.3.2.3  PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO REASONS) 
 
Procedural fairness requires the administrator to have followed the prescribed procedures in 
their administrative action. PAJA reinforces the common law principles of natural justice in 
relation to procedural fairness, namely audi alteram partem310 and nemo iudex in sua 
causa.311 Required procedures for just administrative action in terms of PAJA (which meet 
the requirements of audi alteram partem) are found in sections 3 and 4 thereof. Section 3, 
very widely, sets out the procedure required when an administrative action affects any 
person. Section 4 of PAJA sets out the procedure required when an administrative action 
affects the public. 
 
In terms of section 3(1) only administrative action which 
 
“materially and adversely affects rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be 
procedurally fair”. 
 
A decision which materially affects someone has serious consequences. This provision would 
therefore appear to narrow the ambit of PAJA somewhat.312 However, the inclusion of not 
only adversely affected rights, but also legitimate expectations broadens the scope of the Act 
again.313     
 
Section 3(2) of PAJA specifies what is necessary for procedural fairness to exist. Section 
3(2)(a) indicates quite simply that a fair administrative procedure depends on the 
circumstances of each case.  
                                                 
308  1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T). 
309  Supra. 
310  Both parties to a dispute have the right to put their case forward. There must be a fair procedure in place 
to allow for this.   
311  The decision-maker should be impartial and unbiased. 
312  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 666. 
313  Ibid. 
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 However, section 3 gives more substance to procedural fairness requirements in terms of 
compulsory procedural fairness elements in section 3(2)(b) and discretionary elements in 
section 3(3). Compulsory requirements include adequate notice, the right to make 
representations and the right to reasons. Discretionary elements, the required presence of 
which would depend on the circumstances, are assistance for the affected party and such a 
person’s right to appear in person. 
 
Bushula and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and 
another is an example of a case in which there was held to be administrative injustice due to 
procedural unfairness.314 The court held that failing to give the applicant a hearing 
invalidated the administrative decision taken.315
 
As was stated above, the constitutional right to reasons is given effect to in section 5 of 
PAJA.316 Section 5 requires adequate written reasons to be provided on request by a person 
whose rights have been substantially and negatively affected by an administrative action.317 
The link between the provision of reasons for a decision and the reasonableness of that 
decision has also already been discussed. 
 
The importance of such reasons being furnished is well illustrated in the minority judgment 
of Sachs J and O’Regan J in Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier of the Western 
Cape Province which held that the provision of reasons is a crucial part of judicial review. 
This is the case because an affected person needs to know the basis for a decision taken 
against them in order to know whether there are grounds to challenge the administrative 
act.318  
 
                                                 
314  2000 (2) SA 849 (E). In this case the applicant’s disability grant was cancelled without notice to him and 
without the applicant having the chance to put his case forward.  
315  Supra 856D - E. 
316  Currie and De Waal point out that unlike various other aspects of administrative justice in terms of which 
the Constitution and PAJA built upon common law grounding, there is no general right to reasons in 
common law for an administrative decision taken. Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 678. 
317  Paraphrased from ss 5(1) and 5(2) of PAJA. 
318  2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) para 159. 
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The Bushula case, cited above, is an example where no reasons for an administrative action 
taken were furnished.319 The case of Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 
and another is an instance where inadequate reasons were furnished for the administrative 
decision taken.320
 
It is clear that to meet the “adequate reasons” requirement of section 5(2) of PAJA, the 
administrator who has taken the administrative action must sufficiently substantiate the action 
taken. Currie and De Waal indicate that adequate reasons must be understandable to the 
recipient party and precise enough for such a person to understand the reason for the 
decision.321 That is not to say that the person seeking reasons for an administrative decision 
taken against them is entitled to reasons for the decision which are satisfactory to them: as 
this might never be the case. Rather, the reasons given for the administrative action must be 
objectively sufficient and phrased in such a way as to be understandable for the applicant.    
 
4.4  APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE TO THE 
RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
As was alluded to at the beginning of this Chapter, the provision of just administrative action 
in relation to food programmes is an essential aspect of ensuring that the food challenges in 
this country are met. The very reason for discussing administrative justice in the context of 
this research is that the roll-out of feeding and nutrition programmes must be justly 
administered for such programmes to have a positive, meaningful affect on those in need.  I 
will now briefly attempt to apply the administrative justice provisions discussed above to the 
right to food. 
 
In relation to the requirement of lawfulness, the cases cited above holding the denial of social 
assistance to worthy applicants to be unlawful are notable.322 Any person who qualifies for a 
state feeding programme, who is denied access thereto without lawful cause, could challenge 
such administrative action as unlawful along similar lines.    
                                                 
319  2000 (2) SA 849 (E). 
320  2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E). This decision held that “pro-forma” grounds for rejection of a social grant, like 
“not disabled” or “condition is treatable” did not meet the “adequate reasons” requirement of s.5 of 
PAJA. Rather than being reasons for the decision taken, the standard-form replies to rejected social grant 
applicants were simply notifications of decisions made.   
321  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 680. 
322  For example, Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525 
(E). 
 67
 
In terms of reasonableness, it was noted earlier that administrative decisions impacting on 
fundamental rights involve a proportionality enquiry to ensure that the action is 
reasonable.323 Such a test would involve weighing up the advantages to be gained from 
taking a particular action against the disadvantages of not taking it. I would argue that there is 
a clear need for administrative decisions relating to the fundamental right to food to pass such 
a proportionality test. In the context of a right as paramount to human existence as food, it is 
further submitted that arguments in favour of administrative action which promotes a broad 
and generous interpretation of food entitlement are very likely to be reasonable.  
 
The requirement of procedural fairness is applicable to the right to food in many ways. As 
was already noted, section 3 of PAJA provides the procedure required when an 
administrative action affects any person. It is submitted that administrative justice relating to 
state provision of food could be applicable to any person and hence subject to the provisions 
of section 3 of PAJA. Therefore someone affected by an administrative decision affecting 
their right to food is entitled to the compulsory procedural fairness elements in section 
3(2)(b) including adequate notice (of any hearing to determine the decision to be made), the 
right to make representations before the decision is made and the right to reasons for the 
action taken or decision made. Section 4 of PAJA’s requirements for when an administrative 
action affects the public are also relevant. Administrative justice relating to state provision of 
food does affect the rights of the public and is therefore subject to the provisions of section 4 
of PAJA. As the provision of food is a matter of great concern to the public, it is highly 
conceivable that one or both of the notice and comment procedure or a public inquiry 
procedures, provided for in sections 4(3) and 4(2) of PAJA respectively, are applicable to the 
administration of food provision programmes. 
 
In relation to the right to reasons for a decision taken, it has been noted that section 5(2) of 
PAJA requires “adequate reasons”. It is worth reiterating Currie and De Waal’s compelling 
argument that adequate reasons must be understandable to the recipient and sufficiently 
precise enough for such a person to understand the reasons.324 It is submitted that this last 
point is significant in the context of this research, in that lack of adequate food and education 
often go hand in hand. Thus the reasons given by a state party for denying someone food 
                                                 
323  De Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa 215. In Currie & De Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 677. 
324  Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 680. 
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needs to be adequate from the perspective of the person seeking the food. The language and 
register chosen should, it is submitted, be apposite for the person affected by the 
administrative action. On a more simple level, there is plenty of case authority making it clear 
that sufficient reasons must be provided for administrative decisions taken. Hence 
administrative action concerning the right to food sans reasons,325or adequate reasons,326 is 
reviewable.  
 
4.5  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this dissertation the need for theoretical rights to be converted into meaningful 
reality has been called for. The rules of administrative justice which are found in the South 
African common law, Constitution and PAJA ensure that the exercise of executive and 
bureaucratic power takes place in an acceptable way. In so doing the rules of administrative 
justice ensure that the obligations on the state created by law are given meaningful realisation 
through just administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. These 
requirements of just administrative action are critically important in the roll-out of state food 
and nutrition programmes as a crucial part of converting the right to food into reality. Part of 
Chapter 5, which considers government food policy, will consider whether existing 
administration of food policies and programmes is meeting the aforementioned requirements 
of just administrative action.   
 
 
                                                 
325  For example, Bushula and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare and another 2001 (8) 
BCLR 844 (E) 2000 (2) SA 849 (E). 
326  For example, Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare and another 2001 (8) BCLR 844 
(E). 
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 CHAPTER 5 
PROGRESS IN REALISING THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
 
The earlier discussion of the ambit of the right to food established that the state is duty-bound 
to take decisive steps to reduce food insecurity and fight hunger and malnutrition. This 
Chapter will focus on existing and proposed state mechanisms for realising the right to food. 
This analysis will first consider the mechanisms involved and thereafter whether through 
such mechanisms the constitutional obligations discussed in earlier in this dissertation are 
being met. Whilst the focus will be on food programmes, because of the link between the 
right to food and other socio-economic rights, it is necessary to briefly consider existing state 
policies relating to these interconnected rights. The interconnected state programmes which 
will be considered are those of land redistribution, income generation or job creation and 
social security.  
 
5.2  MAIN EXISTING NATIONAL STATE FOOD PROGRAMMES AND 
POLICIES  
5.2.1  INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
(IFSS) 
 
The IFSS was released by the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs in July 2002.327 
The IFFS was based on a Cabinet decision to 
 
“launch an updated national food security strategy to streamline, harmonise and integrate 
diverse food security sub-programmes in South Africa”.328
 
This Cabinet decision succinctly indicates the main aims of the IFSS. Other aims of the IFSS 
are for it to serve as a guide for further development and to co-ordinate sub-policies.329 
                                                 
327  The IFSS as a whole can be viewed at www.nda.agric.za/docs/Foodsecurity/FinalIFSS (accessed on 25 
February 2006). 
328  Quoted in South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social 
Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 71 Footnote 36. 
329  Department of Agriculture, Republic of South Africa The Integrated Food Security Strategy for South 
Africa (2002) 11. 
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However, the need for policy to be converted into acceptable implementation is emphasised 
by the Cabinet’s acceptance of the IFSS being conditional upon it being converted into a 
programme capable of implementation.330 The IFSS ambitiously states that its goal is to 
halve hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity by the year 2015.331
 
The central tenet of the IFSS is that food security should be met by ensuring that those in 
need should gain access to productive resources and thereby be empowered to have nutritious 
and safe food. Backup measures are then put into place for those who do not gain access to 
productive resources. In the first instance, such people should benefit from food security 
interventions which should give them access to income and employment opportunities to 
improve their ability to buy food. Secondly, those who are unable to benefit from either of the 
aforementioned measures due to disability or extreme poverty will receive direct state aid.332
 
The IFSS highlights five challenges for South African households vulnerable to food 
insecurity333 which the Strategy aims to counter. These are: 
 
i) insufficient safety nets;  
ii) weak support networks and disaster management systems; 
iii) inadequate and unstable household food production; 
iv) low purchasing power; 
v) poor nutritional status. 
 
Although the IFSS does not clearly explain what these challenges mean further, it is 
submitted that these challenges, respectively, can be understood as: 
 
i) There are a lack of back-up plans and mechanisms to ensure access to sufficient 
adequate food in difficult times.  
 
                                                 
330  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 11. 
331  Department of Agriculture, Republic of South Africa The Integrated Food Security Strategy for South 
Africa 13.   
332  Summarised from IFSS. Accessed at www.nda.agric.za/docs/Foodsecurity/FinalIFSS on 25 February 
2006. 
333  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 11 and 12. 
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ii) Related to the first challenge, households facing food insecurity have few support 
mechanisms, particularly in times of disaster, such as droughts and floods. 
 
iii) Vulnerable households are not producing enough food and the supply is not steady. 
 
iv) Food insecure households do not have enough money to buy sufficient food to meet 
their needs. 
 
v) The food available to vulnerable groups is not of a nutritionally good quality.  
 
Aligned with its aforementioned aims, the IFSS identifies seven priority areas to reduce food 
insecurity and realise the right to food.334 The IFSS lists these priorities in its perceived order 
of importance: 
 
i) Increase the amount of food being produced and traded by households; 
ii) Increase the amount of money being earned and work opportunities; 
iii) Improve nutrition and the safety of food produced; 
iv) Widen safety nets and food crisis management systems; 
v) Advance investigation and information management systems; 
vi) Provide capacity building; 
vii) Discuss food issues amongst the various stakeholders. 
 
These perceived focus areas will be analysed later in this dissertation in relation to the 
assessment of existing state action in this Chapter as well as in when proposals are put 
forward in the concluding Chapter. 
 
5.2.2  AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMMES 
5.2.2.1  INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL WATER USE 
 
There are various reasons for the need for policy controlling water usage for agriculture. 
South Africa has limited water available for agricultural purposes and modern South Africa 
inherited from the apartheid era an uneven distribution of irrigation infrastructure along race 
                                                 
334  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 12. 
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and geographical lines.335 The National Guidelines for Integrated Management of 
Agricultural Water Use (National Guidelines), intended to cope with these challenges, was 
released by the Department of Agriculture in July 2002.336 In order to cope with the 
extremely uneven distribution of irrigated land, in terms of the National Guidelines, the 
Department of Agriculture will launch a smallholder irrigation initiative across the country. 
An example of the broad range of projects envisaged by the National Guidelines is the 
redistribution of land already serviced by irrigation schemes.337  
 
5.2.2.2  AGRO-PROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT 
 
This Project of the Department of Science and Technology aims to transfer technologies and 
build upon indigenous knowledge in relation to agricultural development.338 In so doing the 
Project aims to improve agricultural skills, reduce poverty, create sustainable employment 
and promote co-operation between the government, educational institutions and the private 
sector.339 Establishing partnerships between the state, industry and educational bodies also 
has the potential to release more resources and investment opportunities for agricultural 
development.   
 
5.2.2.3  AGRICULTURAL STARTER PACK PROGRAMME 
 
Because of its link with the National Food Emergency Scheme, the Agricultural Starter Pack 
Programme of the Department of Agriculture will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
 
                                                 
335  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 13. 
336  The National Guidelines as a whole can be viewed at (www.nda.agric.za/docs/Foodsecurity/FinalIFSS) 
(accessed on 25 February 2006). 
337  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 15. 
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5.2.2.4  LANDCARE PROGRAMME 
 
The LandCare Programme supports the development of infrastructure and facilities for 
productive and sustainable land use.340
 
This Department of Agriculture programme provides funding for community-based projects 
such as the creation of community gardens to grow crops and the construction of small 
dams.341 This programme has the dual aim of creating employment and improving food 
security. The LandCare Programme takes an integrated approach to sustainable use and 
management of agricultural resources, with a focus on areas of water shortage as well as 
areas previously harmed by poor farming practices.342 The ravages of poor farming practices, 
such as over-grazing, deforestation and a lack of contour ploughing, are especially evident in 
the former homelands of South Africa. It is submitted that scientifically-based projects, like 
LandCare, are most needed in these areas. 
 
Along similar lines to parts of the LandCare Programme, separate so-called Food Security 
Projects have been set up at local health clinics to establish food gardens. The households 
involved in the cultivation are the first to benefit from the food gardens in terms of personal 
use or sale of the food grown.343   
 
5.2.3  INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION PROGRAMME 
(IFSNP) 
 
The IFSNP builds upon the foundations of the aforementioned IFSS. According to the 
Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs, the IFSNP has certain key focus areas.344 The 
focus areas which relate most directly to the right to food will be briefly discussed in turn. 
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5.2.3.1  SOCIAL SECURITY NETS AND FOOD EMERGENCY MEASURES 
 
This is a special relief package provided to counter dramatically increased food prices 
experienced in South Africa from late 2001 until 2003. This money was allocated to relief 
efforts of the World Food Programme as well as to distribute food parcels to needy 
households. A sub-programme of the IFSNP called the National Food Emergency Scheme 
(NFES) was introduced at a similar time by the National Department of Social Development. 
Needy families receive food parcels as part of the NFES.345 An off-shoot of the NFES is the 
Agricultural Starter Pack Programme (ASPP). Those who qualify for NFES food parcels also 
qualify to apply for a food security package from the Department of Agriculture in terms of 
the ASPP. The “starter pack” consists of seeds and gardening equipment or chickens. Those 
who qualify for the NFES are also eligible for the ASPP if they show an interest in 
agriculture and have land and water available for the purpose.346 The NFES is intended to 
work hand in hand with the ASPP or an accessible public works programme in the sense that 
the NFES food packages are intended to provide three months’ worth of food until the 
recipients are able to produce food through the ASPP or a public works programme.347 The 
particular social assistance grants available through the Department of Social Development 
will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
 
5.2.3.2  INTEGRATED NUTRITION PROGRAMME (INP) 
  
This progamme of the National Health Department provides the state’s overall policy 
framework for improving nutrition in South Africa.348 In other words, the INP focuses on the 
quality of food consumed by South Africans with an aim of improving the nutritional status 
of everyone in South Africa. 
 
The listed strategies of the INP are:349
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i) Using good nutrition as a means to counter the effects of disease. Such programmes 
would, it is submitted, need to include information campaigns so that such knowledge 
becomes widespread. The Health Department has provided nutritional guidelines for 
those living with TB, HIV/Aids and other chronic diseases.350 The INP provides 
nutritional supplements for those living with HIV/ Aids and/ or TB.351 
 
ii) Growth monitoring and promotion. This is likely to be most applicable to infants whose 
growth can be monitored at state clinics. The INP aims to improve mother and child 
nutrition through the provision of Vitamin A supplements to mothers and their babies 
and young children and other nutrition interventions at state health facilities to counter 
child malnutrition.352 
 
iii) Promoting nutrition generally and specifically micronutrient nutrition. Once again the 
policy is not clear as to the meaning of this strategy, but its focus appears to be to 
encourage South Africans to consume more nutritious foods. In relation to 
micronutrient nutrition, government promotion and regulation of fortified foods, such as 
bread, is likely to be envisaged.  
 
iv) Improved food service management standards. This pertains to the provision of 
nutritious food to those in state institutions, like hospitals.353 
 
v) Promotion of breastfeeding. This strategy is self-evident. The nutritional benefits of 
babies being fed with breast milk as opposed to bottled milk is well known. In food 
insecure families, where the availability of bottled milk is likely to be a problem, 
breastfeeding is even more desirable. However, where breastfeeding can open the child 
up to other health risks (such as contracting HIV from an HIV-positive mother), these 
dangers need to be brought to the attention of the mother or other care-giver, and 
suitable alternatives made available to them.354 
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 vi) Contribution to household food security. This is likely to entail food packages and other 
state aid to those in urgent need of food. 
 
A critical part of the INP is the Primary School Nutrition Programme to which about 86% of 
state monetary allocation to the INP is currently spent.355
 
5.2.3.3  SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMMES 
 
The Primary School Nutrition Programme was initially run by the National Health 
Department. The Programme was taken over by the Education Department in April 2004356 
when it was given the new name of the National School Nutrition Programme.357 Due to the 
close similarity between the two school feeding programmes, they will not be separately 
discussed in this dissertation. The feeding programme involves the provision of learners from 
Grade R to Grade 7 in particular identified poverty-stricken areas with a standardised 
nutritious meal at school.358   
 
A separate feeding scheme for learners in crèches, known as the Community-Based Nutrition 
Programme, is run by the Gauteng Health Department.359 There have been no reports of this 
Programme being extended to other provinces.  
 
5.3  NATIONAL LEGISLATION IN PLACE OR BEING DRAFTED 
 
There is no overall piece of legislation covering the right to food.360 Legislative intervention 
to cope with the right to food issue in South Africa has, to date, been fragmented. Khoza 
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notes that various pieces of sectoral legislation relating in some way to the right to food have 
been passed.361  
 
5.3.1  NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY DRAFT BILL (NFSDB) 
 
According to Khoza the NFSDB is an attempt by the South African government to meet its 
constitutional and international law obligations to take reasonable legislative measures to 
achieve the right to food.362 According to the SAHRC, the NFSDB aims to achieve better 
integration of affected and responsible government departments by: 
 
-  all the relevant departments reporting on their food security related activities to a central 
department (probably the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs); and 
 
-  creating a system for food security project proposals, evaluation and disbursement.363  
 
The NFSDB’s preamble outlines its aims in more detail. These aims include ensuring 
accessibility and use of safe, nutritious and quality food which is necessary for dignified 
existence.364 The NFSDB also aims to provide financial and institutional means for 
maintaining availability, accessibility and distribution of sufficient food for all, including 
emergency food measures and to promote sustainable access to land, food production and 
natural resource conservation. In relation to governance and administration of the 
programme, honest and responsible food trading systems and the promotion of co-operation 
between government departments and spheres is sought.365
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5.4  ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PROGRAMMES AND LEGISLATION AND 
PARTICULARLY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
5.4.1  GENERALLY 
 
Khoza argues that existing South African food policies and laws do not seem to properly 
protect the right to food.366 The widespread food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition cited in 
the introductory chapter of this dissertation support this view. Brand adopts a three-pronged 
analysis for considering whether the state’s existing approach to food is constitutionally 
sound.367 The three aspects he cites are all requirements of the state’s duty to fulfil the right 
to food, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Brand attempts to establish:368
 
i) whether the state has in place a national strategy to meet the right to food; 
 
ii) whether this strategy is reasonable; and 
 
iii) whether the state is succeeding in ensuring that the right to food is being progressively 
realised. 
 
During the course of my analysis of existing state food programmes and legislation and their 
implementation, I will attempt to include a consideration of what can be termed Brand’s 
barometers of state fulfilment or failure to fulfil the right to food. The question of the 
reasonableness of state action will be considered again in the next Chapter when the tests laid 
down by our courts for the reasonableness of state fulfilment of socio-economic rights in key 
constitutional decisions will be analysed. 
 
The SAHRC’s 2004 Right to Food report recommends the need for greater public awareness 
of malnutrition, provincial roll-out of the Integrated Food Security Strategy, better food 
safety, better regulation of the food industry through state buying and faster agricultural land 
reform.369 The Right to Food report could not say whether there had been progressive 
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realisation of the right to food during the 2002/2003 report period. It did acknowledge that 
many people, especially children, were denied the right to food due to high prices or poor 
government plans.370  
 
The shortcomings of the government's food policy generally are highlighted by Khoza who 
argues that until the formulation of the IFSS (evaluated below), government policy relating to 
the right to food was fragmented and poorly co-ordinated and implemented.371 He argues 
further that the situation is aggravated by a lack of effective communication between the 
numerous government departments who have a role to play in realising the right to food.372 In 
gauging whether the state has a national strategy to tackle the food challenge Brand also 
distinguishes between the position before and after the formulation of the IFFS. Brand notes 
that before the IFFS there was in effect no strategy at a national level dealing with food, but 
this constitutional shortcoming has largely been remedied by the IFFS.373 Similarly, 
according to Engh, right to food policies are hard to gauge because they transcend a number 
of sectors and government departments374. Hopefully the IFFS will provide a more co-
ordinated, organised and better implemented national policy. Furthermore, it would make 
sense for one government department to take clear overall responsibility for implementation 
of government policies and for that department to ensure that the supporting departments 
meet regularly with it and each other to ensure a better co-ordinated response to the food 
challenge.  
 
Khoza notes that most of government's attempts to fight food insecurity, hunger and 
malnutrition have been by way of policy measures.375 It is submitted that the very fact that 
the main government response to the food issue in South Africa has been by way of policy as 
opposed to legislation is an indication that government needs to be doing more to guarantee 
the right to food. Policy, by its very nature, is a planning mechanism and the need for 
implementation of policy has already been highlighted in this research as being critically 
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needed. It is submitted that government's response to realising the right to food must be based 
first and foremost on legislation. 
 
It has sensibly been suggested that government should co-operate with non-government 
organisations committed to realising the right to food.376 The fact that input from non-
governmental organizations (NGO’s) has not been sufficiently utilised or sought is reflected 
in the SAHRC noting a lack of inclusive participation in the formulation of comprehensive 
food legislation.377 Government tapping into the expertise and assistance of qualified NGO's 
to assist in realising the right to food makes sense for various reasons. Unlike government 
departments, which have a far wider scope of concern, many NGO's are particularly focused 
on certain social needs, such as the right to food. The collective experience of NGO's is, 
therefore, likely to be invaluable to government. It is also probable that the assistance of 
NGO's might well be available at minimal or no cost to the state due to external funding of 
many non-governmental organisations. This is not to say that the government may or should 
negate its obligations and leave everything to NGO's, but rather that meaningful co-operation 
between state and non-state actors is likely to make the realisation of the right to food a more 
attainable task. 
 
In considering whether the national food strategy currently in place is reasonable Brand 
acknowledges the strides made through the IFSS in providing a co-ordinated approach to 
obtaining food security.378 He acknowledges state programmes which “facilitate” access to 
food such as land distribution and “provide” access to food such as school feeding.379 
However, Brand pertinently notes that existing state food policy fails to be reasonable in that 
is does not make provision for certain persons in what he terms a “food crisis”.380  Put 
another way, someone who does not qualify for a government grant or is not fed at school is 
generally not provided for in government food policy.381 Such desperate individuals are left 
to fend for themselves. The statistics given in Chapter 1 of this dissertation indicate that the 
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problem of hunger and malnutrition remains widespread. Therefore clearly the existing social 
assistance net (discussed later in this Chapter) is not doing enough to ensure that many South 
Africans are not forced to suffer from hunger and malnutrition. Consequently this lacuna in 
existing South African state food policy cannot be considered constitutionally reasonable. 
 
Brand questions whether existing state policy can be termed reasonable in light of 
implementation problems. He cites limited uptake of social assistance grants and the small 
number of people who are benefiting from state-aided food provision as a basis for this 
submission.382 These valid criticisms are considered below when related social assistance 
provision as a means to counter hunger and malnutrition are considered. However, at this 
stage it can be noted that any policy which fails to have a meaningful impact in achieving its 
desired aims cannot be said to be reasonable. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned shortcomings in the implementation of government food 
policy, there are a number of areas in which it is submitted the state is meeting aspects of its 
obligations in terms of the Constitution. In the evaluation of particular policies, which 
follows, both the positive and negative aspects will be highlighted.  
 
5.4.2  EVALUATION OF PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT FOOD POLICIES 
5.4.2.1  GENERALLY 
 
The aforementioned policies and programmes can be regarded as indirect social security 
measures aimed at ensuring access to sufficient and adequate food and nutrition.383 However, 
the SAHRC could not say whether on the whole there had been progressive realisation of the 
right to food during the reporting period.384 An assessment needs to be made of government’s 
progress in realising the right to food in light of the constitutional duties placed on it in this 
regard.  
 
It is submitted that the mere creation of state policies covering various aspects of the right to 
food and food security is a positive move. The formulation of such policies evidences an 
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awareness of the multi-faceted nature of South Africa’s right to food challenges. There has 
also been some backing up of government policy with state expenditure. In this regard the 
South African Human Rights Commission reports that the 2002/2003 year saw more 
government spending on poverty reduction and vulnerability than ever before.385  
 
The SAHRC’s latest report found that existing state policies respected the right to food by 
taking cognizance of the food resources of individuals and their ability to meet their own 
food requirements through their knowledge, skills and actions.386 It is submitted that this 
finding of the South African Human Rights Commission is a fair one in so far as it relates to 
those in society with the ability to feed themselves. However, the statistics shown in Chapter 
1 indicate unequivocally that hunger and malnutrition remain a fact of life for many South 
Africans. It is the state’s inadequate response to assisting those facing the greatest food 
insecurity and hunger which is the main problem. By way of example, the SAHRC itself 
noted during the 2002/ 2003 reporting period that very high maize prices were passed onto 
the poor for an extended period.387 These high maize prices were experienced despite the 
establishment of a public-private partnership called “Yiyo Lena” to provide discounted 
maize.388 It is submitted that unaffordably high prices for staple foods, like maize, raises the 
very real possibility of sufficient food being denied to certain sectors of the population.389
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5.4.2.2 INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
(IFSS) 
 
The very fact that the IFSS is a comprehensive interdepartmental policy is an improvement 
from its piecemeal predecessors. The South African Human Rights Commission390 has 
described the IFSS as the most coherent policy on food security by any South African 
government department.391  Similarly, Khoza describes the IFSS as South Africa's most 
complete interdepartmental policy on food security.392 The espoused aims of both the IFSS 
and the Integrated Food Security and Nutrition Programme (discussed further below) were 
said by the SAHRC to promote short-, medium and long-term state actions which amount to 
progressive realization of the right to food.393 It is significant, however, that the SAHRC did 
not indicate that these policies actually led to a fulfilment of the right to food. It must be 
remembered that to realise the right to food in section 27(1)(b), section 7(2) requires that the 
right be respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled. If any of these aspects are lacking, then 
the right cannot be said to be being realised. 
 
Khoza believes that the IFSS lacks both the necessary focus on implementation to meet its 
aims and the legal mechanisms to protect the right to food.394 The IFSS is a broadly stated 
policy requiring specific guidelines for what it aims to achieve, how its achievements are to 
be assessed, and perhaps most significantly, the means of implementation.  Significantly, 
commenting on the IFSS, the South African Human Rights Commission has noted that it is 
not clear what measures will be put into place to realise the right to food and meet the needs 
of vulnerable groups.395   Cabinet's precursor for acceptance of the IFSS, namely the putting 
into place mechanisms capable of implementing IFSS strategy, has not yet occurred.396  A 
proposal to create framework legislation governing the right to food, discussed later in this 
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Chapter, is quite possibly the best solution in this regard. An indication of the extent of work 
still required is the Department of Agriculture noting that the IFSS itself has yet to be 
finalised.397 It is logical that until a strategy itself has been finalised there is little prospect of 
proper implementation thereof.    
 
The problem of non-implementation of policy is aggravated (and perhaps caused) by a lack of 
institutional capacity, particularly in rural areas.398 This is a major indictment on 
government’s response to the food problem in South Africa: simply putting in place 
reasonable policies (like the IFSS) without coming up with ways of turning policy into 
tangible implementation is not meeting the right to food as contained in the Constitution. This 
submission is backed up by the Grootboom judgment’s test of reasonable government policy 
which states that a reasonable policy must be reasonable in conception and 
implementation.399
 
It would therefore seem as though the IFSS, although a big improvement on earlier 
government policy, has yet to produce the intended realisation of the right to food. It would 
appear, however, to lay a solid foundation upon which implementation strategies and 
legislation can build. But these comments stem from the fact that the Integrated Food 
Security Strategy is, as its name suggests, a strategy and not an alternative to legislation or 
other means to translate policy into tangible results.  
 
5.4.2.3 AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMMES  
 
An analysis of the implementation of these programmes reveals areas of strengths and 
weaknesses. The SAHRC reports that there was some sign of improvement in certain areas 
through the state’s support of agricultural production for emerging farmers who were often 
the beneficiaries of land redistribution programmes.400 It also indicated that agricultural 
production support was also made generally available through national and provincial 
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agricultural departments.401 Arguably, this agricultural support served to fulfil parts of the 
state’s right to food duties. On the down side, however, major operational shortcomings of 
provincial agricultural departments have been evident which has meant that much food 
production support has been lacking.402
 
The SAHRC indicates that the National Guidelines for Integrated Management of 
Agricultural Water Use support traditional African production techniques as they promote 
household food security.403 In this way the National Guidelines can be said to be successfully 
promoting the right to food. 
 
The Agricultural Department of the North-West Province has indicated that the provision of 
agricultural infrastructure, such as the provision of adequate farming equipment, is lagging 
way behind agricultural training initiatives.404 Such infrastructural shortages need to be met 
as having the requisite training to produce food is wasted without the physical means to do 
so. 
 
According to the Agricultural Research Council (ARC): 
 
“research and technology programmes make a very significant impact to optimise food 
production”405  
 
The ARC listed examples, during the last SAHRC reporting period, of technology transfer 
projects and agricultural training which have helped vulnerable groups to produce and 
process food.406 Such interventions, driven by government’s agricultural polices, are a 
positive trend which should be expanded upon to promote better food production.   
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The Land Care Programme has been successful in countering soil erosion in a number of 
areas, which is necessary to increase agricultural productivity. During the latest SAHRC 
report period, the Department of Agriculture noted that approximately 140 key soil 
conservation projects had been completed.407 Although there are no statistics yet available to 
back up the submission, reduced soil erosion with resultant improved agricultural 
productivity is a positive development in terms of improving food security.   
 
5.4.2.4 INTEGRATED FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION PROGRAMME 
(IFSNP) 
 
The Department of Social Development's National Food Emergency Scheme (NFES), a 
branch of the IFSNP, lacked support from Seed and Plant programme of the Department of 
Agriculture and public works programmes.408 As has already been argued, such problems call 
for a more co-ordinated government response as well better co-operation between 
government departments. Emergency feeding programmes should also be conducted hand in 
hand with longer-term measures to empower people to feed themselves. This submission is 
made on the basis that without the longer term results being considered, the beneficiaries of 
food aid may become reliant on the aid and can be even more vulnerable to hunger and 
malnutrition than before receiving the aid. The way in which the state’s National Food 
Emergency Scheme is intended to work hand in hand with the Agricultural Starter Pack 
Programme or an accessible public works programme (discussed earlier in this Chapter) is an 
example of successful intended co-ordination of programmes. However, Khoza argues that in 
practice the National Food Emergency Scheme has been rolled out without these supporting 
programmes being in place. As a result, the households which received food parcels have 
been left in vulnerable positions.409 A further question mark against the National Food 
Emergency Scheme comes from Mr Nick De Villiers of the South African Legal Aid Board 
who indicates that as of 2006 the Scheme in effect has been abandoned.410 Clearly any 
scheme which exists in theory only, in no way assists in realising the right to food. 
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 On the positive side, the South African Human Rights Commission reports that in 2002/2003 
the State’s obligation to fulfil the right to food was effected mainly through social grants and 
the National Food Emergency Scheme. The Commission noted that 230 million rand was 
spent on NFES during the 2002/2003 report period.411 This substantial state expenditure on 
emergency food aid was meeting some of the food needs of vulnerable groups. Such state 
spending to reduce the plight of vulnerable groups is in accordance with the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of reasonable State policy in the Grootboom case. 412 However, the fact 
that the SAHRC provides such a broad estimated range of number of households who 
benefited from the NFES (between 60089 and 149779)413 indicates a lack of the requisite 
information to properly implement the Scheme. 
 
5.4.2.5 INTEGRATED NUTRITION PROGRAMME  
 
It has already been stated that an aim of this Programmes is to monitor the extent of 
malnutrition of children treated in public healthcare facilities. The SAHRC notes that this 
monitoring has not been taking place comprehensively for a number of years.414 
Comprehensive monitoring is clearly needed to accurately gauge the extent of the child 
malnutrition in South Africa. It is submitted that such comprehensive monitoring is both 
called for and not an overly difficult task in that it can be done at the same time as children 
are brought into public health care facilities by their guardians for inoculations or any 
medical treatment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
between the author and Mr De Villiers, attorney for the applicants, on 6 July 2006.) Whether this 
personal opinion, albeit of someone closely involved with food law and policy in South Africa, is borne 
out by data and authoritative reports to back it up remains to be seen. 
411  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. The same report noted that between 60089 and 149779 households received 
food parcels as part of the National Food Emergency Scheme in the 2002/2003 reporting period. South 
African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report Series, 
2002/2003 (2004) xvii. 
412  Supra. 
413  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) xvii. 
414  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 31. 
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5.4.2.6 PRIMARY SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMME AND NATIONAL 
SCHOOL NUTRITION PROGRAMME 
 
These programmes have been criticised for taking an over-simplified approach to which 
schools are provided with food. The criteria used focuses only on the previously 
disadvantaged status of a school, rather than on particular needs and socio-economic 
circumstances.415 To elaborate, it is quite possible that in an area where all learners were well 
fed at one time, at a later date there may be certain learners who now lack such sufficient and 
adequate food.  Due to changing circumstances, clearly such a system will mean that certain 
learners in need of food at school will therefore not be fed and their ability to learn will 
undoubtedly suffer as a result. It is submitted that additional methods must be implemented to 
ensure that hungry and malnourished learners at schools not otherwise covered by school 
feeding schemes are provided for. Notwithstanding these criticisms of the school feeding 
programmes, the SAHRC rightly indicates that these programmes are going some way 
towards fulfilling the constitutional right to food.416  
 
It has been argued that the primary school feeding programme is a good means of alleviating 
poverty amongst the selected pupils, but that the programme falls short in that learners are 
only fed during school days.417 This would seem to be a harsh criticism of the programme in 
that a key reason for the school feeding programme is to provide an environment which is 
conducive to learning through ensuring that the learners are not hungry. As these authors 
themselves note, a lack of food has adverse results for mental and physical health and 
productivity.418
  
The SAHRC’s Right to Food Report found three parts of the Primary School Nutrition 
Programme to be unreasonable. Firstly, the Report indicated that too little money was 
allocated for the cost of feeding each learner. This figure showed a dramatic decrease to 67 
cents per learner per day in the 2002/2003 reporting period, down from a range of between 
                                                 
415  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 679. 
416  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
417  Olivier; Smit and Kalula Social Security: A Legal Analysis 546. 
418  Ibid. 
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99cents and R2.10 per learner per day in 2001/2002.419 Whilst this research is not the 
appropriate place to argue as to how much needs to be spent on feeding each learner per day, 
such a notable decrease in the amount spent, notwithstanding that a moderate increase could 
be expected in line with inflation, is cause for concern. Secondly, the Report noted that 
151615 fewer learners benefited from the scheme in 2002/2003 in comparison to the year 
before.420 This reduction in the number of learners fed is a step in the wrong direction and is 
made worse when one considers the aforementioned criticism of the programme not catering 
for hungry or malnourished learners at non-designated schools. Thirdly, the Report indicated 
that during the reporting period there was a period of three months when the programme was 
not running at all in the Eastern Cape.421 Clearly, such geographical inequality in service 
delivery is totally unacceptable. It is perhaps not out of place to draw an analogy here with 
the TAC case in which provision of anti-retrovirals in only selected public health facilities 
was found to be unacceptable.422 In the same way, to deny learners in one province social 
security benefits received in other provinces is unacceptable. 
 
Notwithstanding the school feeding programmes, the SAHRC reports a shocking statistic that 
101152 children in South Africa were hospitalised for severe malnutrition in the SAHRC’s 
2002/2003 reporting period.423 In two East Cape hospitals the fatality rate for these children 
was between 21 and 38%.424 It could be considered unfair to lay blame for the startling 
number of malnourished children with the school feeding programme which only operates 
during term-time and even then only applies to particular primary school learners. However, 
by allowing such a situation to exist, it is submitted that government is failing to fulfil its 
section 28(1)(c) obligation to provide all children with basic nutrition.  
 
Another issue requiring closer examination is the fact that the current school feeding scheme 
does not cover high school learners at all. The Mail and Guardian newspaper reports that 
there are three million children from the ages of 15 to 18 in need of poverty assistance, 2.5 
                                                 
419  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
420  Ibid. 
421  Ibid. 
422  Supra. This and other key aspects of the case are discussed in the next Chapter. 
423  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
424  Ibid. 
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million of which are living in dire poverty.425 This report raises the prudent questions of what 
happens to such hungry high school learners and questions whether they are less deserving of 
food than their primary school counterparts. The report also notes the high drop-out rate 
amongst high school learners, often attributable to poverty and a lack of sustenance.426 Whilst 
government might argue that it has insufficient resources to fund school feeding at high 
schools, it should be noted that section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution does not limit the food 
rights of children to those of a primary school-going age. It is hard to envisage a 
constitutionally acceptable argument for feeding a hungry or malnourished grade 7 learner 
and yet not providing the same assistance for such a learner the following year when he or 
she moves up to grade 8 and the rest of high school to follow. It is therefore highly arguable 
that government is under an obligation to extend its current programme to high schools.      
 
5.4.3  GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION 
 
Khoza notes that there is no single piece of legislation covering the right to food in a holistic 
manner. He argues that the right to food gets only implicit and ad-hoc protection in laws 
covering various sectors including agriculture, land, water, public works, social welfare and 
health care.427 A national food security workshop held in the Limpopo Province in June 2002 
decided and recommended that the proposed National Food Security Bill is an important step 
towards realising the right to sufficient food.428 This recommendation appears a valid one in 
light of the lack of co-ordinated national legislation dealing with the right to food. This 
recommendation accords with Khoza’s call for a comprehensive piece of legislation 
specifically dealing with the right to food.429 A lack of existing co-ordinated legislation is a 
likely cause of the South African Human Rights Commission noting that protection of the 
right to food is not as good as it could or should be.430 It is therefore submitted that the 
passing of this legislation, after adequate consultation with all relevant stakeholders, should 
                                                 
425  Mail and Guardian (2006/02/07) Food for Thought www.mg.co.za (Accessed on 1 September 2006)   
426  The report notes that in 2003 there was a 44.8% under-enrollment of grade 12 learners. Ibid. 
427  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 678. 
428  Khoza “Workshop on the Right to Food Security” 23. This workshop also called for further integration 
between government departments responsible for meeting the right to food and for co-operation between 
these departments and non-government actors. Ibid. 
429  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 673. 
430  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Social Assistance Fifth Economic and Social 
Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 57. 
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be prioritised by government. It is therefore not surprising that Khoza identifies as a positive 
aspect of NFSDB that it, like the IFSS, aims to create co-ordinated food security policies, 
strategies and programmes including establishing institutions to co-ordinate cross-sectoral co-
operation.431  
 
However, whilst the previous paragraph notes the chorus of calls for a comprehensive piece 
of food legislation, a number of problems with the National Food Security Draft Bill have 
been raised. According to the SAHRC, problems with the NFSDB include a lack of measures 
to regulate the private sector or to maintain food for disaster relief and/or price stability.432 In 
addition the Bill does not guarantee a minimum income for those affected by malnutrition 
and in relation to project application based facilities, credible organisations to run the projects 
are not identified.433 It is submitted that these are very relevant criticisms which need to be 
ironed out before the NFSDB becomes law. This argument is made on the basis that each 
criticised aspect relates to necessary aspects of the right to food identified earlier in this 
research.434  This research has shown that the private sector is duty-bound to respect the right 
to food. Disaster relief feeding and price regulation (the latter point being more controversial) 
have both been proposed as part of the state’s right to food obligations. The idea of providing 
a minimum income which could be used by those affected by malnutrition is discussed later 
in this Chapter in the context of the Basic Income Grant and the social relief of distress grant. 
Finally, throughout this research the need for proper implementation of policy, rather than 
mere rhetoric, has been called for. It is therefore imperative that before the Bill becomes law, 
credible organisations are identified or created to run the projects created by co-ordinated 
food legislation. 
 
There are various other laws in the pipeline which show signs of a greater commitment from 
government to solving food issues and improved prospects for more effectively realising the 
right to food. Legislative developments in the areas of nutrition, food safety, food trading, 
                                                 
431  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 682. 
432  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 25. 
433  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 25 and 26. 
434  See Chapter 3. 
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agricultural development and food security are all reportedly underway.435 Whilst such 
developments would appear promising, it is premature to become carried away with the 
possible improvements which might result. It is first necessary to see what laws are 
formulated, and perhaps even more importantly, what mechanisms are put into place to 
convert such laws into sufficient food on the plates of hungry and malnourished families. 
 
5.5  INTERCONNECTED STATE PROGRAMMES 
 
Each one of the following programmes has sufficient content to be the subject-matter of a 
thesis on its own. This Chapter does not therefore intend to analyse these related state 
programmes in any great detail. The aim of this brief analysis is rather to indicate how these 
state programmes tie in with realisation (or denial) of the right to food. 
 
5.5.1  LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
 
In earlier Chapters the possible link between realising the right to food and land redistribution 
in South Africa was raised. If one accepts that having access to land, especially fertile land, 
has an obvious role to play in realising the right to food and creating food security, then a 
brief consideration of South Africa’s land reform policies would not be out of place. As of 
2002 only about 1.2% out of the government’s espoused 30% post-apartheid land 
redistribution had taken place and approximately 80% of prime agricultural land was still 
owned by white commercial farmers436. It has been stated earlier that white South Africans 
also happen to be the race group with the greatest food security and smallest food shortage. 
When all these factors are considered as a whole, the legal right to food would appear to be a 
basis upon which calls for accelerated land redistribution could be made. 
 
It was noted earlier in this Chapter that one aspect of the state’s duty to fulfil the right to food 
is to ensure that state measures to realise the right are progressive and conversely not 
retrogressive. The problem of land redistribution in South Africa is most clearly illustrated by 
Brand who highlights that a change in government policy making the qualification criteria for 
                                                 
435  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 678. 
436  Coomans and Yapko are citing 2002 figures provided by the Department of Land Affairs. Coomans and 
Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African Perspective” 29. The 
same source also indicates that as of 2002 approximately 14 million black South Africans were living in 
the infertile former homelands. Ibid.  
 93
land distribution stricter amounts to a retrogressive step which prima facie amounts to a 
denial of the right to food.437 This submission is in accordance with international law in terms 
of General Comment 3 of the Committee on ESCR which notes that any purposeful 
retrogression amounts to a prima facie right to food violation, which will be hard to justify.438 
Lahiff notes that the stricter criteria for land distribution cuts out the most needy applicants 
and in so doing greatly lessens the extent to which that land distribution programme is able to 
fulfil the right to food.439
 
Despite the above-mentioned major shortcomings, a laudable government programme to 
ensure that redistributed land is productively used is the Comprehensive Farmer Support 
Package of the Department of Agriculture. This project aims to comprehensively train those 
who benefit from land distribution.440 Although too early to comment as to the effectiveness 
of its implementation, in theory this policy makes a great deal of sense as providing 
previously disadvantaged people with land suitable for agriculture is pointless unless they 
have the skills to productively use the land. 
 
Another promising government initiative is the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development Programme (LRAD). As the name suggests, LRAD provides land redistribution 
to previously disadvantaged groups for agricultural use. LRAD provides both land and a 
contribution towards start-up costs.441 Beneficiaries are required to contribute some of the 
start-up costs in cash or in kind. 
 
Whilst land redistribution in South Africa remains a highly emotive issue, especially in light 
of the experiences in Zimbabwe, in the context of the fight against food insecurity it is 
submitted that land redistribution has an important role to play. 
 
                                                 
437  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 188. Here 
Brand notes that to qualify for a grant under the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
programme a new requirement of a minimum contribution by the applicant of R5000 towards buying the 
land.  
438  General Comment 3 at Para 9. Cited in Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa 178. 
439  Cited in Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
188. 
440  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 9. 
441  Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs: “Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development: A Sub-
Programme of the Land Redistribution Programme” accessed at http://land.pwv.gov.za/redistribution on 
6 July 2006. 
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5.5.2  SOCIAL SECURITY GRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
I will consider the various categories of social grants and the social relief of distress grant 
separately. In both instances the content of the assistance provided will be outlined and 
suggestions made as to their significance towards realising the right to food. 
 
The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004442 and its Regulations provide for various types of 
social assistance grants.  The listed443 social grants are the: 
 
(i) child support grant; 
(ii) care dependency grant;  
(iii) foster child grant; 
(iv) disability grant; 
(v) older person’s grant; 
(vi)  war veteran’s grant; and 
(vii) grant-in-aid. 
 
The rest of this section will explain the requirements to qualify for each of these social grants 
and provide a brief commentary as to how the grants and their implementation could be 
adapted to increase access to the right to food. All categories of social grants are non-
contributory444 and, with the exception of foster child grants, are only provided upon the 
successful completion of a means test which ensures that the recipient is in financial need of a 
social grant.445
 
                                                 
442  Its date of commencement was 1 April 2006 (Proc. R15 in GG 28652 of 31 March 2006).   
443  These social grants are listed in ss 6 to 12 respectively of the Social Assistance Act. 
444  Olivier; Okpaluba; Smit and Thompson (eds) Social Security Law - General Principles 87. 
445  There are also various other requirements. The requirements for receipt of a social grant are found in s 5 
of the Social Assistance Act. Section 6 of the Act, as read with Regulation 8, provide the prescribed 
procedures for applying for the various grants. The means test is determined by a formula contained in 
Regulation 12 which takes cognizance of the income and assets of the grant applicant and his or her 
spouse.  
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5.5.2.1 CHILD SUPPORT GRANT 
 
This grant provides support to the primary care-giver of a child.446 The primary care-giver 
must be over the age of 16. Significantly, there has been a relatively recent extension of the 
child support grant to children under the age of 14.447 Before this extension the grant only 
applied to children of under 11 years. In terms of the new age threshold, as with the old, to 
qualify the primary care-giver must pass a means test contained in Regulation 16. 
 
5.5.2.2 CARE DEPENDENCY GRANT 
 
This grant is for the parent, primary care-giver or foster parent of a physically or mentally 
disabled child in need of permanent care or support services, unless the disabled child has 
been cared for by a state-funded institution on a full-time basis for at least 6 months.448
 
2.5.2.3 FOSTER CHILD GRANT 
 
This grant is for foster parents, as defined in the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, who qualify for a 
foster child grant for the time that the foster child needs such care.449
 
2.5.2.4 DISABILITY GRANT 
 
This grant is for physically or mentally disabled people who are unable to support themselves 
due to their disability.450  
 
5.5.2.5 OLDER PERSON’S GRANT 
 
Currently women of 60 years and older and men of 65 years and older, who meet the other 
requirements of section 5 of the Social Assistance Act, qualify for an older person’s grant.451 
                                                 
446  S 6 of the Social Assistance Act. 
447  This extension of the child care grant was created by Government Notice 460 of 31 March 2003. 
448  S 7 of the Social Assistance Act. 
449  S 8 of the Social Assistance Act. 
450  S 9 of the Social Assistance Act. 
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Interestingly, the age differential between women and men for payment of these grants is 
currently the subject of a constitutional challenge by four men in the Transvaal Provincial 
Division of the High Court. At the time of launching their application these men were all at 
least 60 years of age, but not yet 65. The applicants live in poverty in Gelvandale, Port 
Elizabeth.452  
 
5.5.2.6 WAR VETERAN’S GRANT 
 
This grant is for someone who has performed a prescribed form of military service and is 60 
years old or more or is unable to maintain themselves due to physical or mental disability.453  
 
5.5.2.7 GRANT-IN-AID 
 
This grant is for someone whose physical or mental condition requires them to be regularly 
attended to by someone else (called a care-giver).454
 
5.5.3  THE LINK BETWEEN SOCIAL GRANTS AND REALISING THE RIGHT 
TO FOOD 
 
In the introductory Chapter it was explained how the receipt of a social assistance grant from 
the state can assist in realising the right to sufficient food in that grant holders are more likely 
to be able to afford to buy food. This is particularly important for those who qualify for social 
grants as they are highly vulnerable groups to hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity. The 
2001 report of the Ministerial Committee on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-treatment of Older 
Persons substantiates this point by estimating that 80% of elderly persons have no other 
income apart from their social assistance grant.455 So clearly the social assistance grant has a 
                                                                                                                                                        
451  S 10 of the Social Assistance Act. Section 10 should be read together with s 5 and regulation 2 of the 
Regulations in terms of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (GN R162 in GG 27316 of 22 February 
2005). 
452  Krüger “ ‘Come Back When You Are 65, Sir’:  Discrimination in Respect of Access to Social Assistance 
for the Elderly”. Forthcoming in LDD 2006(2). See also Matyu “Men Challenge Ruling Which Allows 
Women Earlier Pension” The Herald (11 November 2005) Accessed at 
http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/09/16/news on 25 October 2006. This constitutional challenge 
will be very briefly considered a little later in this Chapter. 
453  S 11 of the Social Assistance Act. 
454  S 12 of the Social Assistance Act. 
455  Mothers and Fathers of the Nation:  The Forgotten People (2001) Report of the Ministerial Committee 
on Abuse, Neglect and Ill-treatment of Older Persons at 
www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/reports/welfare/2001. Accessed on 21 October 2006.  
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crucial role to play in meeting the basic needs, including food, of these people. Alternatively, 
it is possible for the recipient to use the social grant to buy the means to be able to produce 
their own food, such as farming implements.  
 
Coomans and Yapko note that South Africa’s social security system is extensive by 
developing world standards. However, this positive aspect is tempered by the fact that a large 
percentage of those who qualify to receive benefits do not do so due to various problems.456 
Van der Merwe estimates that less than a quarter of those in need of social assistance in 
South Africa actually benefit from the social security system.457 Liebenberg lists various 
problems, mainly administrative in nature,458 which she sees as impeding access to 
appropriate social assistance. These identified problems include inadequate systems for re-
registering qualified grant beneficiaries in certain provincial welfare departments, major 
backlogs in processing grant applications and actually paying the grants, and a general lack of 
satisfactory infrastructure.459 Liebenberg also cites a lack of public awareness in affected 
communities on the workings of the social security system and specifically eligibility 
requirements for grants.460 The 2002 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa (known as the Taylor Report) 
also lists various causes of qualified people struggling to receive social grants.461. The 
interconnectedness of social security provision with the right to food highlights a major 
concern that those who often struggle to access social grants to which they are entitled, for 
the above-mentioned reasons and others, are also those who are most vulnerable to hunger 
and malnutrition.462  
 
                                                 
456  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 29. 
457  Van der Merwe “Social Transformation in South Africa by Means of Social Assistance: A Legal 
Perspective” (4 November 1998) 21. Cited in Olivier; Okpaluba; Smit and Thompson (eds) Social 
Security Law - General Principles 17.  
458  The commonly encountered problem of a lack of administrative justice when it comes to processing 
social grants has been shown in Chapter 4. 
459  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 243 to 244. 
460  Ibid. 
461  Examples of the factors indicated in the Report were claimants being unable to travel to payment points, 
often due to geographical isolation, and highly inefficient payment systems.  “Transforming the Present – 
Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 48 (This will be termed the Taylor Report 
in this dissertation). 
462  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 30. 
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The monthly value of each type of social grant is increased periodically by the state to allow 
for inflationary price increases.463 The value of social assistance paid out by the state in the 
form of grants increased by approximately 20 percent per year from R42.9 billion in 2002/03 
to R74.2 billion in 2004/2005.464 The values of social grants per month for the 2006/2007 tax 
year are as follows: the Child Support Grant amount is R190; the Older Persons Grant, the 
Care Dependency Grant and the Disability Grant are R820 and the Foster Child Grant is 
R590.465 It has been argued that the existing levels of these grants are too low to assure an 
acceptable minimum standard of living.466 The Finance Minister acknowledged in his 2006 
Budget Speech that the value of the grants is modest, taking cognizance of the cost of 
living.467 However, it is submitted that in a developing country like South Africa, with 
numerous pressing calls on limited state resources, the government cannot be criticized for 
the size of the existing grants. Were budgetary constraints not a necessary factor to consider, 
then clearly the value of social grants could and should be increased further. However, in that 
there are clear limitations as to the money available for social grants, then provided that the 
value of the grants is objectively reasonable in relation to budgetary constraints and the needs 
which the grants aim to assist with, then such allocation limitations are both acceptable and 
necessary. It will be argued later that a more urgent need is to provide some sort of social 
assistance to those in great need who currently fall outside the social security net totally.  
 
In support of the submission that the current value of grants is objectively reasonable in light 
of South Africa’s resource limitations, it should be noted that current government spending 
on social grants ranks alongside education as its highest expenses.468 Finance Minister 
Manual accurately identifies the key issue in this context as follows: 
 
                                                 
463  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 4. 
464  2006 National Budget Speech of Finance Minister, Trevor Manual. Accessed at 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/ 2006/06021515501001.htm on 10 July 2006. 
465  GN 294 in GG 28672 of 31 March 2006. 
466  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme (28 April 1998) 11. This 
same view was also expressed in the more recent Taylor Report which found that those receiving social 
grants remain poor notwithstanding the grants they receive. “Transforming the Present – Protecting the 
Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South 
Africa”.  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 59. 
467  2006 National Budget Speech of Finance Minister, Trevor Manual. Accessed at 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/ 2006/06021515501001.htm on 10 July 2006. 
468  Ibid. 
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“The challenge remains, to balance these income support commitments with continued 
strengthening of expenditure on infrastructure and service delivery.”469
 
In other words, social grants on their own are not the solution towards adequately alleviating 
the scourge of poverty in South Africa. Social grants do provide a crucial mechanism for 
providing basic assistance for those in great need. However, meaningful development and 
poverty reduction require a multi-faceted approach along the lines proposed by the Finance 
Minister in the above-mentioned quotation.  
 
5.5.4  A CRITIQUE OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF GRANTS 
5.5.4.1  CHILD SUPPORT GRANT 
 
The South African Human Rights Commission commends government for prioritising the 
needs of children.470 In relation to the extension of the child support grant from the earlier 
limit of children under 11 years to children under 14 years, it is submitted that this move 
should be welcomed as an important poverty alleviation tool which will allow qualifying 
parents of children in the 11- to 13-year age group to better meet their child’s basic needs, 
including food. The SAHRC’s Right to Food Report proposes that the child support grant be 
extended further to children under the age of 18.471 This proposed further extension makes 
sense in that children up to the age of 18 are equally likely to be in need of support from their 
parents. Furthermore, 18 years is the threshold for the definition of a child as contained in the 
Child Care Act.472  
 
Delany notes that child support grants are lacking in failing to cater for child-headed 
households.473 In other words, where the primary care-giver of a child under 14 is themselves 
16 or under, no provision is made for a child support grant. Goldblatt and Liebenberg argue 
that the state is constitutionally bound to provide child support grants to children who 
                                                 
469  Ibid. 
470  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Social Security. Fifth Economic and Social 
Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 25. 
471  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) ix. This proposal has also been made by Liebenberg. Liebenberg “The Right to 
Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa” 248. 
472  The Child Care Act 74 of 1983. Definitions section. 
473  Delany Rights to Reality - The Right to Social Security, with Particular Emphasis on the Legal Resources 
Centre’s Welfare Project in the Eastern Cape (2003) 27. 
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themselves are supporting other children in their household.474 This anomaly must be 
urgently remedied, especially in the light of the HIV/Aids pandemic which has sadly made 
such child-headed households far from uncommon. Haarman’s research identifies a sharp 
increase in the number of so-called Aids orphans,475 which ties in with an increased number 
of child-headed households. A failure to remedy this situation is very likely to deny such 
families and children their constitutional rights to sufficient food and adequate nutrition.    
 
5.5.4.2  DISABILITY GRANT 
  
At the time of its formulation, the White Paper for Social Welfare found that there were 
significantly more people suffering from disabilities than the number of disability grants 
being received.476 If this position continues today (no more up to date report has been made), 
then urgent steps are called for to ensure that disabled persons in need of assistance receive 
state grants. Delany raises another pertinent criticism of the welfare system vis-a-vis 
disability grants. She argues that the means test used may discourage disabled persons from 
seeking income from work they are able to perform, because holders of disability grants 
forfeit benefits if they earn small amounts of money.477 It is submitted that a policy change is 
called for in relation to the granting of disability grants (which may be equally applicable to 
other social grants for adults) in terms of which grant holders are encouraged to seek 
alternative forms of income to supplement their grants. The status quo creates a disincentive 
for grant holders to seek work (especially if it is likely to be low paying) and in so doing 
promotes dependency on social assistance. 
5.5.4.3  OLDER PERSON’S GRANT 
 
It has already been noted that the differentiation in the age for payment of older person’s 
grants between women (60 years) and men (65 years) is currently the subject of a 
                                                 
474  Goldblatt and Liebenberg “Giving Money to Children: The State’s Constitutional Obligations to Provide 
Child Support Grants to Child Headed Households” (2004) Vol 20 Part 1 SAJHR 151. 
475  Haarmann “Social Assistance in South Africa: Its Potential Impact on Poverty” (2000) 105. 
476  Unfortunately the White Paper does not indicate or suggest reasons for the large number of disabled 
persons not receiving grants. “White Paper for Social Welfare” GN 1108 in Government Gazette 18166 
(8 August 1997) Accessed at www.gov.za/whitepaper/1997/soswel97.htm on 19 February 2006. Chapter 
7, point 8. 
477  “White Paper for Social Welfare” GN 1108 in Government Gazette 18166 (8 August 1997) Accessed at 
www.gov.za/whitepaper/1997/soswel97.htm on 19 February 2006. Chapter 7, Point 8. 
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Constitutional challenge.478 Clearly the differentiation is prima facie unfairly discriminatory, 
but it waits to be seen whether the previously disadvantaged status of women (as recognised 
in the Employment Equity Act)479 will mean that this gender discrimination will be held to be 
fair. If the differentiation is held to be unfair, and due to budgetary constraints state old-age 
pensions for men and women are set at a “middle-ground” of for argument’s sake 62 and a 
half years, then it would appear as though on the whole the ability of older persons to meet 
their basic needs, such as the provision of adequate food, will not have been advanced.  
 
According to Liebenberg and Tilley,480 research indicates that the old-age pension system has 
various poverty-alleviation advantages, including: 
 
 A notable impact in rural areas; 
 
 A positive impact on the welfare of other household members and household security, 
where the older person’s grant is used to support entire households;481 
 
 The achievement of an excellent take-up rate;482 
 
 The promotion of gender and inter-provincial equity. 
 
It is submitted that Liebenberg and Tilley’s comments apply equally to realising the right to 
food, a core component of poverty-alleviation. For this reason some of their comments will 
be considered further. It has already been noted that the most serious food shortages and food 
insecurity exists in rural areas. Therefore the sizeable impact of old-age pensions in rural 
areas is a positive move. However, the fact that people in rural areas remain the most at risk 
                                                 
478  Krüger “ ‘Come back when you are 65, Sir.’:  Discrimination in respect of access to social assistance for 
the elderly” Forthcoming in LDD 2006(2). See also Matyu “Men challenge ruling which allows women 
earlier pension” The Herald (11 November 2005) Accessed at 
http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/09/16/ news/n04_16092005.htm on 25 October 2006.   
479  Act 55 of 1998. 
480  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme 11. 
481  According to the White Paper for Social Welfare, in black households each older person’s grant sustains 
an average of five other people. “White Paper for Social Welfare” GN 1108 in Government Gazette 
18166 (8 August 1997) (www.gov.za/whitepaper/1997/soswel97.htm) accessed on 19 February 2006. 
Chapter 7, point 7. The redistributive trait of old-age grants in South Africa is also considered by May, 
who attributes the very survival of vulnerable people to the grants. May believes that the sharing of old-
age grants in multigenerational families forms an important safety net for other members of older 
households. May Chronic Poverty and Older People in South Africa (February 2003) Chronic Poverty 
Research Centre Working Paper 25, 25. 
482  This would appear to be in contradiction with the findings of Yapko and Coomans referred to earlier in 
this dissertation.  
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to having inadequate access to food indicates that the impact of pensions in rural areas has 
not done enough to alter this imbalance. 
 
The aforementioned argument that the utilisation of old-age pensions to support whole 
families is a positive development is countered by other writers. Olivier, Mpedi and Dekker, 
for example, see in a negative light the fact that money earmarked for pensioners is 
frequently used by the beneficiary’s whole household, thereby not providing the desired 
assistance to the grant beneficiary.483 I think that to criticise the use of old-age pensions as a 
means of supporting the recipient’s extended family is a pointless exercise. It is 
understandable that a household will use the financial means at its disposal to support 
everyone in the household. The solution is rather to come up with ways by which other 
members of such a household will be able to meet their own basic needs, such as the 
provision of sufficient food or means to produce sufficient food. The other forms of social 
assistance and security discussed and proposed later in this Chapter, such as greater use of the 
social distress grant, the creation of a Basic Income Grant and the implementation of viable 
income generation and job creation strategies are possible means of reducing household 
reliance on old-age grants. 
 
The argument that the provision of old age pensions promotes gender and inter-provincial 
equity must be considered in the light of the continuing gender and geographical inequality in 
relation to access to sufficient food.484 Therefore, whilst the provision of grants might well 
promote equity to some extent, severe inequality remains.  
 
                                                 
483  Olivier; Mpedi and Dekker “Accommodating Informal Social Security within Social Security Systems: 
Observations From a Southern African Perspective” (2002) Conference on Social Values, Social 
Policies: Normative Foundations of Changing Social Policies in European Countries (unpublished paper 
prepared for a conference held at Tilburg, 29-31 August). 
484  See footnotes 13 and 15 of Chapter 1 which reflect this inequality. 
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5.5.5  CONCLUDING COMMENTS AS TO SOCIAL GRANTS 
 
Notwithstanding the problems in rolling out social grants, the SAHRC notes that the 
provision of social grants has, together with the National Food Emergency Scheme, provided 
the greatest contribution towards fulfilling the right to food.485 The extensive impact of social 
grants is evidenced by there being 5.6 million social grant recipients by the end of March 
2003.486
 
Perhaps the most important commentary on the inadequacy of existing social security system 
in South Africa is the Taylor Report, as it was specifically mandated to make these 
findings.487 Whilst noting positive aspects of poverty-relief promoted by the social security 
system in place, on the basis of its extensive and consultative research, the Taylor Report 
found that the existing social security system had failed to-date to make significant inroads to 
reducing poverty.488 In substantiating this finding, the Taylor Report noted that about half of 
those in need of social security (what it termed “poor people”) live in households not 
benefiting from any social security and even those who do benefit remain “poor”.489 
Unquestionably, the overall conclusion made in the Taylor Report is that the social security 
system in place at the time of the Report’s work (which has not changed greatly in the few 
years hence) is inadequate to meet the existing needs. This conclusion is mirrored by 
Liebenberg who believes that the support provided by the existing social assistance 
programmes in South Africa does not guarantee a minimum standard of living for many poor 
members of society.490 Significantly for this research, Liebenberg goes on to say that: 
 
                                                 
485  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
486  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) xvi. The main contributors to this figure were 2.5 million child support grants, 
2 million old person’s grants, 897050 disability grants and 133309 foster child grants. Ibid. 
487  “Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002).  
488  “Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 56. The 
Taylor Report estimated the number of needy people failing to benefit from social security in South 
Africa to be in the region of 13 million. Ibid. 
489  “Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 59. 
490  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 248. 
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“unless measurable progress is made to improve the implementation of social assistance 
programmes, national and provincial departments of social development will be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge”.491
 
This quote of Liebenberg relates specifically to the constitutional right to social assistance in 
section 27(1)(c). It is submitted that due to the link between the provision of social assistance 
and realising the right to food, this argument is equally applicable to the merits of a 
constitutional challenge based on the right to food.  
 
Govindjee astutely notes a lack of proper protection against unemployment492 as a glaring 
gap in the South African social assistance grant scheme.493 Olivier et al consider informally 
employed people to form part of this neglected group.494 Such informally employed persons 
are not covered by the social insurance schemes of the formal sector, nor do they receive 
social grants unless falling under one of the specifically created grant types. In terms of the 
existing social assistance network, children up to the age of 14 are generally catered for,495 as 
are old-age pensioners and those with certain specific needs (such as disabled persons), but 
able-bodied people between these age thresholds are largely left to fend for themselves.496 
This “forgotten group”, as it were, are extremely vulnerable to having inadequate food. It is 
in the context of this gap and the general social security system shortcomings identified by 
the Taylor Report that the social relief of distress grant and other proposed ways of 
alleviating this problem, such as the effective implementation of income generation and job 
creation strategies and the proposed Basic Income Grant, need to be considered. 
 
5.6  SOCIAL RELIEF OF DISTRESS GRANT 
 
This grant created by the Fund Raising Act 107 of 1978 provides for immediate, temporary, 
material assistance to relieve distress.497 The Act lists the categories of people in need of 
                                                 
491  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 246. 
492  Limited income protection is provided in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Fund, but such 
protection is of limited duration and is not applicable to those who have never been employed. 
493  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 133. 
494  Olivier; Okpaluba; Smit and Thompson (eds) Social Security Law - General Principles 4.  
495  Subject only to the child-headed household exception discussed earlier. 
496  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 133. 
497  Regulations 26 to 29 provide more detail as to social relief of distress grants. 
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temporary material assistance who qualify to apply for a grant.498 In addition to this broad 
range of applicable applicants, the Director- General is given a discretion, in exceptional 
circumstances, to provide a social relief of distress grant where he or she reasonably believes 
undue hardship will result from a grant not being provided.499 Significantly, a social relief of 
distress grant cannot be held in conjunction with a social grant.  
 
Social relief of distress grants are normally only provided for a maximum of three months.500  
In exceptional circumstances, however, this period may be extended for a maximum further 
three months.501 The amount of the grant is linked with the amounts payable at the time for 
adult or child social grant recipients. The amount of the distress grant is limited to the 
maximum monthly social grant payable to adults, if the distress grant applicant is an adult 
applying for herself, and to the size of child support grant for an applicant qua guardian.502
 
5.6.1  SOCIAL RELIEF OF DISTRESS GRANT AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
This grant is especially significant to this research because it has the potential to provide 
emergency feeding in times of great need. This last point is emphasised by the fact that in 
practice the social relief of distress grant takes the form of successful applicants being issued 
with food vouchers.503 My arguments in favour of greater use of the social relief of distress 
grant in appropriate circumstances will mirror the arguments in favour of the Basic Income 
Grant (to be discussed later). Healthy, unemployed adults below a determined age-threshold 
                                                 
498  The specifically listed categories are: people with social grant applications pending or who have appealed 
against the suspension of their grants; sick people who cannot work as a result but are likely to recover 
within six months; single parents unable to obtain maintenance from the other parent; a single parent 
whose deceased partner left them no inheritance; a parent whose spouse (who was the family’s 
breadwinner) has been institutionalised for under six months; those affected by natural disasters like 
tropical cyclones or fires or other emergencies; those unassisted by other organizations; people with no 
one in their household benefiting from a social grant. 
499  Fund Raising Act 107 of 1978. 
500  Brand “Between Availability and Entitlement: The Constitution, Grootboom, and the Right to Food ” 
Law, Democracy and Development (2003) Vol 7 No 1 (1) 17. 
501  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme (background paper for 
South African National Non-Governmental Organisation (SANGOCO), the South African Human Rights 
Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality 11. 
502  Regulation 29 in Government Notice No R418 (31 March 1998) as amended by Government Notice No 
R1233 (23 November 2001). The regulations also allow the Director-General, in exceptional 
circumstances, to fund transportation costs to a medical facility where no other transport options exist or 
to transport an applicant to begin work so that they will no longer be dependent on the state.  
503  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme (background paper for 
South African National Non-Governmental Organisation (SANGOCO), the South African Human Rights 
Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality 11. 
 106
are not eligible for child grants or old-age pensions. Such people are clearly vulnerable to 
food insecurity. The social relief of distress grant has the potential to ensure that the state’s 
social security net is widened somewhat to provide basic assistance to such people in times of 
emergency. The fact that in practice this grant takes the form of food vouchers means that no 
argument can be made that recipients may well waste a monetary grant on unnecessary and 
harmful practices or substances like gambling, alcohol and illegal drugs. 
 
Govindjee points out that in practice the award of social relief of distress grants are rare.504 
Brand goes even further to provide examples of how the social relief of distress grant has 
fallen into disuse.505 The case of Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social 
Services, Culture, Arts and Sport in the North West Province provides authority for 
shortcomings of the social relief of distress grant.506 In this case indigent applicants who 
clearly qualified for a grant did not receive it owing to administration shortcomings in the 
North West provincial government. In light of the fact that the recipients of Social Relief of 
Distress Grants receive food stamps, it is arguable that the Kutumela case is the closest case 
yet to a direct right to food challenge. The Kutumela case also provides authority for the link 
between the need for administrative justice for the provision of a socio-economic right. 
Furthermore the case is an indicator that the state policy in relation to the implementation and 
roll-out of the social relief of distress grant has not been reasonable.507 In light of the 
potential of the grant to feed hungry people during times of crisis, the clear under-utilisation 
of the grant should be urgently remedied.  
 
It would be an incomplete discussion of the Kutumela case to not mention the government’s 
response to the order wherein it formulated the Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of 
Distress.508 It would appear as though the state adopted the Manual in response to the threat 
of contempt of court proceedings against the Minister of Social Development in the Kutumela 
case. What the Manual does is provide for the implementation of social relief of distress 
                                                 
504  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 131. 
505  Brand “Between Availability and Entitlement: The Constitution, Grootboom” in Law, Democracy and 
Development 18. 
506  Case 671/2003. 
507  Due to the link between the social relief of distress grant (which takes the form of food vouchers) and 
realising the right to food, it can be clearly argued that an unreasonable approach to implementation of 
this grant is also unreasonable in so far as it forms part of the broader right to food.  
508  www.gov.za (accessed on 1 November 2006). November 2005 and February 2006 drafts of the 
Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress exist. 
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grants in instances of undue hardship. The Manual provides guidelines on who should be 
considered to be facing “undue hardship” and hence applicable for the grant.  The Manual 
lists various categories of vulnerable people as instances of those facing "undue hardship". 
Although a discretion remains, examples of these categories are unemployed people of 50 or 
older not qualifying for another form of pension who cannot support themselves or their 
children; unemployed people evicted from where they live; singles parents unable to work 
due to their care-giving responsibilities and therefore cannot adequately feed themselves or 
their dependants; families where there are symptoms of malnutrition and stunted growth in 
children and homeless people without access to a nutritious meal.509 It is submitted that these 
guidelines if properly implemented provide a very useful starting point for ensuring that some 
of the most food insecure people in society are fed. The Draft Manual also sets out a 
mechanism for accessing funds for relief, provides control mechanisms and simplifies the 
application procedures.510 As has been argued throughout this research, the need for proper 
roll-out rather than rights on paper only, means that these measures to simplify and expedite 
how the scheme operates should also be welcomed. A final positive aspect of the Manual is 
its attempt to counter continued poverty through the integration of social relief measures with 
employment creation schemes.511 Again this development should be applauded as the need to 
link social assistance and social development is imperative. It would therefore appear as 
though the Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress is an extremely positive 
move. The question now remains how successful implementation of the Social Relief of 
Distress Grant will be in light of the rules and procedures contained in the Manual. 
 
There are certain criticisms of the nature and implementation of the distress grant which it is 
submitted are less compelling. Brand regards the temporary nature of the distress grant as 
being a concern.512 The distress grant has been established as an emergency measure for 
times of crisis. It is therefore submitted that to use this grant as a longer-term social security 
measure is to extend its use too far. Other means need to be formulated to provide longer-
term assistance to this category of needy people. The distress grant has also been criticised 
                                                 
509  Paraphrased from latest Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress. February 2006. 
www.gov.za (accessed on 1 November 2006). 
510  Ibid. Regulation 27. 
511  Ibid. Regulation 26(3). 
512  Brand “Between Availability and Entitlement: The Constitution, Grootboom” Law, Democracy and 
Development 18.  
 108
for the discretionary nature of it being awarded.513 However, it is submitted that this criticism 
is also lacking in substance as the very nature of the grant requires a judgement-call as to 
whether the applicants require immediate, material assistance to relieve the emergency 
situation they face. The normal rules of administrative justice would apply to the decision 
whether to accept or reject the application. Furthermore, clear guidelines are provided as to 
the specific situations of distress envisaged by the Fund Raising Act for the provision of the 
grants together with Director-General’s wider discretion, in exceptional circumstances, to 
provide a grant to prevent undue hardship. 
 
5.7  INCOME GENERATION AND JOB CREATION STRATEGIES 
 
The formulation of proposed income generation and job creation strategies fall beyond the 
scope of this research. In addition to simply making note of a few such strategies which tie in 
with food production, it suffices to say that creating jobs and generating income are keys 
ways of realising the right to food. Govindjee makes the general observation that the South 
African government is making increased attempts to adopt economic policies at a national 
level which stimulate economic growth and job creation.514
 
The Community Based Public Works Programme of the Department of Public Works aims to 
alleviate poverty and has the rural poor as a focus area.515 Improved access to sufficient food 
should result from poverty reduction, especially in rural areas where it has been shown that 
food shortages and malnutrition are most prevalent. 
 
The Poverty Relief Programme of the Department of Public Works provides money to 
worthy, registered non-profit organisations. The type of projects funded are food production 
clusters, especially for households affected by HIV/ Aids, income generation projects and 
skills development.516
 
                                                 
513  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme (background paper for 
South African National Non-Governmental Organisation (SANGOCO), the South African Human Rights 
Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality 11. 
514  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 116. 
515  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Social Security.Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 25. 
516  Kallman Knowing and Claiming Your Right to Food 11. 
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The Poverty Relief Programme, Community Based Public Works Programme and similar 
projects of the Department of Public Works are obviously welcomed, mainly due to their 
employment-creation potential. For example, the Department of Public Works’ 2002/2003 
Annual Report indicated that 20 539 new jobs were created due to local-level public works 
activities.517 These and other income generation and job creation opportunities are positive 
initiatives in helping households to meet their basic needs, including the provision of 
sufficient food. According to the South African Human Rights Commission, these public 
works programmes are put together so as to meet an integrated cluster of needs, with 
employment-creation spin-offs and the production of assets and income to assist in meeting 
basic needs, including food.518 It is submitted that state recognition of the need for a holistic 
approach to poverty alleviation, with public works projects as a key component, is evidenced 
by significantly increased government spending on poverty reduction and vulnerability.519
 
Govindjee argues that state employment creation schemes should not be understood to 
constitute a state plan for social assistance.520 A similar argument can be made that 
employment creation schemes should not be considered as a state plan for meeting its right to 
food obligations. However, it is respectfully submitted that the key question is whether 
people are being adequately fed or not. Whether their proper feeding is a result of a direct 
food-provision scheme or via job creation which empowers people to buy their own food is 
not of great importance. However, the aforementioned arguments that food provision for 
those in positions of crisis is called for, is not changed by this point. Similarly, Mashava 
notes that if the economy cannot generate enough employment for people to be self-
sufficient, social assistance becomes a key way of alleviating poverty.521 It is submitted that 
in the context of the right to food such state assistance must take the form of direct provision 
of food (where necessary) and other measures to facilitate the provision or the means to 
produce or acquire adequate food in other all other circumstances. 
                                                 
517  Cited in South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food. Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 49 and South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Social 
Security Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 25. 
518  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food. Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 50. 
519  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food. Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) xi. 
520  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 116 and 117. 
521  Mashava “Introduction to the Right to Social Security in the South African Constitution” in Mashava (ed) 
A Compilation of Essential Documents on Economic, Social and Cultural RightsI: Economic and Social 
Rights Series 17. 
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 5.8  SOME PROPOSED STATE IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS WHICH ARE 
LIKELY TO IMPACT ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
5.8.1 BASIC INCOME GRANT 
 
The Basic Income Grant (BIG) has been put forward as one way to plug some of the 
aforementioned gaps in the social security system.522 A number of interested organisations, 
including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Black Sash, the South 
African Council of Churches and the South African National NGO Coalition have formed the 
Coalition of South Africans for a Basic Income Grant (the Coalition) to put weight behind the 
introduction of BIG in South Africa.523 This dissertation does not attempt to comprehensively 
consider all the pros and cons of BIG. The aim of including it in this research is to highlight it 
as an option still available to the state to achieve its social security obligations, and in 
particular the right to food.   
 
The Coalition has proposed the introduction of a basic income grant, of at least R100 per 
month,524 which would be paid out to all citizens regardless of their age, socio-economic or 
other status.525 The Taylor Report likewise understood BIG as a general social assistance 
grant applicable to all in South Africans.526 In other words, to relieve the administrative 
burden of determining who should receive a grant, the grant would be payable to all and 
recovered by way of taxation from those with financial means.527 Liebenberg therefore 
indicates that although the grant would not only be for the poor, its target would in fact be the 
                                                 
522  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 2. 
523  The Coalition of South Africans for a Basic Income Grant Accessed at www.drc.org.za/docs on 4 May 
2006. 
524  This figure was not unanimously accepted across the Coalition, with some arguing for a higher figure. 
However, the amount of R100 is significant in that four leading economists who researched the financial 
viability of BIG were unanimous in its affordability at a R100 per month per person level. BIG Financing 
Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 7 and 56. 
525  The Coalition of South Africans for a Basic Income Grant Accessed at www.drc.org.za/docs on 4 May 
2006. 
526  “Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 61. 
However, Liebenberg indicates that whilst BIG would be paid to everyone, including children, recipients 
of other social grants would be excluded. Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications 
of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa” 249. 
527  The Coalition proposes that the necessary funding for BIG could be raised from a combination of 
personal income tax, company tax, value-added tax and excise tax. BIG Financing Group Breaking the 
Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 7. 
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poor and hence BIG would have a redistributive effect.528  Significantly, the Coalition called 
for the acceptance of BIG as part of a comprehensive social protection strategy, of which BIG 
would form a part.529  
 
A number of positive comments have been made as to BIG’s potential as a useful tool to 
counter poverty in South Africa. Submissions made to and accepted by the Taylor 
Commission indicated the potential of BIG, more than any other potential social protection 
measure, to alleviate the worst affects of poverty and unemployment and to promote 
development.530 The Coalition regards the creation and implementation of BIG as a key 
intervention to alleviate some of the poverty under which so many South Africans live531 and 
to promote development.532 COSATU indicates that BIG provides all households with 
income security, however small, thereby improving their stability and potential for further 
economic improvement.533  On the basis of its extensive research, the Coalition concluded 
that BIG is both affordable and feasible to implement in South Africa.534
 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned and other potential advantages of BIG and various 
calls for it to be accepted by government, Govindjee notes that government has to date 
decided against establishing a basic income grant535 and has shown no signs of changing this 
decision.536 The main arguments which have been raised against having a basic income grant 
include employment creation being preferable to handouts, the notion that BIG would create 
a culture of dependency, the possibility of public works projects being sidelined in favour of 
                                                 
528  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 249. 
529  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 8. 
530  “Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 62. 
531  The Coalition of South Africans for a Basic Income Grant Accessed at www.drc.org.za/docs on 4 May 
2006 and BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South 
Africa 7. 
532  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 8. 
533  Cited in Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform 
in South Africa” 249. 
534  Ibid. 
535  BIG was rejected by Finance Minister, Mr Trevor Manual in his 2004 Budget Speech. Accessed at 
www.gov.za/speeches on 30 March 2006. 
536  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 136 and 137. 
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BIG and that BIG is neither affordable nor feasible to implement.537 Each one of these 
criticisms was confronted head-on in the Coalition’s research and, for what it is worth, found 
to be lacking in sufficient substance.538  
 
In accordance with the separation of powers doctrine, government is perfectly entitled to 
reject BIG, as it has done, and to pursue any other (reasonable) policies it sees fit. However, 
it is submitted that a basic income grant of even just R100 would go some way to enabling all 
South Africans to have access to sufficient food. Govindjee regards continued academic 
argument in favour of BIG to be pointless, owing mainly to government’s express rejection 
of the proposal.539 Against this view, the South African Human Rights Commission’s latest 
Right to Food Report says that BIG should continue to be considered as a poverty addressing 
option, especially for people of working age.540 It is submitted that further lobbying for BIG 
as part of an overhauled social security system is called for in order to better realise the right 
to sufficient food in South Africa. 
 
5.8.2  FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION RELATING TO FOOD 
 
Framework legislation has been described as a new type of law, its main aim being to provide 
a single, all-encompassing and co-ordinated means for implementing national policy and 
strategy relating to a particular right.541 Framework law is intended to cover the whole 
spectrum of issues related to a subject (like food security) and to facilitate a holistic, 
harmonized approach thereto.542 In so doing, framework law highlights and accentuates the 
link between constitutional rights, policies and laws.543
 
                                                 
537  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 34 to 
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538  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 63. 
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Legislation” 670. 
542  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 20. 
543  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 670. 
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Khoza says that framework law has four main generally accepted stages or parts: evaluation, 
drafting, implementation and monitoring, each with particular characteristics.544 Firstly, 
evaluation can be understood as the way in which existing law and policy and their 
implementation are “audited” in order to fill gaps and avoid duplication in the current system. 
Secondly, drafting is the creation of the framework laws themselves. Significantly, Coomans 
and Yapko indicate that civil society has a central role to play in policy creation and 
planning.545 Furthermore, the drafted framework laws should aim to translate a constitutional 
right (like the right to food) into definitions of different parts of the right, guidelines and 
targets.546 Thirdly, implementation is the way in which the framework law is converted into 
realisation of the right. A significant difference between framework law and “ordinary” 
legislation is the creation of specific means of implementation, including powers, policies and 
possibly implementation benchmarks.547 Finally, in terms of monitoring, Khoza argues that 
this becomes a far easier task in light of the creation of targets in an earlier stage in the 
process.548 Linked with monitoring of compliance with the frameworks laws is enforcement 
and remedies. Coomans and Yapko indicate that enforcement and remedies may be political 
in nature in the form of parliament, or legal remedies by way of judicial or administrative 
mechanisms.549
 
A more controversial aspect of food framework legislation is the call by academics Khoza, 
Coomans and Yapko that the legislation should incorporate a minimum core right to food.550 
Arguments in favour of a minimum core right to food is based largely upon two General 
Comments of the United Nations Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.551 
However, the differences between the right to food in section 27 of the South African 
Constitution and the right to food in article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
                                                 
544  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 672. 
545  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 24. 
546  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 22. 
547  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 673. 
548  Ibid. 
549  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 23. 
550  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 672 and Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and 
South African Perspective” 22. 
551  General Comments 3 and 12 of United Nations Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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Social and Cultural Rights (the latter upon which the Commission issues authoritative 
interpretations) have been pointed out earlier in this research. A stronger argument made in 
favour of incorporating a minimum core right to food is based on a broad interpretation of 
South African Constitutional Court case law. Khoza argues that both the Grootboom552 and 
TAC553 decisions, in highlighting the need for government policy to protect the most 
vulnerable members of society in order to be reasonable, indirectly calls for the right to food 
to take a minimum form.554 Coomans and Yapko similarly argue for the right to food in 
South Africa to be given a minimum core content below which the right loses its meaning.555 
This minimum core debate will be revisited below when food framework legislation is 
evaluated.  
 
Now that the key characteristics of framework legislation have been pointed out, it is 
necessary to consider the arguments for its application to the right to food in South Africa. 
The Constitutional Court in Grootboom, in considering the government’s housing policy, 
mentioned framework legislation as a method of effectively realising a right.556 However, the 
court did not elaborate on the meaning of the concept further because it did not have to as 
existing national housing legislation was found to be in place already.557 However, the same 
cannot be said for legislation relating to the right to food in South Africa. Hence an 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of creating food framework legislation is 
called for. 
 
There is international law authority and encouragement from the United Nations Commission 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights for the creation of framework legislation for a co-
ordinated national approach to the right to food.558 Furthermore, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food has also called for national governments to set up 
framework legislation for the right to food in accordance with international law food 
                                                 
552  Supra. 
553  Supra. The basis of both these decisions will be explored in much greater detail in the next Chapter. 
554  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 671. 
555  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 22. 
556  Grootboom para 40. 
557  Ibid. 
558  General Comment 12, Paragraph 29 of the United Nations Commission on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
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obligations.559 The establishment of a co-ordinated legislative approach to the right to food 
must be a move in the right direction in light of the piecemeal approach of the South African 
government to date highlighted earlier in this Chapter. The creation of benchmarks to 
measure implementation of the right would allow more effective monitoring of whether 
people are receiving sufficient food and provide tangible means by which the right may be 
more easily actionable. The more concretisised approach of food framework legislation to 
implementation, which goes beyond policies requiring elaboration by government, is what 
distinguishes framework legislation from the aforementioned National Food Security Bill for 
Coomans and Yapko.560  
 
Academics have highlighted a number of other advantages of implementing food framework 
legislation in South Africa. Khoza argues that the involvement of civil society in the 
formulation of framework legislation law and policy would be a far more democratic process 
than the status quo.561 Khoza also believes that framework law creates co-ordination and co-
operation between state and non-state bodies and greater accountability in realizing the right 
to food.562 Coomans and Yapko highlight that framework law can more clearly indicate the 
content of the right to food as well as establishing and accentuating the interdependence 
between the right to food and other rights like the rights to land and life.563 This recognition 
of the interdependence of rights should be welcomed and accords with submissions made in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation as to the connection between the right to food and other 
constitutional rights discussed. 
 
Framework legislation can also be criticised on various grounds. The executive branch of 
government often has to adapt its plans to changing circumstances. For example, natural 
disasters like floods or famine are likely to significantly change both the food needs in the 
country and our food production potential. The establishment of benchmarks and targets in 
food framework legislation may well be inadequately flexible to deal with these changing 
                                                 
559  Cited in Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 20. 
560  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 32. 
561  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 680 
562  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 672. 
563  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 21. 
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eventualities caused. Furthermore, Coomans and Yapko question whether framework 
legislation is the most apposite place for dealing with policy issues.564 To elaborate on this 
possible weakness, in a “normal” legislative setup the executive is given the room to develop 
policy within the broader confines of legislation. However, framework legislation could be 
said to overly fetter this discretion of the executive. Coomans and Yapko also indicate the 
risk that in its attempt to be so multi-faceted, food framework legislation has the potential to 
become highly complex and thereby unworkable.565 However, notwithstanding the 
disadvantages of framework legislation, which do exist, the arguments in favour of its 
creation would appear to outweigh the possible negatives. 
 
A last point which needs to be discussed is whether framework legislation on the right to 
food, if implemented, should incorporate a minimum core right to food. Khoza acknowledges 
that the Constitutional Court did explicitly reject the concept of a minimum core of rights in 
both Grootboom and TAC.566 It is submitted that to explicitly incorporate a minimum core 
right to food in framework legislation cannot be done as it would go against existing judicial 
precedent. However, the creation of mechanisms to provide adequate food and nutrition to 
the most vulnerable members of society is both normatively called for to ensure that the right 
to food is a tangible right for those in great need, and would also follow the precedent of the 
Constitutional Court in the Grootboom and TAC judgments. 
 
5.9  CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
An October 2003 government report concluded that, 
 
“government has both a constitutional obligation and political and moral commitment to 
ensuring that all in South Africa have the means to meet their basic needs”.567
 
It is submitted that this sentiment accurately reflects government’s obligations, including the 
duty to ensure everyone has access to sufficient food. This Chapter has considered some of 
the existing and proposed policies, programmes and laws for realising the right to food. 
                                                 
564  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 24. 
565  Ibid. 
566  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 671. 
567  Government Draft Report: “Towards a Ten Year Review” (October 2003) cited in BIG Financing Group 
Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 6. 
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Whilst various options are open to government, it seems as though government’s current food 
stance is unlikely to pass constitutional scrutiny by the courts in relation to the right to 
sufficient food in section 27(1)(b) and the right of children to basic nutrition in section 
28(1)(c).568 Mubangizi argues that although there has yet to be a specific right to food 
constitutional challenge,569 he predicts that in the event of such a challenge the courts will 
oblige the state to meet its constitutional obligations in light of the precedent in 
Grootboom.570 In support of Mubangizi’s view, I submit that the provision of sufficient food 
for all is an absolute priority for the South African government: a priority it is not adequately 
addressing at present. 
                                                 
568  In support of this submission, in addition to various other points made in this Chapter, the SAHRC noted 
that many people, especially children, had their right to food violated during the 2002/2003 reporting 
period due to poor government plans. South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth 
Economic and Social Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
569  Similarly, state provision of good nutrition for HIV/ Aids infected children or adults have yet to be 
challenged.  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social 
Rights Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 8. 
570  Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 137. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: FROM RIGHTS TO REALITY 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
 
The previous Chapters have shown that socio-economic rights, including the right to food, 
are enforceable and justiciable in South Africa. Ntlama highlights the importance of 
enforcement measures for socio-economic rights by arguing that: 
 
“The real test for commitment to human rights lies in the mechanisms that are put in place for 
their enforcement. In order to ensure that socio-economic rights do not end up as mere paper 
rights, the progress made in realising these rights must be closely monitored.”571
 
However, in relation to such monitoring, it is vital to differentiate between state aversion and 
incapacity to make adequate provision for a particular right. Such a differentiation is crucial 
in determining whether a limitation of a constitutionally protected socio-economic right is 
acceptable. Engh correctly indicates that even where a state has committed itself formally to 
realising socio-economic rights (as South Africa has done through its progressive 
Constitution), it may not have adequate leadership and political will to take action towards 
realisation of these rights.572 An example of unacceptable state conduct is the under-spending 
of budgetary allocations due to incapacity to properly access and manage funds. It is in just 
such circumstances that effective enforcement of state obligations, by the courts and other 
properly empowered bodies, is urgently required. 
 
This Chapter deals mainly with the enforcement of socio-economic rights by South African 
courts.573 The difficulty of coming up with effective judicial mechanisms to enforce the right 
                                                 
571  Ntlama “Monitoring the Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Some Lessons From 
the International Community” in Law, Democracy & Development Vol 8 2004 (2) 207. 
572  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 4. 
573  Ntlama says that the state bears the primary duty for implementing court orders. The courts become 
involved again if the state has allegedly failed to comply with the order. Ntlama  “Unlocking the Future: 
Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio-Economic Rights” (2003) Constitutional Law and Legal 
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to food, if such a claim were to arise, is all the more challenging owing to the lack of 
precedent concerning this socio-economic right. Due to the lack of direct case authority 
concerning the right to food in South Africa, it is necessary to consider court decisions 
relating to other socio-economic rights and then to draw analogies with a possible 
constitutional challenge relating to the right to food. The final part of the chapter will 
consider socio-economic right enforcement through the South African Human Rights 
Commission. 
 
The structure of the Chapter will be as follows: firstly, the rationale for the choice of cases 
analysed will be given. Secondly, each chosen case will be discussed in some detail in the 
form of mini-casenotes. The basic facts of each case will be given, the court’s decision and 
ratio decidendi. Throughout the case discussions, the significance of the constitutional 
challenge and judgment to a possible right to food challenge will be highlighted.  The 
Chapter will finish with the Human Rights Commission discussion. Constitutional 
jurisdiction of South African courts, access to court and locus standi were all canvassed in 
Chapter 2 and will therefore not be repeated in this Chapter.574
 
6.2  CASE ANALYSIS 
6.2.1  RATIONALE FOR THE CHOICE OF CASES ANALYSED 
 
My earlier discussion has shown that the content of socio-economic rights is sometimes not 
very clear. Ntlama argues that litigation is necessary to delineate the ambit of socio-economic 
rights.575 The reason for not analysing cases dealing directly with the right to food is quite 
simply that no direct challenge relating to this right has been heard by our courts to date. 
However, there have been a few seminal Constitutional Court cases relating to other socio-
economic rights which have commented a great deal on socio-economic rights generally. In 
chronological order the cases in question are: Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-
                                                                                                                                                        
Theory Conference (Unpublished Paper distributed at a conference held at the University of the Western 
Cape, September 2003). 
574  The case of Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), which first discussed the justiciability of 
socio-economic rights will not be discussed. Instead cases which deal with specific socio-economic rights 
cases will be discussed as it was felt that these cases were of more relevance to a possible future right to 
food constitutional challenge. 
575  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio- Economic Rights” 3. 
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Natal576 concerning the right to emergency medical care; Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others577 relating to the provision of housing for 
the homeless; Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (1)578 
dealing with the provision of health care and Khosa and Others v Minister of Social 
Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development and 
Others579 dealing with the right to social assistance. Govindjee correctly points out that these 
judicial pronouncements indicate how the Constitutional Court has interpreted section 27 of 
the Constitution within the broader constitutional framework.580 These cases can be used to 
illustrate comparisons with the right to food and, in doing so, predict the way our courts are 
most likely to deal with issues relating to the right to food should they come before the 
courts. Brand indicates that these four key socio-economic rights judgments of the 
Constitutional Court have described the state’s duties to fulfil socio-economic rights.581 
These cases are discussed chronologically in order to show the development in the decisions 
of the Constitutional Court over time. The clear justiciability of socio-economic rights, which 
was adequately covered in Chapter 2, and was accepted in a line of constitutional cases 
starting with the Certification582 judgment, will not be repeated here. 
 
6.2.2  CASE STUDIES 
6.2.2.1  SOOBRAMONEY v MINISTER OF HEALTH, KWAZULU-NATAL583
6.2.2.1.1 THE FACTS AND COURT DECISION 
 
In this case the appellant, who suffered from chronic kidney problems and other health 
problems, was denied renal dialysis by a state hospital on the basis that there were 
insufficient dialysis machines to meet the demand. The hospital had in place guidelines for 
determining which patients would have the use of the machines due to the shortage. The 
appellant argued that his right to health care services in section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
                                                 
576  1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
577  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
578  2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
579  2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
580  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 97. 
581  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 178. 
582  Ex parte Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly: In re: Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
583  1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
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his right not to be refused emergency medical treatment in section 27(3) and section 11, his 
right to life, were being unfairly denied to him in terms of the existing state policy. The 
appellant therefore sought a court order compelling the hospital to provide him with the 
dialysis treatment.584
 
The hospital’s renal dialysis policy indicated that only those who qualified for a kidney 
transplant would receive dialysis until a transplant could be performed. To qualify for a 
kidney transplant patients needed to have no other major disease. Put simply, the policy 
provided for usage of the dialysis machines which would provide the greatest positive impact. 
It was common cause that the appellant did not meet this requirement due to, amongst other 
conditions, his chronic heart disease.585 It was held that there was no suggestion made by the 
appellant that the policy had not been applied rationally or fairly in his case.586
 
The appellant argued that terminally ill patients should be provided with life prolonging 
treatment by the state as part of their section 27(3) rights. It was further submitted on behalf 
of the appellant that state resources needed to be provided to meet the obligation in section 
27(3) in light of the right to life in section 11.587  
 
The court found against the appellant by holding that the term “emergency medical 
treatment” did not encompass on-going chronic treatment as in the appellant’s case. The court 
held further that section 27(3) should be read in light of the resource limitation provision in 
section 27(2). In the circumstances of this case the state did not have sufficient resources to 
provide renal dialysis to all those in need of it.588 Moellendorf also correctly points out that 
the court regarded the right to life as an unsatisfactory way of justifying the right to life-
sustaining medical care. Moellendorf cleverly explains the soundness of the court’s reasoning 
in this regard by arguing that the right to life does not allow a sick patient the right to claim 
resources (in this case life sustaining medical care) to the detriment of someone else.589
 
                                                 
584  Soobramoney paras 1 to 5. 
585  Soobramoney para 4. In addition the appellant’s kidney failure was irreversible and hence he did not 
qualify in terms of the stated hospital policy.  
586  Soobramoney para 25. 
587  Soobramoney para 7. 
588  Soobramoney paras 11 to 13 and para 22. 
589  Mollendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-Economic Rights 
Claims” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327. 
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Having dismissed the appellant’s claim in terms of section 27(3), the court had to consider 
the arguments in terms of section 27(1)(a) read with section 27(2). The court rejected the 
appellant’s argument that the court should order the state to make extra money available for 
kidney dialysis. The court noted that a reasonable and fair policy had been put into place by 
the hospital to decide who would qualify for treatment. Significantly, by allocating the scarce 
resources (the dialysis machines) in terms of the policy more benefits were achieved for more 
patients than would be the case if the dialysis machines were used for patients like the 
appellant.590  
 
Of critical importance to this analysis was the court’s finding that it would be hesitant to 
interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the responsible state authorities in 
such matters. The court acknowledged that it was not in the best position to properly make 
policy decisions as to the allocation of scarce resources. A major factor in the court’s 
reasoning was the great degree of interference in social and budgetary policies that would be 
caused by granting an order in favour of the appellant. The state has to manage the resources 
it has at its disposal in order to meet the constitutional socio-economic rights of as many 
people as possible. The court therefore found that the appellant’s constitutional rights, the key 
one being that contained in section 27(3), had not been unfairly denied. The appeal therefore 
failed.591
 
From a humanitarian perspective, the difficulty in making the decision in Soobramoney was 
emphasised by the appellant dying soon after the judgment was handed down.592 
Furthermore, the disparity between rich and poor was highlighted by Justice Chaskalson: 
 
                                                 
590  Soobramoney paras 23 to 30. Scott and Alston indicate that the court accepted that a court order for funds 
to be reallocated to allow the appellant to receive treatment would have an impact at three levels: 
1) All patients with the same illness would be entitled to the same claim. 
2) Patients with other ailments requiring expensive treatment at state expense would have a similar 
entitlement. 
3)  There might be similar claims for reallocation of scarce resources in other areas such as housing and 
education. These authors thus imply that such a multiplier effect of an order in favour of the 
appellant mitigated against an order in his favour. 
Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 241. 
591  Soobramoney paras 28, 29, 36, 58 and 59. 
592  Mollendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-Economic Rights 
Claims” 327. 
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“the hard and unpalatable fact is that if [Mr Soobramoney] were a wealthy man he would be 
able to procure such treatment from private sources”.593
 
6.2.21.2  SIGNIFICANCE OF SOOBRAMONEY TO THIS RESEARCH 
 
At first glance it might appear as if the judgment in Soobramoney has very negative 
implications for a possible constitutional challenge by a hungry or malnourished person to 
their right to food. For example, Ntlama594 describes as “shocking” Madlala J’s description of 
socio-economic rights as ideals which should be strived for.595 Ntlama’s strong and justified 
criticism of these sentiments of Justice Madlala arise from the fact that the clear justiciabilty 
of socio-economic rights, which I have already discussed at length, appear to have been 
ignored by the learned judge in this case through his relegation of these rights to mere ideals. 
It will be submitted that whilst the judgment in Soobramoney raises some questions as to how 
a right to food challenge could be successfully brought to court, the decision simply indicates 
the parameters in which such a challenge would have to be made. 
 
One of the obvious implications of Soobramoney is its indication of the court’s reluctance to 
blur the separation of powers doctrine through substituting its own view for that of a properly 
made executive decision. This view is apparent from the finding of Justice Chaskalson that: 
 
“A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political 
organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.”596
 
However, it important to note that the court did not rule out its power to make such 
“executive-like” orders. In limiting the ambit in which it is likely to take on a policy-making 
function, the Constitutional Court in the Soobramoney decision is simply reiterating the 
general rule. Although the words “slow to interfere” do suggest a degree of judicial 
deference, the restraint which the court indicates the judiciary should show is merely relative 
to the primary role which the executive has in making policy decisions.597 As was noted in 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation, in terms of the Certification judgment, our courts must 
sometimes move outside their usual boundaries in terms of the separation of powers doctrine 
                                                 
593  Soobramoney para 31. 
594  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio- Economic Rights” 1.  
595  Justice Madlala’s controversial description of socio-economic is found at paragraph 42 of the judgment. 
596  Soobramoney para 29. 
597  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 241. 
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to decide issues which usually fall within the sphere of other government branches.598 August 
v Electoral Commission599 clearly illustrates the willingness of our courts to dictate 
government spending when necessary.600 In relation to a hypothetical constitutional challenge 
on the right to food, it is in any event submitted that the understandable hesitancy of the 
courts, implicit in the Soobramoney decision, to interfere with an existing executive policy 
does not come into play because there exists no analogous policy (to renal dialysis treatment) 
in relation to state allocation of food. Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of any situation 
where someone in need of food could legitimately be denied that food in favour of another 
person. It is therefore submitted that the right to food is distinguishable from a Soobramoney-
type challenge in this regard.  
 
The Soobramoney decision is of clear relevance to a right to food claim in so far as the case 
highlights that the socio-economic rights in section 27(1) and 27(3) are subject to the caveats 
of “progressive realisation” and “available resources”.601 However, it is submitted that this 
finding of the court is merely a restatement of the provisions of section 27 and takes the 
matter no further. It is not argued that everyone in South Africa is immediately entitled to 
food. As will be seen in the discussion of later cases, most specifically in Grootboom, the 
Constitutional Court has rejected the idea of an entitlement to a minimum core of rights.602 It 
is argued that the right to adequate food in section 27(1) as qualified by section 27(2) should 
be read to mean that the state must put into place reasonable policies to ensure that no one in 
this country should suffer from serious malnutrition or die of hunger. This argument is even 
stronger in relation to the nutrition rights of children in section 28(1)(c) in that these rights 
                                                 
598  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 78. 
599  1999 (3) BCLR 1 (CC). Although this decision related to a civil and political right, it is submitted that its 
rationale is applicable to socio-economic rights like the right to food. See the quote from former 
president Nelson Mandela at the outset of the Introductory Chapter wherein he calls for both freedom and 
bread at the same time. I refer back to the quote in this context to argue that because such rights (civil-
political and socio-economic) are of equal importance, the need for courts to ensure that there is adequate 
spending on food is as important as a right like voting.   
600  This aspect of the August v Electoral Commission decision is supported in the words of Scott and Alston 
who say: 
“Coping with the budgetary implications of constitutional priorities is one of the central 
responsibilities of Parliament and the executive, and the courts stay well within their constitutionally 
mandated role if they adjudicate, as best they can, on matters of principle and allow budgetary 
implications to be factored into the fashioning of remedies.”  
Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 253 to 254. 
601  Soobramoney paras 11 to 13 and para 22. 
602  Grootboom para 33. 
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are not qualified by internal limitations. In support of this submission it is noted that the 
Soobramoney judgment held that despite the difficulties of providing socio-economic rights, 
the state is required by the Constitution to meet its section 27 obligations.603
 
Moellendorf raises the view that Justices Chaskalson and Madala use the concept of 
“available resources” in its narrowest sense to mean the resources allocated to a particular 
department.604 However, this part of the judgment should be balanced against Chaskalson P’s 
finding that the state has to manage its limited resources to meet a wide range of needs, 
necessitating at times a holistic approach to the needs of society as a whole.605 The last-
mentioned part of the judgment could be understood to imply the possibility of a court 
enquiry into the reasonableness of budgetary allocations in instances where core service 
provisions were unreasonably denied in budgetary allocations.  Moellendorf’s argument does 
raise a legitimate concern in that if correct, when applied to the right to food, would mean 
that the Department of Social Welfare could avoid feeding people on the basis of having been 
granted an insufficient budget to do so.606 However, it is still submitted that a broader 
conception of “available resources” is the correct one. In other words, “available resources” 
are the resources which could reasonably be allocated to the department in question.607 If the 
latter submission is correct, it would make a constitutional claim to the right to food against 
the appropriate state department(s) far easier.   
                                                 
603  Soobramoney para 36. However, to be balanced against the court’s acknowledgement of the state’s s 27 
obligations, Scott and Alston find it bemusing that the court did not even consider, let alone look into 
whether they had been satisfaction of minimum core obligations. Scott & Alston “Adjudicating 
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and 
Grootboom’s Promise” 251. 
604  Mollendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-Economic Rights 
Claims” 330, 332 and 333. In this regard he cites paragraphs 24 and 28 of the Soobramoney judgment in 
support of his interpretation of the decision.  Mollendorf concedes that a broader conception of “available 
resources” would not have resulted in a different result for Mr Soobramoney. However, his concern 
relates to the narrow conception of the term in so far as it might apply to the enforcement of more 
attainable socio-economic rights, like the right to food. 
605  Soobramoney para 31. 
606  In relation to budgeting issues, Scott and Alston indicate that the court could have intervened in 
budgeting issues in one of two ways: either through increasing the health budget or through re-
prioritising within the health budget. Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a 
Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 240. It has 
already been shown that the court regarded itself as the inappropriate body to make such budgetary 
allocations. Later in the same article, Scott and Alston argue that constitutional adjudication on positive 
obligations will always put pressure on the state to find the necessary resources, from within existing 
budgets or by raising more money (the latter normally through taxes). Scott & Alston “Adjudicating 
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and 
Grootboom’s Promise” 253.   
607  See footnotes 35 and 36 in Chapter 2 and the discussion related thereto. 
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Another factor of significance in relation to the progressive realisation of rights is the date 
when the Soobramoney case was decided. This case went to court just over a year after the 
1996 Constitution came into effect.608 There had thus been a relatively short period of time 
for government to progressively realise the right to health care. This fact is emphasised by the 
court’s finding that: 
 
“Given this lack of resources and the significant demands on them that have already been 
referred to, an unqualified obligation to meet these needs would not presently be capable of 
being fulfilled.”609 (own emphasis added) 
 
Now that the state has had over a decade (since the 1996 Constitution came into effect) to 
progressively realise section 27 rights, it is submitted that there would be less room for the 
state to escape its constitutional duty to ensure that adequate programmes are in place to 
ensure that everyone is sufficiently fed. 
 
A similar line of argument for submitting that a right to food claim would not be negatively 
affected by the Soobramoney precedent relates to the court having indicated that its decision 
would have been different had the necessary dialysis treatment been available but denied.610 
Thus provided that there are sufficient state resources available to adequately feed everyone 
in South Africa, then the Soobramoney judgment is actually authority supporting provision of 
adequate food. Research cited in Chapter 3 indicates that food shortages and malnutrition in 
South Africa are due to problems of uneven allocation of resources rather than a lack 
thereof.611
 
Scott and Alston regard as worrying the apparent conflation of section 27(1) with section 
27(2) in Soobramoney.612 In other words, they see the court as having inadequately examined 
the requirements of section 27(1), as read with the need to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
rights in the Bill of Rights (as section 7(2) requires), in its haste to stress that that the socio-
economic rights in section 27(1) are subject to the limitations of section 27(2). The authors 
                                                 
608  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 243. 
609  Soobramoney para 11. 
610  Soobramoney para 18. 
611  Mubangizi The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide 137. 
612  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 249. 
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see this as a potential relegation of section 27(1) to a mere definitional role. In light of my 
lengthy discussion in Chapter 3 of the proposed requirements of respecting, protecting, 
promoting and fulfilling the right to food, I would argue that it is wrong to relegate section 
27(1) to a purely definitional role. Thus in the context of a right to food challenge, although 
subject to the internal limitations of section 27(2), a court would need to consider the 
requirements of the provision of sufficient food in section 27(1)(b) in light of the section 7(2) 
requirements. 
 
Liebenberg highlights the significance of the Soobramoney judgment opting for a 
reasonableness review on the basis of a standard of rationality.613 In relation to this test, the 
state is given a wide discretion in terms of budgetary allocations. This would obviously apply 
to any state budgetary allocations in terms of food provision. For example, an applicant 
would not be successful in arguing that more money should be spent by the state in order to 
improve the variety of food provided. The only requirement is that the food provided would 
need to be adequate. 
 
Liebenberg614 warns that the Soobramoney judgment provides very little guidance on the 
standard of the rationality review to be applied and in what particular circumstances the court 
would intervene.615 If Liebenberg is correct in this assertion, the need to consider other cases 
dealing with socio-economic right provision is obvious. It is worth noting that our courts 
have on numerous occasions given much clearer guidance concerning the implementation of 
civil and political rights.616 Ntlama calls for our courts to provide equally clear guidelines for 
the implementation of socio-economic rights, as there is no basis drawn in the Constitution 
for these rights to be dealt with differently (and more vaguely) than civil and political 
                                                 
613  Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in Chaskalson; Kentridge; Klaaren; Marcus; 
Spitz and Woolman nd(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa  (2004) 2  ed 33-32. 
614  Liebenberg “The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights” in Chaskalson; Kentridge; Klaaren; Marcus; 
Spitz and Woolman (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 33-33.  
615  See also Scott and Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment 
on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 206 and 242 wherein the authors argue that whilst 
the decision in Soobramoney was correct, its reasoning was poor in various respects and therefore it does 
not serve as a very helpful precedent. They indicate that the Soobramoney decision requires the 
legislature and executive to have acted in good faith. Scott and Alston interpret this good faith 
requirement broadly to require that the legislative and executive purposes in question align with a sincere 
commitment to realising the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
616  For example, in Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) the CC ordered the 
instatement of someone denied work due to being HIV-positive. Significantly, the court indicated how 
the Respondent’s compliance would be monitored. Another example is Strydom v Minister of 
Correctional Services 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W), in relation to failure to provide prisoners with electricity, 
where the court gave a time-period for a report to be provided to the court. 
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rights.617 On the basis of the interdependence and interrelatedness of civil and political rights 
with socio-economic rights (discussed in previous chapters), it is submitted that Ntlama is 
correct in his appeal for this approach to be adopted by our courts.   
 
It has already been noted that the court in Soobramoney was hesitant to unduly interfere with 
the executive’s task of creating policy and budgets. The court was concerned that a ruling in 
favour of the appellant would result in various other claims to expensive medical 
treatment.618 Such multiple claims would require budgetary alterations to the prejudice of 
other needs the state must meet. A very difficult choice was made that Mr Soobramoney’s 
claim to life-prolonging dialysis was disproportionate to the drain on state resources which 
his treatment would have entailed. This reflects a clear utilitarian ideal: the greatest good for 
the greatest number should be promoted.619 However, I submit that a court award in favour of 
the right to food is unlikely to have equally expensive ramifications to the prejudice of other 
types of service delivery. The treatment sought by Mr Soobramoney was very expensive, 
quite unlike the provision of the most basic of foodstuffs. Furthermore, I cannot conceive that 
a denial of certain people sufficient food could ever be in accordance with the principle of 
utilitarianism.  This type of necessary trade-off between competing interests Scott and Alston 
term “principled normative trade-offs”.620 By way of a different example, invariably the right 
to free speech is restricted to some degree by the privacy rights of others and vice-versa. 
Whilst fully accepting the need to balance rights, which clearly form the basis for Mr 
Soobramoney failing in his application,621 it is argued that there would be no acceptable 
trade-off vis-a-vis food rights. In other words, there is no analogous reason to deny anyone 
the right to food, unlike the case of Soobramoney where an order in favour of the appellant 
would have invariably led to suffering for someone else or others. 
 
                                                 
617  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio- Economic Rights” (2003) 
8. 
618   Soobramoney para 28. 
619  Scott and Alston highlight that the kidney dialysis machine allocation policy in place as opposed to an 
order in favour of Mr Soobramoney was beneficial both in terms of the number of persons able to benefit 
and the quality of the benefit. Scott and Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational 
Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 243. 
620  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 219 and 238. Scott and Alston note that the court did 
not interpret s 27(3) too generously due to the aforementioned trade-offs between rights of different 
people to health care.  
621  Because dialysis for him would result in shortfalls for others. 
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As an aside, it is apparent from Soobramoney that cases concerning socio-economic rights 
allocation are difficult and frequently emotive.622 However, it is also clear that a successful 
constitutional challenge requires a clear legal basis. It will therefore not suffice to base a 
court challenge on the right to food upon compassionate grounds.  
 
In concluding this discussion of Soobramoney, it is perhaps useful to note Scott and Alston’s 
view that the case should be seen as merely an initial step in socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence. They make this submission on the basis that the case failed to consider 
international law and was considered and decided upon as a matter of great urgency.623  
 
6.2.2.2  GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS v 
GROOTBOOM AND OTHERS624
6.2.2.2.1 THE FACTS AND COURT DECISION625
 
The appellants in this case represented local, provincial and national government responsible 
for housing in the Cape Metropolitan Council (Cape Metro.). They challenged findings of the 
Cape Provincial Division626 ordering them to provide the respondents, who were children 
(together with their parents), with adequate basic shelter or housing until they obtained 
permanent accommodation.627
 
The respondents’ original claim was based on an alleged denial of their constitutional rights 
to housing in terms of section 26 and the rights of children in terms of section 28 (1)(c) to 
shelter.628 Section 26 provides that everyone has the right of access to adequate housing and 
                                                 
622  See in particular Soobramoney paras 52 and 59, as well as the compassion implicit in the judgment as a 
whole. 
623  Scott and Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 208. Clearly the rush, and by implication perhaps the 
dearth of international authority in the judgments, can be attributed to the appellant’s fast failing health; 
the decision had to be reached very quickly. 
624  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). Hereinafter referred to as Grootboom. 
625  This analysis will focus only on those facts and parts of the court order of particular relevance to this 
study.  
626  The provincial division decision is reported at Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 
(3) BCLR 277 (C). An urgent application was made to the High Court praying that the applicants be 
provided adequate basic shelter or housing until they received permanent accommodation.  
627  The Respondents were 900 homeless men, women and children who had been evicted from land where 
they were living illegally.  Grootboom paras 3 to 4. 
628  Grootboom para 12. 
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imposes an obligation upon the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures to 
ensure the progressive realisation of this right within its available resources.  
 
The Constitutional Court judgment of Justice Yacoob outlines the reasoning of the Cape 
Provincial Division, considers the nature of the right of access to adequate housing in section 
26 and its application and evaluates whether the state was meeting its section 26 obligations. 
Finally, the section 28 rights of children to shelter is considered. In this brief analysis of the 
judgment, I will mainly focus on the court’s interpretation of the right to housing and the 
state’s obligations in terms of the section. I will touch briefly on the court’s rejection of the 
applicability of the section 28 arguments. These aspects are considered due to analogies 
which can be drawn between these rights and the right to food in sections 27 and 28 of the 
Constitution. 
 
The court accepted the clear justiciability of socio-economic rights in our Constitution. The 
only question to be answered was how to enforce such rights; in this case, the right to 
housing.629 The court held that section 26(2) of the Constitution requires the state to devise 
and progressively implement, within its available resources, a comprehensive and co-
ordinated programme to realise the right of access to adequate housing.630 The court noted 
that the measures adopted by the state must be reasonably able to meet the aims of the right in 
question.631 A key issue related to the need to provide assistance for those with no access to 
land or roofs over their heads, and who were living in intolerable or crisis conditions. The 
court decided that the state was not meeting its section 26 obligations in that the housing 
programme in the Cape Metro. did not make reasonable provision, within its resources, for 
this most vulnerable group of people just mentioned.632
 
The right of access to adequate housing was considered in relation to other related socio-
economic rights and the Constitution as a whole. The court found that the state was 
constitutionally bound to take positive steps to meet the urgent needs of those living in abject 
poverty, homelessness or inadequate housing.633  
                                                 
629  Grootboom para 20. 
630  These requirements were taken virtually straight from s 26 by the court. Grootboom para 21. 
631  Grootboom para 41. 
632  Grootboom para 52. 
633  Grootboom para 24. 
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 The court found that the right to adequate housing in section 26(1) should be read together 
with the requirements of section 26(2), including the need to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures to realise the right. In attempting to interpret the obligations imposed by the 
right, the court found that there was, at the very least, a negative duty on the state and all 
others not to prevent or prejudice the right of access to adequate housing. This negative right 
was found to be emphasised by the prohibition of arbitrary evictions in section 26(3). The 
court decided that adequate housing entails land upon which a structure is built, the structure 
itself and municipal servicing of the land and dwelling.634
 
In relation to positive obligations, the court decided that responsibility for access to adequate 
housing rests with the state and private bodies, including individuals themselves, but such 
involvement requires enabling legislative and other measures. The state had to create the 
conditions for access to adequate housing for people in all income-brackets. For those able to 
afford adequate housing, the state was still found to have obligations in facilitating the 
logistics for purchasing or building such houses. For those unable to afford adequate housing, 
the court looked closely at the relationship between the right to housing in section 26 and the 
right to social security and social assistance in section 27.635 In Chapter 3 I indicated the logic 
for the link between social security (including social assistance) and other socio-economic 
rights: the provision of adequate social security facilitates easier individual access to things 
like housing and food. 
 
An important aspect of the judgment is the breaking down of the different requirements of 
section 26(2): what reasonable legislative and other measures mean, as well as the internal 
limitations of progressive realisation and resource limitations. A reasonable programme, it 
was held, has to carefully allocate tasks to different levels of government and provide 
adequate money and people to do the jobs. Furthermore, co-operation is required between the 
different government levels, with commitment from all government levels. The court, 
however, identifies national government as bearing overall responsibility for the programme 
and highlights the important need for it to equitably allocate budgets.636  
 
                                                 
634  Grootboom paras 34 to 35. 
635  Grootboom paras 35 to 36. 
636  Grootboom paras 39 to 40. 
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In relation to the court’s analysis of the measures to be taken to realise access to adequate 
housing, the court can be said to have taken a middle path between the apparent judicial 
conservatism of Soobramoney and a directly interventionist approach. The court decided that 
measures have to create a coherent public housing programme with the aim of and potential 
for progressive realisation of the right of access to adequate housing within the state’s 
resource limitations. Provided the measures are reasonable, Grootboom held that it is the task 
of the legislative and executive branches of government to indicate the exact nature of the 
measures. If the measures are reasonable, the court will not interfere.637
 
The court then had to determine the reasonableness of the measures taken by the state at 
various levels. The Constitutional Court did not look to second-guess whether another or 
other measures could have done the job better, including spending money differently. The 
court rather looked at the measures that had been adopted and enquired as to whether they 
were objectively reasonable.  In order to be reasonable, the state was held to have a duty to 
act to achieve the planned result, and the legislative measures require support of suitable, 
well-directed executive policies and programmes. These policies and programmes had to be 
reasonable both in their formulation and roll-out. Significantly for this research, Grootboom 
held that a programme that excluded a significant segment of society could not be said to be 
reasonable. Furthermore, if the measures, though statistically successful, ignored the needs of 
those in most need, they might not be regarded as reasonable.638
 
The internal limitation of “progressive realization” was interpreted as requiring an 
improvement of access to housing over time through the minimising of legal, administrative 
and financial obstacles over time. The Constitutional Court decided that the concept of 
progressive realisation requires the state to move as:  
 
 “expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the goal”.639
 
The court held that “within available resources” means that what the state had to do, the 
timeframe therefore and the reasonableness of the measures were all to be measured against 
the barometer of the resources available for the task.640
                                                 
637  Grootboom para 41. 
638  Grootboom paras 42 to 44. 
639  Grootboom para 45. 
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 Having provided its interpretation of section 26’s requirements, the court then analysed 
whether the state had met these obligations. The Appellants were able to show the legislative 
and other measures they had adopted.641 The court began by noting the significant 
achievements achieved by the state in terms of the programme through significant 
expenditure and the building of a number of houses; this indicated an organised response to a 
clear need. The programme was also held to have the aim of progressive realisation of the 
right.  In attempting to answer whether the measures were reasonable, the court was happy 
with the allocation of state responsibilities and functions. The programme applied country-
wide and solutions for difficulties in particular areas were being sought.642  
 
The court had to determine whether the nationwide housing programme was flexible enough 
to deal with people in desperate need and to meet other urgent needs.643 In other words, the 
medium- and long-term aspects of the housing programme were held to be perfectly 
acceptable, the only issue related to short-term measures for people like the Respondents in 
crisis situations. The national housing programme did not have in place short-term housing 
measures for people in desperate need. The measures in place failed to provide temporary 
relief for people without access to land and shelter, people living in intolerable conditions and 
for people in crisis because of natural disasters, or because their homes were threatened with 
demolition. The question which then needed to be answered was whether such a gap in the 
programme could be considered reasonable within the parameters of section 26.644 The 
Appellants raised a similar argument to that accepted in Soobramoney for denial of a right, 
namely that ordering provision for this category would unacceptably hamper the policy as a 
whole. The court rejected this argument of the appellants by holding that provision for those 
in desperate need formed an intrinsic part of the state’s duty in terms of section 26.  In 
coming to this finding the court indicated the need for a reasonable budgetary allocation for 
this category of housing need.645   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
640  Grootboom para 46. 
641  The state housing programme provided for the progressive realisation of access to formal housing, to be 
accessed via a waiting list. In casu, some had been on the waiting list for up to seven years. Grootboom 
para 8.  
642  Grootboom paras 47 and 50. 
643  Grootboom para 56. 
644  Grootboom para 63. 
645  Grootboom paras 64 to 66. 
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The court then had to apply its collective mind to the housing programme in place in the 
Cape Metro. and specifically the Oostenberg Municipality where the Respondents lived. The 
court decided that a mere progamme does not suffice without the requisite steps being taken 
to start and continue the programme, especially considering the urgency of the housing 
situation faced by those in the position of the Respondents. Effectual execution of the policy 
required an adequate national government budgetary allocation- which as has already been 
said, was lacking. The court found that allied with the need to recognise immediate needs at 
the national level of the housing programme came the need to plan, budget and monitor the 
implementation of these crisis-situation policies. This enforcement aspect, requiring intra-
governmental co-operation, had to ensure that a significant number of those in such a crisis 
situation were in fact benefiting in terms of the implementation of the policy.646
 
The Constitutional Court rejected the court a quo’s reasoning that the respondents, many of 
whom were children, and by virtue of the rights of these children, their parents, had to be 
housed by the state in terms of section 28(1)(c). The court came to this decision on the basis 
that the children were in the care of their parents, not the state.647  
 
The Constitutional Court issued a declaratory order requiring the state to meet its section 
26(2) obligations, specifically to create, fund, put into practice and supervise measures to 
assist those in desperate need. Significantly, the court held that there was no right to housing 
or shelter immediately on demand. Instead section 26 requires a reasonable programme to be 
in place and implemented.648 The problem with the existing programme in the Cape Metro. 
was its failure to assist those in desperate need of housing.649  
 
                                                 
646  Grootboom paras 67 to 69. 
647  Grootboom para 77. 
648  The court described such a reasonable progaramme as: 
 “coherent and co-ordinated”. 
Grootboom para 95. 
649  Grootboom paras 95 and 96. 
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6.2.2.2.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF GROOTBOOM TO THIS RESEARCH 
 
Grootboom has been described as the Constitutional Court’s most significant case dealing 
with the enforcement of socio-economic rights.650 In respect of the implementation of socio-
economic rights, Grootboom has been described as laying the foundations for the 
Constitutional Court’s future adjudication of socio-economic rights.651 De Vos sees 
Grootboom as showing a notable new commitment to seeking methods to enforce socio-
economic rights.652 Liebenberg describes Grootboom as an encouraging precedent for the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights, particularly those in sections 26 and 27, by the 
courts.653 The status of Grootboom as a benchmark in South African socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence is reflected in its moving away from the narrow approach evident in the earlier 
Soobramoney judgment and the adoption of much of its reasoning in the later TAC and Khosa 
cases.654 The clear relevance of the Grootboom case to this research into the right to food 
should be evident in that the wording of section 26(1) and (2) dealing with the right to 
housing, subject to internal limitations, is almost identical to the right to sufficient food in 
section 27(1)(b) subject to the internal limitations of section 27(2). Furthermore, the section 
28(c) rights of children include both adequate shelter and nutrition. Hence the Grootboom 
case warrants very careful analysis. 
 
Wesson views as a key aspect of the Grootboom decision, an attempt by the court to protect 
the needs of vulnerable groups in society, whilst leaving the co-ordination of socio-economic 
programmes mainly in the hands of the state.655 This opinion is supported by the Grootboom 
judgment’s indication that the nationwide housing programme fell short of the national 
government’s duties in not recognising the obligation to provide assistance for those in 
                                                 
650  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” (2004) Vol 20 Part 2 SAJHR 285. 
651  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 284 - 285. 
652  De Vos “Grootboom. The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” 
(2001) Vol 17 SAJHR 259. 
653  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 232. 
654  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 284.  
655  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 285. 
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desperate need.656 De Vos interprets this part of the decision as recognising the 
transformative aim of the Constitution which, in his view, sometimes obliges the state to 
speed up transformation. Where the state unreasonably fails to meet the socio-economic 
needs of the most vulnerable sectors of society, De Vos argues that such state action or 
omission is likely to amount to unfair discrimination.657 The protection of vulnerable groups 
principle is of clear relevance to the right to food in that the hungry and malnourished are 
unquestionably one of the most defenceless groups in society. In a similar vein, Chetty 
submits that policies that are not comprehensive and exclude children and/ or considerable 
numbers of people in desperate need are unlikely to comply with the requirements of section 
27.658
 
De Vos argues that the Grootboom decision reflects that the Constitution is underpinned by 
the need to achieve substantive equality in South Africa.659 Along these lines he sees the 
Constitution as an instrument of transformation towards a society where people live in 
dignity and without poverty, hunger and disease. In order to achieve such a society De Vos 
indicates that Grootboom highlights the need to consider constitutional rights within the 
prevailing social and economic context.660 De Vos’s argument, which is framed within the 
context of the vulnerable group of Respondents in Grootboom (who were vulnerable because 
of their lack of housing), is, it is submitted, equally applicable to those whose susceptibility 
stems from a lack of adequate food. The prevailing socio-economic position in South Africa 
is clearly one of gross inequality which begs the courts to ensure that there is a move towards 
a more equitable society.  
 
                                                 
656  Grootboom para 66. The court highlighted the needs of vulnerable groups in various other parts of the 
judgment too. For example, the court found that the state was constitutionally bound to take positive 
steps to meet the urgent needs of those living in abject poverty, homelessness or inadequate housing. 
Grootboom para 24. Furthermore, the court held that statistically successful measures which ignored 
those most in need might not be regarded as reasonable. Grootboom. para 44. 
657  De Vos “Grootboom. The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” 
262, 270 and 271. 
658  Chetty “The Public Finance Implications of Recent Socio-economic Rights Judgments” (2002) Vol 6 No 
2 Law, Democracy and Development 244. 
659   De Vos contends that the achievement of what he terms “contextual fairness” lies at the centre of the 
Constitutional Court’s equality jurisprudence. De Vos “Grootboom. The Right of Access to Housing and 
Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” 275. 
660  De Vos “Grootboom. The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness” 
268. 
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The court in Grootboom661 identified its role as ensuring the reasonableness, broadly 
construed, of the state action.662 The court noted that the measures adopted by the state must 
be reasonably able to meet the aims of the right in question.663 The court held that a 
programme excluding a major sector of society cannot be regarded as reasonable.664  In order 
to be reasonable, the state was held to have a duty to act in order to achieve the planned 
result, and the legislative measures require support of suitable, well-directed executive 
policies and programmes.665 Wesson contends that at the heart of the Grootboom case lay the 
need to decide what the obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures entailed, 
within the available state resources, to realise a particular socio-economic right.666  The 
policies and programmes had to be reasonable both in their formulation and roll-out. 
Liebenberg welcomes the court's emphasis on the duty to reasonably implement laws and 
policies. She argues that whilst there has been logical enthusiasm for policy and legislative 
development, even the most inventive programmes will fail without adequate institutional 
capacity and resources to properly deliver services.667 In the analogous right to food, this part 
of the Grootboom decision requires both reasonable feeding scheme policies and other food 
provision mechanisms for those in need, as well as adequate measures to ensure the proper 
implementation of the policy. The Constitutional Court has thus moved from the mere 
rationality enquiry of Soobramoney to the more probing reasonableness enquiry of 
Grootboom. The reasonableness enquiry, it is submitted, is more likely to result in a 
satisfactory interpretation of the state’s socio-economic rights obligations.668
                                                 
661  Grootboom para 41. 
662  Liebenberg regards the reasonableness test as the main test in Grootboom as to whether the state is 
fulfilling its positive socio-economic rights obligations.  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: 
The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa” 241. 
663  Grootboom para 41. 
664  Grootboom para 68. 
665  Grootboom para 44. 
666  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 287. 
667  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 242 and 244 to 246. Liebenberg provides a practical illustration of the severe consequences of 
the failed implementation of a state programme. On the basis of a cited case study, she indicates the 
severe, life-threatening, results of inadequate implementation of state social grants in the Mount Frere 
District of the Eastern Cape. The cited case study showed severe malnutrition amongst children due to 
the implementation problems. 
668  It may be asked why the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney was satisfied that Mr Soobramoney could 
legitimately be denied kidney dialysis, yet the state was failing in its obligations to the Respondents in 
Grootboom? De Vos provides a clear distinction between the facts of the two cases and compelling 
argues that the factual differences warrant the conflicting decisions. In Soobramoney the Appellant 
sought very expensive medical treatment when many others in the province and country did not even 
have access to adequate basic health care. By contrast, the Respondents in Grootboom were a very 
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 Brand discusses various other aspects of the Grootboom judgment which are indicators of 
whether the state’s measures to fulfil a particular right can be considered reasonable.669 For 
example, the state measures must be comprehensive and co-ordinated in terms of allocation 
of duties within government structures with available resources allocated.670 The measures 
must be able to adapt to changing needs and capable of responding to both short-term crises 
and longer term needs.671 Also according to the judgment, to be classed as reasonable, state 
measures to fulfil the right must not ignore a significant part of society.672  These aspects 
often mirror the requirements of international law (discussed in Chapter 3) and are of clear 
applicability to the right to food. In applying these requirements to the measures implemented 
by the state in relation to the right to food (discussed in Chapter 5), it is apparent that 
notwithstanding the somewhat more structured approach of the IFSS, there remains a lack of 
a clear, co-ordinated government response to the food challenges faced and greater human 
and financial resources need to be invested in the state’s response to the challenges. The lack 
of emergency feeding for those in crisis situations has already been stressed as a major 
oversight in the state’s right to food strategy and the fairly extensive hunger and malnutrition 
in much of South Africa is evidence that the existing approaches can be said to ignore a 
significant part of society.  
 
Whilst the previous paragraphs have highlighted the positive implications of Grootboom’s 
reasonableness requirements, it should be noted that the judgment has come in for severe 
criticism in relation to the actual enforcement of its decision.673 Wesson, for example, argues 
                                                                                                                                                        
vulnerable group of homeless people who sought inclusion in the state housing programme. According to 
De Vos, in terms of its transformative approach to the Constitution, it was therefore logical for the 
Constitutional Court to have denied Mr Soobramoney’s claim, yet accept that of the Respondents in 
Grootboom. De Vos “Grootboom. The Right of Access to Housing and Substantive Equality as 
Contextual Fairness” 260. Wesson provides a related basis for distinguishing between the cases. He 
argues that merely being vulnerable or unable to met one’s needs does not give a group an automatic 
claim to public resources. Instead, the court needs to establish whether the group has a reasonable claim 
to inclusion in a socio-economic rights programme from which others already benefit. Wesson 
“Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 293. 
669  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 179. 
670  Grootboom para 39. 
671  Grootboom para 43. 
672  Ibid. 
673  Wesson describes this crucial shortfall as a failure by the court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction. 
Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 286. 
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that the problem with Grootboom is not the judgment but the lack of enforcement thereof.674 
The court indicated that the state had fallen short of its section 26 obligations and ordered the 
state to remedy the situation. Crucially, however, it failed to set up satisfactory means to 
ensure that the remedial state action was satisfactory.675 Whilst the SAHRC was given the 
responsibility of supervising the implementation of the order and did file a report to the court, 
it had not received adequate information concerning the implementation of the order 
nationwide.676 There was therefore, in effect, no adequate follow-up to ensure state 
compliance with the order. This gap in the effectiveness of the judgment is reflected in the 
fact that a full two years after the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Grootboom, there 
remained substantial non-compliance by the state.677 The failure by the court to exercise 
supervisory jurisdiction is a glaring gap in the precedent of Grootboom towards acceptable 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence. As Liebenberg correctly asserts, the ultimate test of 
constitutional recognition of socio-economic right is whether they result in real 
improvements in the quality of life of all.678 A lack of court supervision into state measures, 
implemented in response to a successful constitutional challenge, calls into question whether 
any positive result is achieved from the “successful” court challenge in the first place.679 In 
order to prevent this weakness of the Grootboom judgment being perpetuated, proposals in 
the final Chapter of this dissertation in relation to the right to food will have enforcement of 
any court order on the right to food as a priority. 
 
Govindjee highlights the lack of timeframes for state compliance as a further weakness of the 
Grootboom judgment.680 This fair criticism is closely related with the aforementioned lack of 
adequate court supervision into state compliance with court orders handed down. In light of 
                                                 
674  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 306. 
675  The court did indicate that a court can require the state to give an account of its progress in implementing 
those measures. Grootboom para 42. However, this point was not taken far enough, in that no indication 
was made of a report-back to the court of the implementation of the order.  
676  Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future 
Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) Vol 19 Part 1 SAJHR 26.  
677  Pillay “Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” 
(2002) Vol 6 No 2 Law, Democracy and Development 277 Pillay rightly contends that the Grootboom 
judgment has been restrictively interpreted with the consequence that there has been seemingly little 
positive policy change in favour of vulnerable groups in crisis situations.  
678  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 233. 
679  I will take this point further in the concluding Chapter. 
680  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 99. 
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the repeated extreme tardiness of the state to provide social grants plainly owing to qualified 
recipients, the need for clear and enforceable timeframes for the state to comply with court 
orders relating to socio-economic rights seems apparent.681 In the context of a right to food 
challenge, where time is of the essence to avoid further malnourishment and conceivably 
starvation, there is a pressing need for clear timeframes for state compliance with court 
orders.  
 
It has already been noted that Grootboom recognised the urgent needs of the vulnerable group 
in question. The court interpreted progressive realisation as improving accessibility over time 
to both a larger number and wider range of people.682  This interpretation of the ambit of 
progressive realisation of the right to housing should apply mutatis mutandis to the right to 
food. In fact, the crux of Grootboom would appear to be that the Constitution requires the 
state to help those living in crisis situations or unbearable conditions.683 In so finding, I 
would argue684 that the court has narrowed the scope in which the state can escape liability 
for urgently meeting socio-economic rights in light of the “progressive realisation” caveats in 
sections 26(2) and 27(2).685 Liebenberg argues that the immediate needs of these vulnerable 
groups are urgent. If meeting these urgent needs takes a back seat to government's long-term 
economic growth goals, the individuals and families concerned will be irreparably harmed. 
The results of abject poverty include malnutrition, health problems and premature death.686 
Hence crisis-situation food provision is called for.  
 
                                                 
681  For example, Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government)[1998] 1 All SA 525 (E) 
in which a grant applicant had been unlawfully denied pension arrears owing to her. The state (in)action 
amounted to a lack of administrative justice. For a broader discussion of this issue see Plasket 
“Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” 497 to 501.  
682  Grootboom para 45. 
683  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 257. 
684  Liebenberg argues along similar lines that, in light of Grootboom, socio-economic rights programmes are 
subject to constitutional challenge unless tangible progress is made to improve their implementation. 
Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 246. 
685  The Grootboom judgment indicates that even if a progressive strategy is adopted, the expansion of access 
to programmes must be substantial enough to ensure that that “a significant number” of people living in 
severe poverty receive urgent assistance. Grootboom para 68. Whilst the court did not elaborate on what 
a significant number would be, this finding implies that the national feeding programme would have to 
be equally comprehensive to pass constitutional muster. 
686  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 254. 
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However, on the other side of the coin to Grootboom’s recognition of the urgent needs of 
vulnerable groups, is its rejection of the concept of minimum core rights.687 The court made 
this finding despite the existence of the right to a minimum core of socio-economic rights in 
international law. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
decided that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides for 
such a minimum core of rights.688  
 
The court’s rejection of a minimum core of rights would appear to negatively affect a right to 
food claim in that, as things stand, claimants would not be entitled to demand immediate 
provision of food.689 This argument is reflected in Grootboom’s rejection of the Respondents’ 
claim to shelter or housing immediately upon demand.690 However, Wesson argues that 
Grootboom’s rejection of the concept of the minimum core was justified. Wesson argues that 
the court was correct to reject the minimum core concept in that pro-minimum core 
arguments tend to overlook the complex relationship between core and non-core needs, and it 
is difficult to balance core and non-core needs against one another.691 Notwithstanding the 
dangers of the concept highlighted by Wesson, I would argue that there remains a strong 
constitutional argument for judicial enforcement of a minimum core of rights. The 
Grootboom judgment itself notes that the goal of the Constitution is to effectively meet 
everyone’s basic needs and that the progressive realisation requirement requires positive state 
steps to do this.692 I would argue further that Grootboom’s recognition that reasonable 
measures must cater for those in “desperate need”693 and those living in “intolerable 
conditions or crisis situations”694 implies a theoretical acceptance of the right to certain 
minimum service provisions.  Whilst the court rejected the concept of minimum core rights, 
the provision of basics for those in crisis situations seems to indicate the right of everyone to 
                                                 
687  Grootboom para 33. 
688  Para 10 of The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment 3 
issued in 1990. Cited in Grootboom para 29. 
689  Grootboom recognises the individual’s right to demand state measures to begin to meet the relevant 
urgent housing needs, but this right does not equate to an individual having the right to immediate 
provision of housing. Grootboom para 94. 
690  Grootboom para 95. 
691  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 300. Wesson also notes that the Constitutional Court has often cast doubt upon its 
own competence to define the minimum core. Ibid.   
692  Grootboom para 45. 
693  Grootboom para 96.  
694  Grootboom para 99. 
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certain indispensable levels of rights.695 It seems perverse that a right like the right of 
prisoners to vote was immediately enforced by the courts (in August v Electoral 
Commission)696 yet our courts have yet to recognise any minimum core of socio-economic 
rights to which all are entitled. A vulnerable group, like the Respondents in Grootboom, 
would clearly want (and I would argue need) an actual order that the state is duty-bound to 
provide them with at least the most basic aspects of the right that is being denied to them. 
Instead the Respondents received nothing tangible: the promise of an improved state policy 
from which no immediate benefits are derived for the litigants could be said to discourage 
vulnerable groups from going to court in the first place.697 People in crisis approaching the 
court for assistance surely seek an urgent improvement in their lives rather than court orders, 
which as far as the affected group are concerned, may or may not result at some undisclosed 
later date in an improvement in their situation. It is submitted that susceptible groups who are 
being wrongfully denied core socio-economic rights (like food and housing) should receive 
adequate food and proper shelter. Such ineffectual court orders are of little benefit for the 
“successful” litigants; because in reality they remain hungry and without shelter.  
 
It is clear from the Grootboom judgment that broadening access to various types of socio-
economic rights will have major resource implications for a resource-scarce country like 
South Africa.698 The needs are great but the state’s resources can only go so far. 
Notwithstanding the resource challenges, the court indicated that national government must 
equitably allocate money to other levels of government to meet their socio-economic rights 
obligations.699 On this basis, Liebenberg indicates that the state may not therefore ignore 
                                                 
695  Grootboom recognises that reasonable measures must take account of the degree and extent of the denial 
of the right they aim to realise. Furthermore, those with critically urgent needs, who are consequently 
most vulnerable, must not be ignored by the measures in place to provide the right. Grootboom para 45 
Yet not notwithstanding the court’s laudable recognition of the need to assist those critical need, the court 
failed to recognise that anyone has a minimum standard of rights which are individually enforceable. 
696   1999 (3) BCLR 1 (CC). 
697  Wesson points out a related fear that, in terms of the reasonableness test laid down in Grootboom, even 
minimal state efforts will be considered sufficient to compliance with the court's judgments. Wesson 
“Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 305. 
698  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 254. 
699  Grootboom para 40. The court also identified the state’s obligation to set money aside for the meeting of 
immediate requirements and the management of disasters. For the state to meet its constitutional housing 
obligations, its programme would have to be adjusted to include a focus on these urgent needs, even if 
doing so detracted from its long-term goals. However, beyond the requirement of reasonableness, the 
actual budgeting process was left in government’s hands. Grootboom paras 66 and 68. 
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immediate needs in favour of longer-term plans.700 However, as has already been stated, the 
immediate claim is to a reasonable policy and implementation thereof, not to the provision of 
the right itself to the claimant. It will be remembered that the Constitutional Court in the 
Soobramoney case was very hesitant to make any findings as to budgetary allocations by state 
departments.701 It would thus seem that the Grootboom judgment adopts middle ground 
between the hands-off approach of Soobramoney and an entirely interventionist judicial 
approach which could be said to blur the separation of powers doctrine. Wesson praises this 
approach in Grootboom as establishing a relationship of collaboration between the state and 
the courts, in terms of which these different branches of government apply their particular 
skills to the provision of rights.702 In practice, this requires the government to explain the 
reasons for its actions and for the judiciary to assess the reasonableness thereof. The 
executive branch of government is best placed to allocate budgets, but the courts serve a 
“checks and balances” function to ensure that the government action is objectively 
reasonable.703
 
The final aspect of the Grootboom judgment which I will deal with briefly, as it was rejected 
by the Constitutional Court as a ground for granting relief, are the rights of children in terms 
of section 28 of the Constitution. I have already noted the Constitutional Court’s rejection of 
the Cape High Court’s reasoning that the Respondents, the majority of whom were children, 
and by virtue of the rights of the children, their parents, had to be housed by the state to 
comply with section 28(1)(c).704  The Constitutional Court came to this decision on the basis 
that the children in question were in the care of their parents, not the state. The court 
explained that the court a quo’s decision created a number of illogical results. For example, 
adults with children would be entitled to housing by virtue of their having children, yet adults 
                                                 
700  Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 254. 
701  Soobramoney 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
702  Wesson “Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court” 284 and 293.  
703  Grootboom clearly held that it would not prescribe the form which state policy should take. The court 
recognised the broad range of choices available to the state. The courts are then empowered to enquire 
into the reasonableness of the chosen government measures. Grootboom para 41.  
704  Grootboom para 77. The court therefore held that the rights of children to basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care and social services in s 28(1)(c) was to be read as the embodiment of their s 28(1)(b) rights to 
family or parental care, or alternative (state provided) care when the family environment is lacking. 
Grootboom para 76. 
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without children would not.705 Sloth-Nielsen notes that the court being unable to discern a 
distinctive difference between the right of children to shelter in section 28 and the right to 
housing in section 26 was another reason for the court deciding that section 28(1)(c) did not 
create a direct and enforceable claim by children against the state.706 The court indicated that, 
unlike the facts in casu, the state only owes specific duties to children in terms of section 28 
if those children are in the care of the state, for example if the children live in a state 
institution.707 However, if children are in the care of their parents or other guardians and not 
the state, the direct obligation to house them falls on the parents or guardians.708 The court 
did, however, acknowledge the state’s indirect obligations to children to put into place laws 
which require parents to fulfill their responsibilities to their children.709 The indirect state 
obligation to provide mechanisms for the care of children by their parents or other guardians 
and direct obligation to provide care when parental care is lacking is in accordance with the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child710 and forms part of South African 
common law and statute.711 Sloth-Nielsen believes that Grootboom’s caution that the rights 
of children in section 28 cannot trump other socio-economic rights (for example in section 26 
and section 27) seems to indicate that the needs of children do not have to be accorded 
priority.712 However, I contend that the needs of children can still be highlighted in line with 
Grootboom’s acceptance of the need to prioritise government programmes which assist 
vulnerable groups with urgent needs. Children, who are dependent on others for support, will 
invariably constitute such a vulnerable group.  
 
                                                 
705  Grootboom para 71 Furthermore, providing unqualified socio-economic rights to children in all instances 
would make a nonsense of the caveats of progressive realisation and resource limitations applicable to 
other socio-economic rights. The court also warned that children could become stepping stones to 
housing for their parents instead of being valued in themselves. Ibid. 
706  Sloth-Nielsen “The Child’s Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, And Primary 
Prevention of Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom” 218. 
707  Grootboom para 77. 
708  Ibid. It is therefore clear that the state’s obligations to care for children is secondary to the obligations on 
the child’s parents or guardians. The state’s direct obligations, in this regard, only kick in when the 
parental care is lacking. 
709  Grootboom para 78. 
710  Cited in Grootboom at para 75. 
711  Sloth-Nielsen indicates that the parental duty of support is a trite aspect in common law and statute law in 
South Africa. (For example, parental obligations are found in the Child Care Act). The parental duty of 
support incorporates the provision of nutrition, shelter, and health care. Sloth-Nielsen, J “The Child’s 
Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, And Primary Prevention of Child Abuse: Some 
Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom” 225. 
712  Sloth-Nielsen “The Child’s Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, And Primary 
Prevention of Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom” 229. 
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In relation to a right to food court challenge, it would seem that Grootboom’s rejection of 
section 28 as a basis for upholding the claim is likely to be applicable to a right to food 
challenge too. In other words, a right to food challenge is unlikely to succeed on the basis of 
the section 28(1)(c) right to basic nutrition of children in the care of their parents or other 
guardians. Conversely, the Grootboom case is obiter authority for the state to be 
constitutionally bound in terms of section 28(1)(c) to provide basic nutrition for all children 
in its alternative care.713  
 
6.2.2.3 MINISTER OF HEALTH AND OTHERS v TREATMENT ACTION 
CAMPAIGN AND OTHERS (1)  
6.2.2.3.1 THE FACTS AND COURT DECISION 
 
The main point of contention in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 
and Others (1)714 was whether the measures adopted by the state to provide access to health 
care services for HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies fell short of the state’s 
constitutional obligations.  The government had in place a policy whereby an antiretroviral 
drug, Nevirapine, was made available only in selected research sites at certain government 
medical centres.715 The Respondents, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), challenged the 
constitutionality of the government’s programme as denying access to Nevirapine to people 
who did not have access to the research sites.  The government opposed the application 
mainly on the grounds that it alleged an incapacity to make the treatment available 
nationwide at that point in time. The Constitutional Court was hearing an appeal from the 
decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division (TPD)716 which found that the government had 
fallen short of its constitutional obligations. The TPD, per Botha J, found the government to 
have acted unreasonably in not reducing the risk of HIV-positive mothers passing on the 
virus to their babies at birth, in refusing to make Nevirapine available in the public health 
system when prescribed by the attending doctor and in failing to provide a timeframe for a 
                                                 
713  Sloth-Nielsen puts forward a rather tenuous argument that where child neglect arises purely because of 
poverty, the state could be ordered to adopt meaningful preventive measures. Sloth-Nielsen “The Child’s 
Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, And Primary Prevention of Child Abuse: Some 
Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom” 231 She makes this submission on the basis that the right 
of children to protection from abuse, neglect, maltreatment and degradation in s 28(1)(d) was held to be 
directly enforceable against the state. Grootboom para 78. 
714  2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC). 
715  The Constitutional Court describes the government’s HIV/ Aids treatment policy at paras 40 and 41 of 
Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) 
(hereafter referred to as TAC (1). 
716  Treatment Action Campaign and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T). 
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national programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV.717 The government 
appealed against this order of the TPD. One of the main arguments raised by the government 
in court was an alleged incapacity to provide the treatment as prayed for by the TAC and 
Others. 
 
The Respondents’ (the Treatment Action Campaign and Others) original claim was based on 
an alleged denial of the constitutional rights of access to health care facilities in terms of 
section 27(1), subject to the internal limitations of section 27(2) and the rights of children in 
terms of section 28(1)(c) to basic health care services.718
 
The court heard argument that sections 26 (the right to housing) and section 27 (the right to 
health care, food, water and social security) of the Constitution should be understood as 
imposing positive obligations on the state to both give effect to the content of the rights 
indicated in subsection one of section 26 and section 27 and to do so progressively subject to 
the limitations and requirements of subsection two of both sections.719  The Constitutional 
Court rejected the arguments put forward by amici curiae that everyone is entitled 
immediately to a minimum core of rights, finding instead that the state is duty-bound to 
progressively realise the rights in section 26 and 27 within its available resources provided 
that the measures adopted are reasonable.720 In so doing the court took a narrow and literal 
interpretation of the applicable sections. However, despite this finding the court also 
recognised that notwithstanding the extremely challenging task of achieving the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights, the state is duty-bound by the Constitution to do so.721   
 
The Constitutional Court re-examined the separation of powers doctrine by deciding that the 
judiciary is not best placed to make pronouncements upon matters where court orders could 
have compound social and economic results for the community. The court held that although 
court orders relating to reasonableness may have budgetary implications, the courts 
themselves should not rearrange budgets.722 Reading into this part of the judgment, it is clear 
                                                 
717  TAC (1) para 2. 
718  TAC (1) para 4. 
719   TAC (1) para 29. 
720   TAC (1) para 39. 
721  TAC (1) para 94. 
722  TAC (1) para 38. 
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that the court regards the important task of budgeting as the prerogative of the executive 
branch of government.    
 
As stated in the preceding paragraph, the Court recognised its constitutionally appointed role 
to assess the reasonableness of government programmes and their implementation in the 
context of this constitutional challenge. In doing this the Constitutional Court recognised the 
efficacy of Nevirapine as a suitable method of significantly reducing the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV.723 The existence of the research and test sites for treatment was 
found to be a reasonable policy on the basis of the information-gathering potential which 
could be garnished from such sites.724 However, the government’s failure to create and 
implement policies to treat all those who could reasonably be treated, where such treatment 
was medically prescribed, was found to be unconstitutional.725 The existing government 
policy was found to be unreasonable because it did not meet the needs of the mothers and 
their unborn children who had no access to the test sites.726  
 
The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous decision,727 set aside the TPD’s order and replaced 
it with a more specific order. The Constitutional Court declared728 that: 
 
- sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution require the government to create and put into 
place within its available resources a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to 
progressively realise the rights of pregnant women and their newborn babies to have 
access to health services to fight mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
 
- the aforementioned programme has to include sound measures for counselling and 
testing pregnant women for HIV, counselling HIV-positive pregnant women on what 
they could do to reduce the danger of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and making 
suitable treatment available to them to reduce that possibility. 
 
                                                 
723  TAC (1) para 131. 
724  TAC (1) para 64. 
725  TAC (1) para 135. 
726  TAC (1) para 67. 
727  Hopkins argues that the Constitutional Court’s order has essentially the same results for government as 
the TPD’s decision it replaced- the Constitutional Court’s order was simply stated in negative terms. 
Hopkins “Democracy in a Post-TAC Society” De Rebus (November 2002) 16. 
728  The order can be found at TAC (1) para 135. 
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- the existing government policy, and its implementation, for lessening the risk of 
mother-to-child HIV transmission failed to meet the requirements indicated in the last 
point in that: 
 
(i) doctors at public health institutions away from the selected research sites could 
not prescribe Nevirapine to reduce the danger of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV even where it was medically indicated and where satisfactory facilities 
existed for the testing and counselling of the pregnant women concerned; and  
 
(ii) the policy failed to make provision for counsellors at public health institutions 
away from the selected research sites to be trained in counselling for the use of 
Nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.729
 
In summary, the Constitutional Court therefore ordered the government immediately to 
remove the restrictions preventing the use of Nevirapine from being made available in the 
appropriate circumstances at public health institutions away from the existing selected 
research sites. It similarly ordered the government to allow and facilitate the use of 
Nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and to make it available 
for this purpose at state medical facilities when called for by the attending medical 
practitioner acting in consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility concerned. 
The Constitutional Court referred to an increased budgetary allocation to facilitate this.730 
The court held that the use of Nevirapine would, if necessary, include appropriate testing and 
counselling of the mother concerned which would require trained counselors at all such 
facilities. The Constitutional Court’s orders would not prevent the government from adapting 
its policy, providing such a change was constitutional, if equally suitable or better methods 
became available to it for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.731
 
Significantly for this research, the Constitutional Court clearly indicated that its finding does 
not mean that everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment. Rather, every effort 
must be made to provide treatment as soon as reasonably possible.732  
 
                                                 
729  TAC (1) para 122. 
730  TAC (1) para 125. 
731  TAC (1) para 127. 
732  TAC (1) para 125. 
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6.2.2.3.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF TAC (1) TO THIS RESEARCH 
 
The Constitutional Court examined the reasonableness of the government’s HIV/ Aids 
treatment policy in the TAC (1) case, and ultimately found the policy unacceptable. This is 
significant in relation to a right to food claim in so far as it is not sufficient for the 
government to merely put into place a feeding scheme or schemes- in addition such schemes 
will have to be reasonable, as assessed by the courts, to pass constitutional scrutiny.   
 
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court in TAC (1) reaffirmed a similar position to the 
Grootboom decision concerning the doctrine of separation of powers.733 In both cases the 
Constitutional Court held that courts with constitutional jurisdiction are permitted to hand 
down decisions that impact on government policy. Welz observes that if such court action 
amounts to an incursion into the normal functions of the executive, it is mandated by the 
Constitution.734  It was upon this basis that the court rejected an argument raised by the 
government that in terms the separation of powers doctrine any decision in favour of the 
Respondents would be limited to a declaration of rights. 
 
Hopkins notes that in effect the decisions of Botha J in the TPD, largely restated by the 
Constitutional Court in TAC (1), directing the government to make Nevirapine available in 
public health facilities to all HIV-positive mothers and their newborn babies, created 
government policy. The Constitutional Court held that it had a wide discretion to make any 
order that was just and equitable in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.  This 
discretion includes the power to grant mandatory relief and the power to exercise a degree of 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure adequate compliance with its order. The Constitutional 
Court considered an order of supervisory jurisdiction unnecessary,735 but did make a 
mandatory order.736 When one considers the criticism raised against government’s failure to 
                                                 
733  In support of this submission, the close correlation between Grootboom (para 29) and TAC (1) (para 98) 
on this point is noted. 
734  Welz “Judicial Restraint and the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights in the Constitutional Court: A 
Comment on Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others” (December 2002) 
Vol 1 No 2 Speculum Juris 314. 
735  Interestingly, the Court commented that the government had always respected and executed orders of the 
Court and there was no reason to believe that it would not do so in the present case.  TAC (1) para 129. 
736  Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future 
Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence” 5. 
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properly comply with the earlier Grootboom decision, strong arguments could be put forward 
that supervisory jurisdiction was called for in the TAC (1) finding.737  
  
Hopkins then goes on to raise the much discussed dangers of a blurring of the separation of 
powers doctrine through government policy being made by the judiciary in just such an 
instance.738  However, Hopkins rightly points out that the Constitutional Court in TAC (1) has 
now indicated that the courts can create policy for government, albeit only in exceptional 
circumstances.739 The exceptional circumstances he indicates would warrant such 
intervention include urgency and the existence of vulnerable people unable to help 
themselves.740 This reconception of the traditional separation of powers doctrine, giving a 
more proactive role vis-à-vis policy making to the judiciary, will be considered in the 
concluding Chapter when more creative court orders are called for. 
 
It has been noted already that the Constitutional Court in TAC (1) found the existing 
government policy to be unreasonable because it did not meet the needs of the mothers and 
their unborn children who had no access to the test sites.741 Hopkins points out that this 
decision aligns with the Constitutional Court’s earlier decision in Grootboom where it 
decided that any government programme excluding a significant segment of society is 
unreasonable.742 In relation to a right to food challenge, reading into the ratio decidendi of 
both TAC (1) and Grootboom it is clear that government policy in relation to the right to food 
must ensure that all segments of society are catered for. However, in light of the statistics 
given in earlier Chapters that certain categories of people (including children, the elderly, 
people in rural areas generally and those otherwise falling outside the existing social 
                                                 
737  An argument to this effect is raised by Bilchitz. Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the 
Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence” 26. 
738  Hopkins “Democracy in a Post-TAC Society” De Rebus (November 2002) 16. Interestingly, later in the 
same article Hopkins actually highlights the advantages that this new interventionist judicial approach 
could have. 
739  Hopkins “Democracy in a Post-TAC Society” 17. 
740  Firstly, in relation to HIV/ Aids, the urgency of the required treatment well before the next election. 
Secondly, newborn babies have no meaningful access to the democratic process because they cannot yet 
vote. Ibid. 
741  The court found the existing policy to be unreasonable in that it did not provide for: 
“the administration of Nevirapine elsewhere in the public health system when there is capacity to 
administer it and its use is medically indicated”.  
TAC (1) para 64. 
742  Hopkins “Democracy in a Post-TAC Society” 16. See also Grootboom paras 42 to 44 and 52. 
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assistance net) remain especially vulnerable to hunger and malnutrition, it is highly 
questionable whether current government food policy is catering for all segments of society.  
 
Currie submits that the TAC (1) case illustrates the Constitutional Court’s ability to challenge 
the government even when there is a risk of crisis.743  However, as has already been 
contended above, the judgment can be criticised for its lack of supervisory jurisdiction over 
government’s response to its order. In relation to a right to food challenge, the TAC (1) case 
provides encouraging precedent of the ability and willingness of our courts to question the 
reasonableness of government policy. However, it is submitted that our courts need to heed 
the lessons of Grootboom and TAC(1) in ensuring that future court orders enforcing socio-
economic rights contain a supervisory element to ensure that government does not play mere 
lip-service to the findings of our constitutional adjudicators.   
 
6.2.2.4 KHOSA AND OTHERS v MINISTER OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
OTHERS; MAHLAULE AND ANOTHER v MINISTER OF SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND OTHERS744
6.2.2.4.1 THE FACTS AND COURT DECISION 
 
This case had to determine the constitutionality of denying permanent residents in South 
Africa, who were not citizens of this country, the right to receive social assistance in terms of 
the Social Assistance Act.745 The Constitutional Court upheld the High Courts’ findings that 
the relevant parts of the Act746 were unconstitutional and henceforth non-citizen permanent 
residents were also held to be entitled to receive social assistance.  The court decided that the 
word “everyone” in section 27(1)(c)747 of the Constitution did not allow the state to 
discriminate on the grounds of citizenship and exclude permanent residents from social 
assistance.  
                                                 
743  Currie “How Much to Adjudicate: The Constitutional Court’s Jurisdictional Jurisprudence” (2004) The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa: The First Ten Years 56. 
744  2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).  
745  Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of 
Social Development and Others para 1. 
746  S 3 of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 as read with the definition of a South African citizen in s 1 of 
the Act. 
747  S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution says: 
 “Everyone has the right to-… 
Social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate 
social assistance” (own emphasis added). 
Conversely, s 3 of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 requires an applicant for social assistance to be a 
South African citizen. 
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 The applicants in the Khosa case were two Mozambican citizens permanently resident in 
South Africa who, but for their citizenship, would have qualified for social assistance in 
South Africa.748 The facts in the Mahlaule case dealt with child-support grants and care-
dependency grants sought by different non-citizen applicants.749 Owing to their similar nature 
(which was the reason for the Constitutional Court’s conflation of the matters in the first 
place),750 this analysis will not consider these two fact-complexes separately as its finding 
applied equally to both. 
 
The applicants argued that their rights to social assistance in terms of section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution and their rights to equality, dignity and life in terms of sections 9, 10 and 11 
respectively were all unfairly denied by the prevailing social assistance provision rules. They 
argued that the denial of these rights was not legitimized by the internal limitations of section 
27 or the general limitations clause in section 36. A further argument was made on the basis 
of childrens’ rights in terms of section 28.751  
 
The various government functionaries who were respondents in the case alleged that non-
citizens were not entitled to social assistance. As support for this submission they averred that 
after a period of five years of residence in South Africa, such permanent residents could 
apply to become South African citizens.752 Clearly then, on obtaining citizenship, they would 
become entitled to social assistance benefits. The respondents raised various other arguments 
against the provision of social assistance to non-citizens, including the additional state 
expenditure which the inclusion of non-citizen permanent residents in state social assistance 
would incur753 as well as the need to ensure that foreigners living in South Africa do not 
become a burden on the state here.754  
                                                 
748  Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of 
Social Development and Others para 3 The court notes that all of the applicants were what it termed, 
“destitute”. Ibid. The court later in its judgment referred to the “dire circumstances” of the applicants. 
Para 24.  
749  Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of 
Social Development and Others para 4. These applicants were also Mozambican.  
750  Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of 
Social Development and Others (hereinafter the case will be referred to as Khosa) para 12. 
751  Khosa para 38 to 39. 
752  Khosa para 55. 
753  Khosa para 60. 
754  Khosa para 63. 
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 The respondents did concede that to deny child-support grants to South African children 
cared for by non-South African permanent residents was indeed unconstitutional.755 In 
addition to the concession vis-a-vis child support grants, acknowledging the plight of the 
destitute applicants in need of care, one of the respondents informed the Court that a request 
had been made to the relevant government functionary to consider extending the definition of 
a “South African citizen” in the Act to accommodate applicants in this case. The respondents 
argued that these two concessions should settle the dispute between the parties and that there 
was therefore no need for a court order in this respect.756 However, the court held that so long 
as legal uncertainty remained, a settlement between the parties would not preclude the 
Constitutional Court from making a definitive constitutionality finding.757
 
As was noted in the introductory paragraph of this particular case analysis, the court held that 
the right of “everyone” to social security and social assistance in section 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution could not legitimately be said to exclude permanent residents who were non-
citizens. The court held that equality in respect of access to socio-economic rights was 
implied by section 27 indicating that access to the rights therein applied to “everyone” and 
those unable to survive without social assistance are equally desperate and equally require 
such support.758
 
In coming to this majority decision the court examined the reasonableness of the 
aforementioned reasons given by the state for non-provision of social security and social 
assistance to non-citizens and found these to be unreasonable.759 The finding of 
unreasonableness related primarily to the context in which the rights were denied to the 
applicants. In this regard the court weighed up the right to social security and the exclusion 
from the scheme of permanent residents, the purpose served by social security, the result of 
excluding permanent residents and the relevance of having a citizenship requirement to 
qualify for benefits. The court also considered the impact of the denial on other interrelated 
rights including the rights to life, dignity and equality.760 The court decided that the provision 
                                                 
755  Khosa para 33. 
756  Khosa para 34. 
757  Khosa para 35. 
758  Khosa para 42. 
759  Khosa paras 49 to 57. 
760  Khosa paras 49 and 44 respectively. 
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of access to social assistance to permanent residents and the impact of such assistance to such 
persons’ life and dignity far outweighed the resource and immigration arguments put forward 
by the state.761 The court rejected the arguments put forward that the provision of social 
assistance to non-citizen permanent residents would be prohibitively expensive. In coming to 
this decision the court noted that even if the state’s own budgetary figures were correct in this 
regard, the change sought would increase state spending on social assistance grants by under 
2%.762 In relation to the issue of budgetary allocation, the court held that even where the state 
was able to justify non-payment of benefits on the basis of unaffordability, the criteria used to 
limit benefits must not unreasonably limit other fundamental rights.763   
 
6.2.2.4.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF KHOSA TO THIS RESEARCH 
 
As the decision in Khosa clearly built upon the jurisprudence of the preceding Grootboom 
and TAC judgments, many of the applicable principles for a right to food argument have 
already been discussed in relation to those cases and will therefore not be repeated here. 
However, there are certain aspects which still warrant discussion. 
 
The Khosa case can be used as authority for the inter-relatedness of the core right in question 
(in this case social security) with other rights. The court noted that socio-economic rights in 
our Constitution are intimately linked to the key values and rights of human dignity, equality 
and freedom.764 In Khosa the applicants rested their arguments on alleged violations of the 
rights to equality, dignity and life in addition to the main section 27(1)(c) argument.765 For 
example, the court held that excluding permanent residents from social assistance entitlement 
is likely to severely impact on their dignity in that they would have to be assisted by others to 
meet their most basic needs, such dependence eroding their human dignity.766 In relation to a 
right to food challenge, Chapter 3 of this dissertation has already examined the issue of 
upholding rights which are inter-dependent with the right to food. This multi-pronged 
                                                 
761  Khosa para 82. 
762  Khosa para 62. 
763  Khosa para 45. 
764  Khosa para 40. In finding thus the court confirmed the sentiments of Yacoob in Grootboom that rights 
are interrelated and are of equal importance. Supra. 
765  See Khosa para 38 and elsewhere in the judgment. In a minority judgment, Justice Ngcobo, also stressed 
the close nexus between socio-economic right provision and other core first generation rights like 
equality and dignity. Khosa para 104. 
766  Khosa para 80. 
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approach to realizing the right to food will be revisited in much more detail in the latter 
stages of this thesis in relation to both a direct court challenge and through interpreting other 
rights (especially socio-economic rights) in such a way as to better promote adequate food 
provision and access in South Africa. 
 
The Constitutional Court in Khosa adopted a broad interpretation of social security and social 
assistance entitlement (through) its interpretation of the term “everyone” in section 27 of the 
Constitution.767 It is submitted that such a broad interpretation is in accordance with the spirit 
and purport of the Constitution as espoused in the Preamble thereto. This generous 
interpretation of social security entitlement is shown in the Khosa judgment acknowledging 
that social security attempts to ensure basic living standards for all in which human life is 
valued as is the dignity, freedom and equality of all individuals.768 Such a broad 
interpretation of social security entitlement under section 27 also, it is argued, supports the 
extensive ambit of the right to food I have proposed exists. 
 
The decision in Khosa that an envisaged increase of under 2% of its social grant spending 
would result through the decision sought by the applicants indicates,769 it is submitted, the 
court’s reluctance to order the state to make provision for socio-economic rights which it 
either cannot afford or would take away money which could be better spent in other ways. In 
applying this reasoning to the right to food, it is argued that whilst the problem of hunger and 
malnutrition is admittedly a more widespread problem, it has already been shown that hunger 
and malnutrition in South Africa is a problem of unequal distribution of resources, rather than 
a resource limitation issue. Therefore the realisation of the right to food should in fact be an 
easier problem to solve in this regard. The solution lies largely in interpreting existing 
programmes and laws in such a way as to better promote the right to food. In relation to those 
in critical need of food, such people should receive urgent state assistance, the limited nature 
of which (in terms of those who would qualify and the duration thereof) should mean that 
such crisis intervention is affordable. 
 
                                                 
767  In doing so the CC confirmed the decisions of the High Court requiring the state to provide social 
assistance under the Social Assistance Act to all residents qualifying for such assistance, irrespective of 
whether they are South African or not. Khosa para 9. 
768  Khosa para 52. 
769  Khosa para 62. 
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It is submitted that the court’s approach in Khosa in assessing the (un)reasonableness of the 
state action in question through a weighing up of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
status quo versus the cost and overall result of provision of the right as sought770 is useful in a 
right to food context. I will seek to justify this submission in two ways. Firstly, in a direct 
right to food court challenge it is hard to envisage any competing interests on the state or in 
the public interest which would trump measures to ensure that all South Africans have 
adequate food. Secondly, in interpreting analogous rights relating to issues like land 
redistribution, which have the ability to improve the food situation in South Africa, it is 
argued that interpretations of such rights and laws and policies relating to such rights must 
occur in such a manner as to promote the right to food. Such interpretations, it is submitted, 
would be “reasonable” as envisaged by the Constitutional Court in Khosa. 
 
The Khosa case recognises that members of vulnerable groups in society are worthy of 
particular constitutional protection.771 It is submitted that this finding is in line with the 
growing acceptance by the Constitutional Court of the need to adopt a broader interpretation 
of socio-economic rights entitlement for those in great need. As has been argued earlier in 
this dissertation, it is submitted that few rights are as worthy of urgent and thorough 
protection and promotion as the right to food for those suffering from hunger and 
malnutrition.    
 
Mokoro J’s finding that provided legal uncertainty remains, the Constitutional Court should 
still make a decision on the issue notwithstanding a settlement between the litigating 
parties,772 may well be important in a right to food challenge. This submission is made on the 
basis that were a group of hungry or malnourished applicants to go to court arguing that their 
right to food was being denied to them, it would not suffice for the state to simply reach an 
out of court settlement with those specific applicants and ignore the potential 
unconstitutionality. Notwithstanding a settlement between the parties in casu, the Khosa case 
is therefore authority for indicating that a right to food challenge brought before a court with 
constitutional jurisdiction would have to be dealt with on the merits of the constitutionality of 
the state’s conduct or omission or law(s) in question. 
 
                                                 
770  Ibid. 
771  Khosa para 74. 
772  Khosa para 35. 
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Govindjee and Ristow argue that the key question to be addressed by the court in Khosa was 
an equality-based one concerned with non-provision of benefits to a particular category of 
people.773 The majority judgment in Khosa indicated that unlike the preceding socio-
economic rights cases it had dealt with,774 this case was the first in which the issue of unfair 
discrimination was a relevant consideration. Govindjee and Ristow indicate that the court had 
to decide whether or not the exclusion of non-citizens from the state’s social security 
framework could be considered unfair discrimination.775 It is submitted that in relation to the 
right to food, where particular categories of people are left hungry, malnourished or food 
insecure due to “falling through the net” of existing state food programmes or interrelated 
social security schemes, a similar argument can be made that such groups are being unfairly 
discriminated against. 
 
Govindjee and Ristow highlight as another significant aspect of the Khosa decision, the 
court’s willingness to consider and reject the state’s resource-based argument as a reason for 
denial of a remedy.776 Before the Khosa judgment, academic argument considered it unlikely 
that the Constitutional Court would accept a direct challenge to budgetary allocation.777 The 
doctrine of separation of powers has been considered earlier in this research. However, 
Govindjee and Ristow note that the court in Khosa was happy to involve itself in an issue 
normally the domain of the legislature (and I would argue equally, if not more so, the 
executive). Furthermore, these writers indicate that in matters following this judgment it is 
clear that the state will not necessarily succeed in arguing a lack of resources as a reason for 
denial of a fundamental right.778 It is worth reiterating the court’s decision in casu that the 
provision of access to social assistance to permanent residents and the impact of such 
                                                 
773  Govindjee and Ristow “Permanent Residents and Eligibility for Social Security Grants: Khosa and 
Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development and Others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC)” (2005) Speculum Juris Vol 19 
No 1 117. 
774  The judgments being referred to here were Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 
Soobramoney supra; Grootboom supra; and TAC supra.  
775  Govindjee and Ristow “Permanent Residents and Eligibility for Social Security Grants: Khosa and 
Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development and Others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC)” 117. 
776  Ibid.  
777  See Liebenberg “South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-economic Rights” (2002) Vol 6 No 2 
Law Democracy and Development 179. See also Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance 
as a Framework for Social Policy in South Africa: Lessons from India 102. 
778  Govindjee and Ristow “Permanent Residents and Eligibility for Social Security Grants: Khosa and 
Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development and Others 2004 6 SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC)” 117. 
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assistance to such persons’ life and dignity far outweighed the resource and other arguments 
of the state.779 Whilst a right to food challenge would necessarily be affected by the particular 
fact-complex before the court, it is argued that it is equally unlikely that compelling enough 
reasons would exist to deny food rights to those in great need on the basis of state resource 
shortages. Furthermore, it may not be necessary to rely on the Khosa precedent in relation to 
a resource enquiry in light of the food problems in South Africa having been shown to be 
primarily ones of allocation rather than scarcity. However, when one considers that the state 
has raised resource limitations as defences to the claims in Soobramoney, Grootboom, TAC 
and Khosa, is likely that this will be the case too if a right to food challenge was to be 
authoritatively brought to our courts. It is encouraging that if a resource-limitation defence 
were to be put forward by the state, then the Khosa case provides authority for the court in 
question to apply its collective mind to the issue of budget allocations, not so as to usurp the 
rightful functions of the legislature and executive, but rather to ensure that these organs of 
state are performing their functions properly in that regard. 
 
Finally, together with a similar approach in the Grootboom decision, it is submitted that 
Khosa’s test for reasonableness780 is a key aspect applicable to a right to food challenge. If an 
application is to be successfully brought to court against the current food provision laws and 
programmes, such an application will have to show the offending state action or laws to be 
unreasonable along similar lines.   
 
6.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (SAHRC) 
 
On accepting the justiciability of socio-economic rights in South Africa, the problem of 
ensuring government compliance with court orders remains.781 It is submitted that the 
SAHRC has a crucial function to perform in terms of monitoring government role-out of 
socio-economic rights in terms of the state’s constitutional obligations and more specifically 
in terms of court orders. The SAHRC’s enforcement role is emphasised if one accepts that 
courts are not best positioned to enforce their own judgments and do not have the human 
resources and money to monitor implementation of their orders.782  
                                                 
779  Khosa para 82. 
780  Khosa paras 49 to 57. 
781  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio-Economic Rights” 2. 
782  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio-Economic Rights” 4. 
 159
 Whilst this Chapter has already shown the courts to have been empowered to protect human 
rights,783 section 184 of the Constitution empowers the SAHRC to do so too. The SAHRC is 
one of the state institutions set up in terms of section 181(1) of the Constitution to strengthen 
constitutional democracy in South Africa. A former MEC for Safety and Security in the 
Northern Province, Nthai, describes the SAHRC as the most important of these state 
institutions.784  Ntlama submits that there is an emphasis placed on socio-economic rights in 
the Constitution through the protection provided by both the courts and the SAHRC.785  
 
It is clear from their empowering provisions that the courts and the SAHRC have been given 
different roles to perform concerning socio-economic rights. Whilst the judiciary protects 
socio-economic rights through binding decisions, the SAHRC provides protection through 
what can broadly be termed a monitoring function.786 The SAHRC must promote respect for, 
protect and develop human rights.787 Perhaps even more significantly, the SAHRC is 
empowered to investigate and to report on whether human rights are being observed and to 
take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated.788 In addition 
to the constitutional provisions, the Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 provides the 
SAHRC with information-gathering tools which should make its monitoring function easier 
to perform. When one considers the criticism highlighted earlier in this Chapter of a lack of 
necessary monitoring of government compliance with court orders and enforcement of court 
orders (especially in the Grootboom case), the SAHRC is ideally positioned to perform these 
roles in relation to the right to food and other socio-economic rights. 
 
An example of the SAHRC’s investigative role is its examination of suspected violations of 
many farm workers’ basic human rights789 in the Messina/ Tshipise district in the Northern 
Province. In the course of its investigations the Commission held public hearings in the 
district and inspected selected farms. The Commission made a series of recommendations on 
                                                 
783  The authority of the courts to hand down binding judgments is provided for in s 165(5) of the 
Constitution.  
784  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa.” 41.  
785  Ntlama “Monitoring the Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Some Lessons From 
the International Community” 207. 
786  S 184 fleshes out the Commission’s aims and powers.  
787  S 184(1)(a) and (b). 
788  S 184(2)(a) and (b). 
789  The alleged violations concerned harassment and unlawful arrests and detention.  
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the basis of its findings.790 By holding public hearings as was done in this instance, the 
SAHRC should be able to accurately establish the actual extent of suspected rights violations. 
It is submitted that analogous investigations into alleged violations of the constitutional right 
to food could and should be undertaken by the Commission.   
 
In relation to socio-economic rights, in terms of section 184(3) of the Constitution, the 
SAHRC must annually require relevant organs of state to provide information on specifically 
what they have done to realise the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, 
food, water, social security, education and the environment (which are all socio-economic 
rights).791 Nthai argues that section 184(3) is clearly intended to tackle the abject poverty and 
the neglected settlements experienced by many South Africans.792 Whilst the SAHRC’s 
powers in terms of section 184 would appear to be non-legal in nature, Ntlama points out that 
the Commission has the power to take steps to secure redress where rights have been 
violated.793 Ntlama argues that this redress can be sought by the SAHRC through litigation or 
recommendations to state organs.794 This submission of Ntlama would appear to be supported 
by Brand and Heyns who highlight that the SAHRC has the potential to play a major role in 
socio-economic rights enforcement.795 On the basis of this academic authority, it is submitted 
that the SAHRC has a crucial role to play in enforcing the right to food, one of the most 
fundamental of all socio-economic rights. In relation to the Commission’s role in litigation 
pertaining to other socio-economic rights, the SAHRC has gone to court in the Eastern Cape 
in relation to wrongful denials of pensions by the state.796  
 
                                                 
790  Mochaba “South African Human Rights Commission investigation into alleged violations of farm 
workers’ human rights in the Messina/Tshipise district” (1999) Vol 15 Part 4 SAJHR 614 to 615. 
791   S 184(3) says: 
“Each year, the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to provide the 
Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the 
rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, social security, education 
and the environment.” 
792  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa” 41.  
793  This power is provided in s 184(2)(b). 
794  Ntlama “Monitoring the Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Some Lessons From 
the International Community” 208. 
795  Heyns and Brand “Introduction to Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution” in Bekker 
(ed) A Compilation of Essential Documents on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Economic and 
Social Rights Series 14. 
796  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa” 41. Also see further discussion 
relating to the SAHRC and the courts a little later in this Chapter. 
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Ntlama argues that another clear intention of all this monitoring by the SAHRC is for the 
Commission to produce reports on state progress in terms of socio-economic rights 
realisation.797 It is submitted that this proposed aim of the SAHRC is being met in terms of 
its Economic and Social Rights Report Series.798 In analysing the SAHRC’s Economic and 
Social Rights Report Series, it is evident that the Commission requires the relevant organs of 
state to be fully accountable for their role in socio-economic right realisation and to justify 
their actions in this regard. Ntlama is of the opinion that state bodies having to justify their 
actions to the SAHRC (in terms of section 184(3) of the Constitution) ensures that state 
organs will keep socio-economic rights realisation on their list of priorities.799 Delany argues 
that the reporting function of the SAHRC is also well placed to meet the reporting 
requirements of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).800 Ntlama believes that the Commission’s reports have the potential to be a 
significant public record of monitoring of socio-economic rights violations but to be effective 
reports needs to be properly considered by parliament.801 This is a very valid point as without 
remedial government action to implement the suggestions of the Commission it would appear 
to be merely an academic exercise, performing no tangible function. To have any real value it 
is argued that the state organs to which any SAHRC report is made must commit themselves 
to acting upon the recommendations made. Applying this argument to the right to food links 
with a key theme in this research: the need to turn the right to food into reality. 
 
The SAHRC has been a litigant in certain cases and has been used by the courts to implement 
certain decisions. I will now briefly consider the role of the Commission in a few selected 
cases which went to court concerning alleged rights violations. These examples illustrate the 
useful function which the SAHRC can serve in the enforcement of rights. The focus on civil 
                                                 
797  Ntlama “Monitoring the Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Some Lessons From 
the International Community” 207. See a similar argument made by Newman “Institutional Monitoring 
of Social and Economic Rights: A South African Case Study and a New Research Agenda” (2003) Vol 
19 Part 2 SAJHR 195. 
798  See for example, the South African Human Rights Commission Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004). 
799  Ntlama “Monitoring the Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Some Lessons From 
the International Community” 209. 
800  Delany Rights to Reality - The Right to Social Security, with Particular Emphasis on the Legal Resources 
Centre’s Welfare Project in the Eastern Cape 10. In terms of the ICESCR, state parties are required to 
report their progress at realising socio-economic rights in their country.  
801  Ntlama “Monitoring the Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Some Lessons From 
the International Community” 214. 
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and political rights is necessitated by a lack of much evidence of SAHRC intervention in 
relation to socio-economic rights.   
 
In S v Twala the SAHRC intervened on behalf of a convicted person who requested leave to 
appeal by way of a handwritten letter not complying with the formal rules of court.802 The 
court allowed the letter to be considered an acceptable application for leave to appeal and 
hence condoned the failure to comply with the ordinary rules pertaining to leave to appeal 
applications. This case, it is submitted, points towards an even greater role which the SAHRC 
could play in educating people both as to the content of their rights and then how to protect 
those rights via the judicial process. 
 
The Grootboom case, discussed earlier, demonstrates the SAHRC’s monitoring role.803 In 
this case the Constitutional Court tasked the SAHRC with monitoring the implementation of 
the court-ordered state housing programme which the state was required to formulate and put 
into action for homeless people.804 However, as was noted in my above critique of the 
Grootboom decision, notwithstanding the SAHRC having been mandated to perform this 
monitoring role, state compliance was extremely tardy.805 It is therefore submitted that 
specific parameters for government compliance with court orders, such as timeframes, are 
called for in order for the Commission to be capable of properly monitoring compliance with 
a particular court order. It is submitted that applicants would be well advised to include in 
their applications specific prayers relating to monitoring of orders sought and time-frames for 
compliance.  
 
An example of a case wherein the SAHRC acted as a litigant is the seminal Bhe judgment in 
which male primogeniture in customary law of intestate succession was held to be 
unconstitutional.806 The SAHRC (and the Women’s Legal Centre Trust) acted in both their 
own interests and in the interests of the public.807 In the context of a right to food challenge, 
                                                 
802  S v Twala (South African Human Rights Commission Intervening) 2000 (1) SA 879 (CC). 
803  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
804  Grootboom para 97. 
805  See the arguments to this effect made earlier in this Chapter. In particular see footnotes 103 to 107 of this 
Chapter and the main text to which they relate. 
806  Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; SA Human Rights 
Commission and Another v President of the RSA and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
807  Supra para 30. 
 163
it is argued that as in the Bhe case the Commission would be able to act as both a litigant in 
its own right and in the interests of the public. 
 
In the realm of unfair discrimination on the basis of disability, the SAHRC assisted Ms Esthe 
Muller in successfully obtaining a court order against the Department of Public Works and 
the Justice Department in the Equality Court in Germiston.808 The case related to inadequate 
wheelchair access to court buildings. In terms of one part of the court order, the two 
government departments were given a set time-period to provide the SAHRC with a report on 
measures taken to remedy the situation.809 There is no conceivable reason why a successful 
right to food challenge brought to court could not require the government department(s) 
concerned to provide the SAHRC with a report, within a stipulated period, setting out the 
remedial action taken in response to the court order.  
 
The SAHRC worked together with academics in formulating questionnaires to gauge grass-
roots perception of measures taken by state organs to realise social and economic rights.810 If 
properly used, these questionnaires have the potential to aid government’s decision-making 
through the provision of accurate information on the affect of government’s food polices on 
the people such policies are intended to assist. However, the questionnaires used to date have 
been criticized for being too complex.811 Furthermore, it has been said that government 
departments do not provide enough information to the Commission, in part due to financial 
and human resource limitations.812 It is submitted that whilst problems with such 
questionnaires need to be ironed out, they have the potential to significantly aid the 
Commission in its work. For example, when one considers that hunger and malnutrition is 
often encountered in remote parts of South Africa, it is imperative to come up with 
mechanisms to gauge adequate food availability.   
 
Whilst the SAHRC’s actual and potential role as en enforcer of human rights has many 
positive aspects, it is also open to criticism on a number of grounds. The Commission has 
                                                 
808  Unreported decision handed down on 24 February 2004. Cited in De Rebus “Between Issues” (March 
2004). Accessed at www.derebus.org.za on 29 April 2006. 
809  Ibid. 
810  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 5. 
811  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 4. 
812  Ibid. 
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been criticised for having focused insufficient attention on the implementation of socio-
economic rights.813 Govindjee notes that the Commission has also been criticised due to a 
lack of guidelines regarding what exactly should be monitored and timeframes for feedback. 
Again this failure has related mainly to socio-economic rights.814 On a slightly different line, 
I submit that whilst the SAHRC does perform a useful function, the reliability of its reports is 
negatively affected by the fact that the Commission’s reports are based on the reports of the 
applicable state organs themselves. What I mean by this is that a state department which has 
failed to deliver adequate performance might well not readily admit its shortcomings. This is 
analogous to being the referee in a sporting match in which one is also a participant. 
Furthermore, from a perspective of openness and accountability, it would appear nonsensical 
for state functionaries to form a pivotal part of their own assessment.815 Finally, on a very 
practical level, the SAHRC is hamstrung by not having any budgetary allocation for 
monitoring court orders.816 Quite clearly this needs to be remedied if the Commission is to be 
able to adequately perform this important task. 
 
It would thus seem that the SAHRC has the potential to strengthen constitutional democracy 
in South Africa as section 181(1) of the Constitution requires it to do. The Commission has 
already made a positive impact in various respects, but there is definitely room for 
improvement in others. It is submitted that the SAHRC can play a central role in the 
enforcement of the right to food. 
 
6.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter has focused on the interpretation of socio-economic rights entitlement by the 
Constitutional Court in leading judgments.  Possible applications of these judicial 
pronouncements to the right to food have been proposed.  Finally, the crucial role of the 
                                                 
813  Nthai (July 1999) De Rebus 41. 
814  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 96. See also Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in 
Respect of Socio-Economic Rights” 4. Here Ntlama identifies problems of our courts requiring SAHRC 
monitoring of its orders, without sufficient guidelines as to the scope of the monitoring to be done and a 
lack of timeframes for the job to be done.  
815  I will take this criticism further in the final Chapter of this thesis when I will put forward proposals for 
improving the status quo. 
816  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio-Economic Rights” 4. This 
information was obtained by Ntlama in a personal communication with Mr A. Mahomed, the Western 
Cape SAHRC Provincial Co-ordinator. 
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SAHRC in enforcing socio-economic rights compliance has been considered.  This leads onto 
the final Chapter of this dissertation where suggestions as to how to better realise the right to 
food in South Africa will be brought together. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
 
The aforementioned Chapters have shown various anomalies relating to the right to food. On 
the positive side there is a clear constitutional right to food, which like other socio-economic 
rights is undeniably justiciable. The constitutional right to food is informed by rich 
international law jurisprudence and a Constitutional Court which has shown a willingness to 
give socio-economic rights substance.817 Furthermore there exist various policies from 
government which have the potential to enable the realization of the right to food.  However, 
juxtaposed with such positives are a series of negatives. The actual roll-out of government 
policies and programmes relating to food provision and food security as well as failures in 
other spheres of service delivery, such as poor provision of social assistance grants and the 
slow pace of land reform, mean that many South Africans remain hungry or malnourished.818 
We are therefore facing a paradox when it comes to the right to food in South Africa:  
 
“the disparity between the most admirable constitution in the history of the world and an 
increasingly harsh reality for common South Africans is probably as wide as it can get.”819
 
The previous Chapters have posed serious questions as to whether the state can be said to 
meeting its section 27 and section 28 rights to food obligations. At the very least, the earlier 
analysis of South Africa’s existing food provision measures and roll-out has shown that the 
status quo is flawed in that there remain many hungry and malnourished people in this 
country. The question then remains how to best remedy the shortcomings and in so doing 
better and adequately realise the right to food. What this final Chapter aims to do is to point 
out some suggestions as to how the right to food can be better realised. The foundations for 
most of the proposals have been laid in earlier parts of this research. Rather than reiterating 
the earlier suggestions as they were discussed in earlier Chapters, what I will do in this 
                                                 
817  I have in mind here the aforementioned Grootboom and TAC judgments particularly. 
818  See the statistics in Chapter 1 indicating the extent of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition still 
present in South Africa. 
819  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 33. 
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Chapter is to summarise the most salient aspects thereof and consider them in light of the 
discussion as a whole.  This concluding Chapter will consider a two-fold approach in which 
the right to food could be better realised. Firstly, a direct court challenge will be considered 
whereby it will be argued that with the correct applicants it could be successfully argued that 
the constitutional right to food is being currently denied in certain circumstances. However, 
certain features of such a possible challenge which differ from successful socio-economic 
rights cases launched to date will be raised and therefore indicate that in all likelihood the 
second proposition is a more viable option. The second proposed option, which is a more 
holistic approach, will consider promoting the right to food through interpretations and 
applications of related existing laws and policies in such a way as to better promote the right 
to food.   
 
7.2 PROPOSAL 1: COURT CHALLENGE 
7.2.1 GENERAL COMMENTS 
 
In order to launch a successful socio-economic rights challenge in court, it is necessary for an 
affected group of people to prove the unfair denial of a right. Many of the aforementioned 
arguments have indicated that there does indeed appear to be a breach of particular persons’ 
and groups’ right to sufficient food in section 27(1)(b) and the rights of children to basic 
nutrition in section 28(1)(c). The question that I seek to deal with at this juncture is to 
consider the prospects of such a challenge succeeding. To do this I will consider both 
arguments in favour of a direct court challenge and those against it. 
 
7.2.2 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF A COURT CHALLENGE AGAINST THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT POLICY AND ACTION 
 
The most obvious barometers against which the likelihood of such a constitutional challenge 
being successfully launched can be tested are the key socio-economic rights judgments 
discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. The extension of the ambit of socio-economic 
right enforcement by the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom,820 TAC821 and Khosa822 
cases has been discussed in the previous Chapter and will not be repeated in detail again here. 
In summary it can be said that these cases indicate that existing law or policy which 
                                                 
820  2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
821  2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T). 
822  2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). 
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unreasonably denies a socio-economic right will not pass the constitutional muster. In this 
regard the lack of existing programmes to cater for certain categories of desperate people is 
perhaps most susceptible to constitutional challenge. Brand’s research has shown that 
government’s food policy fails to cater for people in crisis situations.823 The food-crisis 
position faced by certain individuals and groups is shown by the statistics cited in Chapters 1 
and 5 of this dissertation. In assessing government socio-economic rights policy, Bilchitz 
sensibly argues that it is necessary for such policy to prioritise the urgent requirements of 
those in dire need whose very survival is threatened by the status quo.824 It would therefore 
be useful to reconsider instances of so-called “urgent cases” where right to food challenges 
could be launched. This is done immediately below.  
 
The argument in favour of a court challenge can be illustrated by two examples. Firstly, 
hungry or malnourished high school pupils who receive no food at school and as a result 
cannot concentrate on their studies could argue that they are as in need of food at school as 
their primary school counterparts: hence the lack of a high school feeding programme 
arguably unreasonably breaches both their section 27 and section 28 food rights. Secondly, 
hungry or malnourished adults who do not qualify for some form of social assistance grant or 
a social relief of distress grant could argue that their right of access to food in section 27 is 
being denied to them if they are unable to adequately feed themselves. For example, in the 
Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social Services, Culture, Arts and Sport 
in the North West Province825 case, discussed in Chapter 5, the dire food situation of Mr 
Abbey Kutumela, the first applicant in that matter, was described in his founding affidavit. 
Mr Kutumela described the situation of the applicants, including himself, as:  
 
“presently without food, or … living without food and (are) in desperate need of social 
assistance.”826  
 
And 
 
                                                 
823  See generally, Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa 153. 
824  Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future 
Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence” 1. 
825  Case 671/2003. 
826  Kutumela case 671/2003 paras 9.1 and 9.2 of Founding Affidavit. 
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“We struggled to survive, and often went hungry.  Our only income at the time was what my 
wife could earn doing part-time domestic and cleaning work in the area.  She earned about R 60 
per week.  It was not enough to feed us.  We had to beg and borrow food.”827
 
It is absolutely apparent that people in a similar position to Mr Kutumela require urgent food 
assistance in order for their right to food to be met as well as to promote the interrelated 
rights such as dignity and equality which such suffering causes. In the Kutumela case the 
situation could be remedied by way of the provincial government being forced to roll out the 
Social Relief of Distress Grant. However, as was noted in Chapter 5, this grant has limited 
application as well as duration (albeit that a limited extension is possible). Therefore it is 
argued that persons in a food-crisis position like Mr Kutumela, who either do not qualify for 
a Social Relief of Distress Grant or continue to lack food after having had a grant, could 
justifiably argue that the state’s response in failing to take adequate measures to meet their 
needs is unconstitutional. Furthermore, those whose right to food appears to be being denied 
to them need to be aware of their right to food and what it entails. This last point would 
indicate the need for an education drive on the right to food for all food insecure individuals, 
for without knowledge of the existence of a right it cannot be properly exercised. Education 
on the right to food will significantly increase the prospects of a suitable litigant or group of 
litigants coming forward to successfully challenge the constitutionality of the existing state 
response to the issue.   
 
It could be argued that the aforementioned arguments in favour of the provision of some form 
of direct food-provision assistance would go against the precedent of Grootboom which 
rejected an entitlement to a minimum core of rights in the particular circumstances of that 
case.828 However, in that judgment the court did recognise that there may be particular fact 
complexes in which it could be both possible, and more significantly appropriate, to consider 
the content of a minimum core obligation to establish the reasonableness of state action.829 
Furthermore, as was argued in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, the later Khosa decision 
provides authority for weighing up competing considerations to provide for the most basic of 
needs.830 In doing this, the Constitutional Court in Khosa also showed its readiness to make 
wide-ranging orders on issues of social justice for those in greatest need in society. The TAC 
                                                 
827  Kutumela case 671/2003 para 21 of Founding Affidavit. 
828  Grootboom supra. 
829  Grootboom para 33. 
830  Khosa para 82. 
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case too, in which the wider state roll-out of anti-retrovirals was found to be necessary, 
supports the requirement for state policy to meet peoples’ most basic, urgent needs.831 It is 
therefore argued that there is ample judicial authority for a direct court challenge against state 
policy which fails to meet the most basic, urgent and life-sustaining needs of certain people in 
South Africa.  
 
From a procedural perspective, a final aspect in favour of a direct court challenge is the very 
broad access to court provided for in section 34 of the Constitution as read with the wide 
locus standi provisions of section 38.832 Applying section 34 to the right to food, it is clear 
that litigants have the right to approach the appropriate court to enforce an alleged 
infringement of the right. As was noted in Chapter 2, a very broad range of interested and 
affected parties have locus standi in terms of section 38 of the Constitution. In relation to the 
right to food it is envisaged that locus standi could potentially be founded on any one or more 
of the grounds provided for in subsections a) to e) of section 38. To elaborate, a hungry or 
malnourished person not benefitting from a state feeding programme could challenge the 
state action or inaction in his own interests. Alternatively, such an affected person might be a 
young child or elderly or infirm person unable to act on his own, in which case someone 
could act for him.833 A class action could be also formed by those in a similar position or 
public interest litigation launched. In the latter categories an organization like the Legal 
Resources Centre is well placed to assist such affected persons. A precedent for locus standi 
vis-à-vis a socio-economic right being successfully based upon public interest standing is 
Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, and another.834  Finally, assuming 
that those allegedly being denied the right to food are members of an association, such an 
association can act in the interest of its members. An example of this last category would be a 
particular civic organization representing its members who fall outside the realm of 
government feeding programmes. It is therefore submitted that these broad locus standi 
options provide a useful tool to enforce the right to food by means of a direct court challenge.  
 
                                                 
831  TAC supra. 
832  These were discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
833  The Soobramoney case (supra) is precedent for locus standi being grounded on such a basis. 
834  2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E). This case related to the unlawful canceling of social grants. Pillay held that the 
applicant had locus standi, based on acting in the public interest, to challenge the purported reasons given 
in a pro forma letter for the cancellation or rejection of grant applications.  
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7.2.3 ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCH A COURT CHALLENGE AND RATHER 
TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION TEST-CASES  
 
It is submitted that a right to food challenge at this stage would have key differences from the 
successful challenges against the denial of housing in Grootboom, medical care (in the form 
of HIV-Aids drugs) in TAC and social assistance grants in Khosa. In the aforementioned 
cases the state did not have in place a policy or satisfactory policy for catering for the 
category of harmed persons in question. However, in relation to food, whilst it is still a moot 
point whether the state’s food policy can be considered reasonable, there are in place the 
Integrated Food Security Strategy and the Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of 
Distress.835 For example, the Social Relief of Distress Grant, as was discussed in Chapter 5, 
provides a degree of direct crisis food provision in the form of food stamps for a limited 
period. The potential of the Social Relief of Distress Grant as a means to counter emergency 
food problems has been greatly improved by the Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of 
Distress formulated in response to the Kutumela836 case. Therefore considering the adoption 
of these seemingly adequate initial state responses to the issue, there appears no need to go to 
court to order the creation of a feasible system at this stage. It may be prudent to gauge their 
implementation at greater length before attacking constitutionally the merits of the state’s 
response to the right to food challenges.  
 
Therefore whilst not going so far as to say that a direct right to food court challenge would be 
unsuccessful, the fact that the state has put into place measures to meet some of the most 
glaring needs provides sufficient reason not to rush into a constitutional challenge at this 
stage. If the implementation of these policies and programmes is unsatisfactory, the court 
option remains open.837 However, just as was the case in the Eastern Cape with the numerous 
challenges brought against the failure to pay out old age pensions,838 so there may exist a 
                                                 
835  Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress. February 2006. www.gov.za (accessed on 1 
November 2006). 
836  Case 671/2003. 
837  The quote of Liebenberg cited in Chapter 5 is worth reiterating in this regard: 
“unless measurable progress is made to improve the implementation of social assistance 
programmes, national and provincial departments of social  development will be vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge”. 
Liebenberg “The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South 
Africa” 246. 
838  See the cases discussed in Chapter 4 in this regard. For example, Kate v MEC for Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape, 2006 (4) SA 478 (SCA), Mbanaga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and another 2002 
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very useful role for court challenges whenever the state fails to provide or unduly delays 
provision of Social Relief of Distress Grants when their issuing is justified in cases of undue 
hardship in terms of the Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress. Such cases will 
ensure that Social Relief of Distress Grants are being properly used and in so doing will 
ensure access to food (albeit for a limited duration) to the recipients. For example, it was 
noted in Chapter 5 that application can be made for extension of a Social Relief of Distress 
Grant for a second three-month period.839 Applicants in conditions of unemployment, dire 
poverty and hunger could apply to court to argue that a denial of the extension of a grant for a 
second period is unreasonable. This argument on a court challenge against an inadequate 
application of a Social Relief of Distress Grant is equally applicable to a court challenge 
against any unacceptable roll-out of other food provision programmes created by 
government.   
 
It will require extensive on-site research to establish whether government food programmes 
are being properly administered before successful court challenges on this basis may be 
launched. Such test cases and research would warrant co-operation between legal aid 
organisations like the Legal Resources Centre, Legal Aid Board, University Legal Aid 
Clinics and other non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) like the Black Sash and FAMSA. 
Such court challenges would challenge state inaction and inefficiency, whenever it exists, in 
order to ensure compliance from that time forward. In each application costs should be 
sought against the state to serve as an incentive to properly roll out the programmes 
thereafter. 
 
As the Draft Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress is fairly new policy, it is 
important that knowledge of the rights contained therein are widely disseminated to affected 
persons by way of NGO’s and others in regular contact with likely qualifying recipients of 
Social Relief of Distress Grants. Without knowledge of the new policy, affected persons will 
not be aware that they could qualify to receive a grant and to take the matter to court if their 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1) SA 359. (SE), Kotze v Minister of Health and another 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T) and Bushula and 
others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and another 2000 (2) SA 849 (E). 
839  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme (background paper for 
South African National Non-Governmental Organisation (SANGOCO), the South African Human Rights 
Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality 11. 
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application is improperly dealt with by the state.840 Furthermore, such organizations are well 
placed to assist worthy applicants in applying for grants and in so doing assist them in 
realizing their right to food amongst other rights. 
 
This fairly cautious suggestion of mounting challenges against specific instances of failing to 
implement the existing policy properly rather than attacking the constitutionality of the state’s 
response to the food issue itself is supported by the fact that none of the existing academic 
writing on the right to food in South Africa has suggested a direct court challenge.841 
However, in opposition to this argument is the fact that simply because a court challenge has 
yet to occur, be conceived or written about does not mean that it could and should not be the 
case. A case in point is the pending court challenge against the age differential for old age 
grants for men and women.842 It could have been assumed before papers were filed in this 
matter that the status quo (in terms of just discrimination) was clearly satisfactory (i.e. 
constitutional) and hence not worthy of a constitutional challenge. Only now that the 
challenge is soon to be heard has the issue been subject to some academic scrutiny.843 
However, assuming that the time is not best at present to mount a court challenge on the 
merits of existing food policy, some alternative needs to be formulated in light of the gaps in 
the right to food which this research has highlighted in previous Chapters. This is where the 
multi-faceted approach below may be an answer.      
 
                                                 
840  The research of both Govindjee and Brand indicate that the Social Relief of Distress Grant is 
underutilized. Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy 
in South Africa: Lessons from India 131; and Brand “Between Availability and Entitlement: The 
Constitution, Grootboom” in Law, Democracy and Development 18. It is submitted that improved 
community education on the Grant would go some way to increasing the number of applicants and 
correspondingly grant holders.  
841  This includes the extensive writings of Mr Danie Brand on the subject. His writings on the constitutional 
right to food are perhaps found in their most complete form in Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and 
Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 153. In this comprehensive analysis of the right to 
food Brand makes no suggestion of a court challenge as a way to better realize the right to food.  
842  Krüger “ ‘Come back when you are 65, Sir.’:  Discrimination in respect of access to social assistance for 
the elderly” Forthcoming in LDD 2006(2). See also Matyu “Men challenge ruling which allows women 
earlier pension” The Herald (11 November 2005) available at 
http://www.theherald.co.za/herald/2005/09/16/ news/n04_16092005.htm.   
843  See Krüger “ ‘Come back when you are 65, Sir.’:  Discrimination in respect of access to social assistance 
for the elderly” Forthcoming in LDD 2006(2). 
 174
7.3 PROPOSAL 2: A MULTI-FACETED APPROACH OF PROMOTING THE 
RIGHT TO FOOD THROUGH PROMOTING RIGHTS WHICH SUPPORT 
THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
 
This dissertation has on a number of occasions argued that the right to food is intrinsically 
linked with numerous other rights. Consequently, when it comes to considering ways to 
provide greater access to adequate food for all as required by section 27 of the Constitution 
and adequate nutrition for children in terms of section 28, improving access to these other 
rights in such ways that improve access to food is an obvious solution. This part of the 
dissertation will therefore consider how such interpretations of related rights and laws and 
policies relating to such rights can occur so as to do just this. Brand provides academic 
authority for such an approach in noting that the right to food is often not directly protected 
by law or court rulings. As a result he indicates that the right to food more commonly finds 
protection through other constitutional rights.844 Some of this analysis will necessarily 
involve a degree of repetition from earlier Chapters where the beginnings of such suggestions 
have already been pointed towards. However, this analysis will be limited to certain 
legislation and state programmes relating to other rights which may be used to protect the 
right to food, rather than repeating Chapter 3’s discussion on how the right to food can and 
does overlap in general terms with the rights to life, equality, dignity, property, social security 
(including social assistance), water, health care and education. The role of education, due to 
the multi-faceted role which it may have in enriching the right to food, will be considered 
closely. 
 
In addition to an analysis of possible new interpretations of interrelated rights, this section 
will also make proposals as to more progressive court orders on the right to food and the 
better enforcement of such court orders by the SAHRC and by other means. The possibility 
of introducing certain new measures applicable specifically to the right to food, such as 
framework food legislation and the Basic Income Grant, will also be considered. Due to the 
inescapable link between the right to food and the roll-out of government food programmes, 
proposals concerning administrative justice and the right to food will be made. This whole 
section will focus on measures which have a practical impact on the provision of access to 
food. This focus accords with the insightful comment of Ntlama that: 
 
                                                 
844  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 164 to 165. 
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“While the world admires South Africa for its modern and progressive Constitution, it is time 
that South Africans begin to focus on the implementation of the rights in question, and related 
court orders.”845
 
7.3.1  INTERPRETING RELATED RIGHTS AND POLICIES IN A MANNER 
WHICH PROMOTES THE RIGHT TO FOOD   
7.3.1.1 LAND-REFORM MATTERS 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the link between realising the right to food and land redistribution in 
South Africa. The submission made was that improving access to fertile land for food 
insecure people has an obvious role to play in realising the right to food in South Africa. In 
light of the fact that approximately 80% of the best agricultural land is still owned by white 
commercial farmers,846 there is clearly much room for improvement in this regard. A 
contentious point exists in relation to land usage in the Eastern Cape in particular, where 
sizeable pieces of land have been and are being converted from usage for agriculture, 
primarily commercial livestock farming, into game farming.847 The conversion of land from 
agricultural to game usage reduces the food-production of the area and hence is not a positive 
development from this perspective. However, as a counter-argument it could be put forward 
that the land in question was owned by commercial rather than subsistence farmers and hence 
the issue is really one of increased profits for such farmers rather than reduced food 
availability for subsistence farmers. This last point is supported by the fact that, as has been 
shown, South Africa’s food access problem is one of unequal supply rather than a shortage of 
production. However, notwithstanding the counter-argument, it is arguable that in the context 
of the finite amount of land available for redistribution, the conversion of land used for 
grazing into game farms is questionable. It is submitted that the needs of subsistence farmers 
to use such land to meet their own right to food needs should be considered a greater priority 
for government.  
 
Brand notes that land dispossession in South Africa, in line with the requirements of sections 
25(2) and 25 (3) of the Constitution, may only occur when various factors exist such as the 
                                                 
845  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio- Economic Rights” 
Constitutional Law and Legal Theory Conference 5. 
846  Coomans and Yapko are citing 2002 figures provided by the Department of Land Affairs. Coomans and 
Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African Perspective” 29. The 
same source also indicates that as of 2002. Approximately 14 million black South Africans were living in 
the infertile former homelands. Ibid.  
847  South African Government Website www.gov.za (accessed on 3 January 2007). 
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payment of fair compensation and a consideration of all relevant considerations.848 Brand 
argues that where land is dispossessed from people using it for subsistence agricultural 
purposes, this factor should affect the amount of compensation they should receive.849 It is 
submitted that this argument is both logical and fair and that furthermore the dispossession of 
land from those who use the land as a means to feed themselves should be considered only as 
an absolutely last resort. This last submission is made on the basis that whilst land 
dispossession is sometimes needed in the interests of society at large, a dispossession which 
in so doing removes the owners’ ability to feed themselves creates the need to provide such 
disposed persons with other means to provide themselves with adequate food. 
  
Brand notes also the potential of land reform legislation, in particular the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE)850 and the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act (ESTA),851 to make a significant impact to realising the right to food.852 In 
effect these laws improve the rights of land occupiers over the land they are occupying. 
Whilst in apartheid South Africa racist legislation like the Illegal Squatting Act853 made 
occupation short of ownership very tenuous, PIE and ESTA make great strides in improving 
the tenure of land occupiers. The link between PIE and ESTA and the right to food is that 
through having greater rights to lawfully possess land (and even become the owners thereof 
in terms of ESTA), there is the potential to use this improved security of tenure to improve 
food security through using the land for agricultural purposes. Such agricultural purposes 
would normally be of a subsistence variety, but could also take the form of selling produce 
which would then provide the means to secure other forms of food for the occupiers and their 
dependants. An example of a clear link between ESTA and the right to food is section 1 
thereof whereby a restriction on a rural land occupier’s right to grow crops or graze their 
livestock is considered an unlawful eviction in terms of that section. The case of Ntshangase 
                                                 
848  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 166. 
849  Ibid.  Brand cites the case of In re Kranspoort Community 2000 (2) SA 124 (LCC) as support for this 
argument. In this case the claimants were found not to have received ‘just equitable’ compensation as the 
amount received had excluded their food production losses in the form of cultivation and grazing. Para 
78. 
850  Act 19 of 1998. 
851  Act 62 of 1997. 
852  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 166. 
853  Act 52 of 1951. 
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v The Trustees of the Tereblanché Gesin Familie Trust,854 where grazing rights and access of 
such livestock to water was denied to the applicants, illustrates this point. 
 
Both ESTA and PIE require a court, before ordering the eviction of occupiers, to consider 
what is just and equitable in the circumstances of the matter.855 Brand astutely argues that in 
light of the constitutional right to food, the court must take cognizance of the impact of an 
eviction order on the ability of the affected persons to feed themselves.856 It is submitted that 
such an interpretation of PIE and ESTA accords with an appropriately purposive 
interpretation of these pieces of legislation in light of the right to food in both section 27 and 
28 of the Constitution.  
 
A further link between both ESTA and PIE and the right to food is the fact that the legislation 
requires the court before evicting occupiers to consider alternative land available to such 
persons to occupy upon eviction.857 It is submitted that it is a perfectly reasonable 
interpretation of what alternative land options are available for a court to consider whether 
the alternative could be used for food production purposes. This link is made even more 
clearly in terms of the definition of suitable alternative accommodation in terms of section 1 
of ESTA.858 In terms of section 1 of ESTA suitable alternative accommodation relates to both 
where the evictees will live as well as the suitability of the alternative land for agricultural 
use. It is submitted that the only reasonable interpretation thereof is that where a household is 
dependent upon the land upon which they live to produce their food needs, then the suitability 
of alternative land to meet the equivalent food needs is of crucial importance as to whether an 
eviction should be granted. For example, where an occupying family grow crops (like 
mealies) to meet most of their own food needs, then alternative land would need to be arable 
and preferably suitable for growing similar crops for the right to food to be said to be 
promoted in such circumstances.  
  
                                                 
854  [2003] JOL 10996 (LCC). In this case this form of unlawful eviction was held to have occurred. 
855  ESTA Act 62 of 1997 ss 8 and 11 and PIE 19 of 1998 ss 4 to 6.  
856  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 167. 
857  ESTA Act 62 of 1997 ss 9 to 11 and PIE 19 of 1998 s 6. 
858  Brand argues that this provision provides for the state to mitigate interference with the right to food when 
such interference is called for. Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic 
Rights in South Africa 167. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, on the ambit of the right to food, I discussed 
as part of the state’s right to food duties the duty to mitigate the harm caused when a denial of a right is 
necessary. 
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Brand notes that ESTA, PIE and the Labour Tenants Act859 protect land rights as a way to 
protect the right to food against its denial by private bodies, just as denial by the state is 
protected against. This is done by limiting the ambit of lawful eviction and making the 
process for eviction subject to a number of safety measures to ensure that rights of occupiers 
are not unfairly denied.860 In so doing, the ability of those who depend on the land upon 
which they live to produce the food they need to survive is safeguarded.   
 
In relation to all the aforementioned land reform legislation and their links with food rights, it 
is argued that wherever possible interpretations of such legislation by both government 
functionaries and courts should be such as to promote access to adequate food for land 
occupiers.   
 
7.3.1.2  ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE RELATING TO THE RIGHT TO FOOD 
  
In the light of section 33 of the Constitution, administrative action relating to the right to food 
must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. This dissertation has repeatedly called for 
the conversion of rights into reality. Submissions on how to better realize the right to food 
would therefore be incomplete without the inclusion of proposals for improving 
administrative justice relating to government’s food programmes. The value of such an 
analysis is increased if one accepts the link between substantive rights, including socio-
economic rights, and their implementation. Put differently, the right to administrative justice 
and the entitlement to various socio-economic rights, including food, should work together to 
ensure that everyone has lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair access to the socio-
economic right in question.  The roll-out of feeding and nutrition programmes must be justly 
administered for such programmes to meet the basic food needs of hungry and malnourished 
people.  
 
                                                 
859  Act 3 of 1996. 
860  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 171. Again, 
reference is made to my discussion in Chapter 3 of what duties the right to food implies for the state. In 
that discussion it was shown that this duty requires all people to be protected from rights’ violations by 
both state and non-state entities. 
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In relation to the requirement of lawfulness, there is plenty of case authority for successful 
challenges against unlawful administrative action.861 Relying on this analogous case 
authority, it is clear that any person who qualifies for a state feeding programme, who is 
unlawfully denied access thereto, could successfully challenge such administrative action in 
court. A challenge along similar lines was found in the case of Kutumela v Member of the 
Executive Committee for Social Services, Culture, Arts and Sport in the North West 
Province.862 Although the Kutumela case challenged the unlawfulness of a denial of a social 
relief of distress grant and not directly a state feeding programme, the fact that social relief of 
distress grants in practice take the form of food vouchers,863 makes this challenge even more 
relevant under this heading of administrative injustice in relation to the right to food. 
 
It was indicated in Chapter 4 that administrative action affecting fundamental rights involve a 
proportionality enquiry to ensure that the action is reasonable.864 Such a test involves 
evaluating the advantages to be gained from taking a particular action against the 
disadvantages of not taking it. Clearly administrative decision-making relating to food also 
requires such a balancing act. In light of the fact that food is a basic requirement for human 
existence, this research has called for administrative action which promotes a broad and 
generous interpretation of food entitlement. By way of example, it is submitted that whenever 
an administrator is faced with a difficult judgement call as to whether someone does indeed 
qualify for a particular government food provision programme, then it is reasonable for such 
an applicant to benefit under the scheme.  
 
The requirements of procedural fairness, including the right to adequate reasons for 
administrative decisions taken, were discussed at some length in Chapter 4 and will not be 
considered much further here. Suffice to say that administrative action relating to the right to 
food must follow the steps laid down for the action in question and be backed up by adequate 
reasons for the decision. Due to the fact that hunger and malnutrition have such serious 
                                                 
861  For example, Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525 
(E). 
862  Case 671/2003.  
863  Liebenberg and Tilley Poverty and Inequality Hearings: Social Security Theme (background paper for 
South African National Non-Governmental Organisation (SANGOCO), the South African Human Rights 
Commission and the Commission for Gender Equality 11. 
864  Academic authority for this submission is De Ville, J Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South 
Africa 215. In Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 677. Case authority for such a 
proportionality enquiry is Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 44. 
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consequences, including the possibility of death, it is argued that the procedural fairness 
requirement must involve the process being handled as expeditiously as is reasonably 
possible. For example, if an applicant for a social relief of distress grant were to have to wait 
unduly long for the reasons for her being denied the grant, such an applicant may die of 
hunger or at least suffer great hardship before being able to challenge the administrative 
decision taken in court.865  
 
There is thus a clear scope for our courts to ensure administrative justice in relation to all 
state food programmes. This accords with the Chaskalson P’s finding in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa; In re: Ex Parte Application of the President of 
South Africa that: 
 
“courts no longer have to claim space and push boundaries to find means of controlling state 
power. The control is vested in them under the Constitution …”.866
 
7.3.1.3 INCOME CREATION MEASURES 
 
In Chapter 5 it was indicated how the ability to earn an income is a key way for people to be 
able to feed themselves in that the income earned can be used to directly procure food or 
provide the means to produce food (for example when income earned is used to buy farming 
implements). On this premise it is clear that the promotion of income generation is an 
obvious method of indirectly ensuring that people are provided with the food they require. 
Actual methods by which income generation may be promoted, which were touched on 
briefly in Chapter 5, is considered beyond the scope of proposals for this legal analysis and 
will therefore not be taken further here.  
 
7.3.2  ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
7.3.2.1  CREATIVE JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
 
This research has shown how the right to food has often failed to be properly enjoyed in 
reality. The discussion in Chapter 2 of socio-economic rights generally indicated how, despite 
                                                 
865  The Kutumela decision, discussed earlier, can be used as authority for this submission. Whilst this case 
was actually decided upon the basis of unlawfulness, it is clear that the undue delay in handling the 
whole process was also procedurally unfair. Kutumela v Member of the Executive Committee for Social 
Services, Culture, Arts and Sport in the North West Province Case 671/2003. 
866  2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) Para 45. 
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being fully justiciable rights as opposed to mere values, socio-economic rights have not 
always been properly protected or even adequately recognised by the South African courts, 
even in the constitutional era.867 In addition, the enforcement of socio-economic rights is 
faces the challenge of state resource limitations imposed by the internal limitations of section 
27(2) of the Constitution. Thus implementing the right to food, like other socio-economic 
rights, is a challenging task for the courts. What is called for, therefore, is creative judicial 
decision making which both acknowledges resource limitations whilst at the same time 
converts the rights in question into reality. Such judicial pronouncements would accord with 
foreign case authority868 in the influential Canadian decision of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 
which calls for a purposive and generous approach to the interpretation of constitutional 
rights which are intrinsically linked with effective protection of rights to ensure the full 
advantage of the applicable right.869 Scott and Alston argue that applying a purposive 
approach to the right to food means that court decisions should reflect the need to avoid 
starvation and suffering.870 In order to ensure the adoption of such a purposive and generous 
approach, it is argued that our courts with constitutional jurisdiction need to come up with 
creative means to promote the better enforcement of the right to food. What follows is a 
consideration of possible innovative judicial remedies apposite to the right to food. Before 
specific remedies are mooted a consideration of how such remedies will impact on the 
traditional conception of separation of powers amongst the different arms of government will 
be considered. This section will begin with the latter discussion as to propose judicial 
remedies which would unjustifiably usurp the legislature or executive’s functions would be a 
pointless exercise. 
 
A discussion of the separation of powers doctrine was made in Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
where it was noted that it is conventionally the role of the executive to make state policy. In 
calling for creative court decisions one must be aware of a possible incursion by the courts 
into the normal realm of the executive arm of the state. Such a reconception of the separation 
of powers was envisaged by the Constitutional Court in the TAC case which held that the 
courts may make policy when the circumstances necessitate it and the normal mechanisms of 
                                                 
867  For example, in the Soobramoney case (supra), Justice Madlala describes socio-economic rights as ideals 
which should be strived for. At para 42. 
868  S 39 of the Constitution allows for consideration of foreign law in interpreting a right in the Bill of 
Rights. 
869  (1985) 18 DLR (4th) 321. 
870  Scott & Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on 
Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 206 at 217 to 218. 
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a democratic society do not solve the problem.871 The court held further that since the 
Constitution in section 7(2) requires the state to “respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights” any intrusion by the court into the executive’s realm: 
 
“is an intrusion mandated by the Constitution itself”.872
 
The TAC decision thus indicates that the courts can create policy for government, albeit only 
in exceptional circumstances.873 Hopkins argues that exceptional circumstances which would 
warrant such intervention include urgency and the existence of vulnerable people unable to 
help themselves.874 Hopkins aptly refers to this as a “South Africanised doctrine of the 
separation of powers”, which is more apposite to meet South Africa’s particular socio-
economic needs.875  The importance of this trend vis-a-vis the right to food is that there 
would now appear to be precedent for the courts to create a reasonable food policy should it 
find the policy and programmes in existence to be unreasonable. This submission is made on 
the basis that analogous with the facts in TAC (1), those suffering from hunger and 
malnutrition cannot wait until the next election to exercise their displeasure with government 
policy held to be unreasonable. Furthermore, there are vulnerable groups, such as hungry 
children, who do not have the democratic platform in which to effectively express their 
opinion on government policy; the courts might well have to speak for them. Thus existing 
problems relating to the right to food can be considered exceptional enough to warrant the 
courts to issue remedies which have an impact on government’s food policy. What follows is 
a discussion of the form which such remedies could take.  
 
There is a broad scope to come up with creative court remedies relating to the right to food in 
light of the wide guidelines provided in sections 38 and 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. These 
sections provide respectively for a court with constitutional jurisdiction to make any order 
that is “just, fair or equitable” and to grant “appropriate relief” for a threat to or actual 
infringement of a fundamental right. The question then remains to identify apposite judicial 
                                                 
871  TAC (supra) at para 98 to 100.
872  TAC (supra) at para 99. 
873  Hopkins “Democracy in a Post-TAC Society” 17. 
874  Firstly, in relation to HIV/ Aids, the urgency of the required treatment well before the next election. 
Secondly, newborn babies have no meaningful access to the democratic process because they cannot yet 
vote. Ibid. 
875  Ibid. 
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remedies to best realise the right to food in the light of the wide parameters provided in the 
Constitution. Such an analysis takes on greater significance if one accepts the view put 
forward by prominent legal academics that there remains a lack of effective remedies to date 
to give real meaning to the concept of “appropriate relief”, especially in relation to socio-
economic rights.876 A useful starting point is a consideration of the forms of relief indicated 
by Justice Ackermann in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security as follows: 
 
“appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the 
Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a 
declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to ensure 
that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced.”877 (Own emphasis 
added). 
 
A declaration of rights which indicates the nature and extent of a particular right may be a 
useful starting point in light of the virtually untested nature of the right to food in South 
Africa. Thus, if a person unable to feed herself to goes to court indicating that her right to 
food is being denied, it may be useful for the court hearing the matter to delineate the nature 
of the applicant’s right to food by way of a declaration of rights.  However, just as this 
dissertation has repeatedly noted the need for rights on paper to be turned into reality, so a 
declaration of rights would appear an insufficient remedy without some further indication of 
how the right should be realised in practice. 
 
The argument in the previous paragraph for more practical judicial remedies pertaining to the 
right to food would appear to be met through the granting of an interdict or mandamus. These 
remedies would require the relevant government functionary (or even private individual if 
that were the case) to cease their unconstitutional conduct or to commence what they should 
be doing to realize the right.878 However, bald calls for our courts with constitutional 
jurisdiction to provide remedies in the form of interdicts or mandami without indicating what 
must be avoided or done, again fails to take the matter sufficiently further. Here Trengrove 
provides very useful guidance in suggesting that that appropriate relief for socio-economic 
rights violations would include an order directing the legislature and executive to bring about 
modification defined in terms of their aims and then to retain a supervisory jurisdiction to 
                                                 
876  This view is strongly espoused in Currie and De Waal The New Constitutional and Administrative Law: 
Constitutional Law 399.  
877   1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
878  The Grootboom judgment provides a precedent for such a remedy. Here the Constitutional Court issued a 
declaratory order requiring the state to meet its s 26(2) housing obligations. Grootboom (supra) para 95. 
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supervise the implementation of those changes.879 Trengrove’s call for the courts’ remedies 
to ensure what the legislature and executive are actually doing accords with their aims is a 
logical way of ensuring that the full ambit of the right to food, as discussed at length in 
Chapter 2, is realised.  
 
Perhaps even more useful is the idea of supervisory jurisdiction of government compliance 
with the court order handed down. As was well illustrated in the Grootboom case, there is 
always the danger of government non-compliance with the order of court.880 In Grootboom 
there was inadequate follow-up to ensure state compliance with the court’s wishes. This 
ineffectiveness was shown by state not having complied with the court order a full two years 
after the judgment in Grootboom.881 As was noted in Chapter 6, the failure by the court to 
exercise supervisory jurisdiction is a conspicuous gap in the precedent of Grootboom towards 
acceptable socio-economic rights jurisprudence in that those who launched the application 
did not see any tangible improvement in their circumstances within an acceptable period of 
time. In order to prevent this weakness of the Grootboom judgment being perpetuated, it is 
submitted that any court order relating to a successful right to food challenge must indicate in 
clear terms by whom and how enforcement of the order will occur so as to ensure compliance 
with its provisions. I would also argue for the need for the supervision of government 
compliance to be checked on an ongoing basis by an impartial organization with the power to 
independently gather information. Such a “watchdog” organization should thereafter be 
required to report back to the court which handed down the order on the degree of 
compliance with the order at a particular date. The watchdog should also be mandated by the 
court order to revert back to the court at an earlier date in instances where government non-
compliance has serious or urgent repercussions for the successful applicants. As was 
discussed in Chapter 6, the SAHRC is both well placed and constitutionally empowered to 
adequately perform such a supervisory function.882  
 
                                                 
879  Trengrove “Judicial Remedies for Violations of Socio-economic Rights” 8 at 9. 
880  Supra. 
881  Pillay “Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights” 277 
Pillay rightly contends that the Grootboom judgment has been restrictively interpreted with the 
consequence that there has been seemingly little positive policy change in favour of vulnerable groups in 
crisis situations.  
882  Nthai, for example, sees the Commission as being at the forefront of ensuring that both government and 
non-government actors combat poverty effectively.  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in 
South Africa” 41. The SAHRC’s powers are laid out in s 184 of the Constitution.  
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My earlier suggestion that the appointed supervisory watchdog have the power to 
independently gather information requires elaboration. It is necessary that the government 
department whose compliance with a court order is being assessed does not form part of its 
own assessment. As was discussed in Chapter 6, such impartial assessment is vital for the 
sake of accountability and impartiality in the process.  The lack of enforcement measures and 
monitoring in Grootboom meant that whilst the SAHRC was given supervisory jurisdiction in 
theory, it could not properly perform this function due to it not receiving all the requisite 
information pertaining to the implementation of the order across the country.883  In order to 
prevent the repeat of such a situation in an analogous successful right to food challenge, it is 
suggested that the supervisory body be empowered to gather information on government 
compliance on its own, without having to rely on receiving government reports to do this.  
 
It is submitted that the aforementioned supervision process could be further tightened up so 
as to ensure greater compliance. It makes sense for the court, when handing down its order, to 
indicate exact deadlines for performance by government.884  For example, was a court to rule 
that existing government feeding in schools was insufficient, then particular timeframes 
should be provided by which particular targets must be reached. In providing such 
timeframes the court would need to consider the resource limitation proviso of section 27(2). 
Govindjee cites a lack of timeframes for state compliance as a significant weakness of the 
Grootboom judgment.885 There is an obvious link between timeframes for compliance with a 
court order and monitoring of its fulfilment, in that it is significantly easier to monitor 
compliance if a timeframe for fulfilment of different parts of the order has been laid down by 
the court. To elaborate with an example, in the event of flooding victims successfully 
approaching a court in arguing that there are no satisfactory feeding measures in such an 
emergency situation, the question then remains how long the government has to introduce a 
satisfactory procedure. This lacuna is easily filled by the court order indicating timeframes 
for compliance. The need for court orders relating to the right to food, or any other socio-
economic right for that matter, to include timeframes for conformity is heightened by the 
poor track record of the government in often failing to satisfy court orders relating to social 
                                                 
883  Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future 
Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence” 26.  
884  The creation of timeframes for the state to meet various aspects of its right to food obligations is 
reconsidered later in this Chapter under proposed framework legislation. 
885  Govindjee The Constitutional Right to Social Assistance as a Framework for Social Policy in South 
Africa: Lessons from India 99. 
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grants within a reasonable period.886 The need for urgent and strictly enforced timeframes is 
particularly the case with the right to food where an unreasonable delay in compliance may 
have dire consequences, namely further hunger, malnutrition and even death. The creation of 
timeframes for government compliance forms a key part of framework legislation on the right 
to food which is considered again later in this Chapter. 
 
7.3.2.2 EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF COURT ORDERS 
 
This section continues from the earlier proposals on creative court orders which included 
some discussion on enforcement of such orders by way of monitoring compliance. The South 
African Human Rights Commission has called for monitoring of whether the state is 
progressively realising the right to food.887 The above proposals on effective judicial 
remedies to ensure the right to food called for the court orders themselves to make provision 
for their own enforcement. Putting into place measures to monitor government compliance 
with court orders is linked with the issue of creative judicial remedies on the right to food in 
that the best court orders in the world count for nothing if they are not implemented. I 
commented above that the Grootboom decision failed to order adequate measures to ensure 
that the court’s order would be properly monitored so as to ensure proper government 
compliance with the court’s requirements.  To recap, the court indicated that in the 
circumstances the state had fallen short of its right to housing obligations and ordered the 
state to remedy this. The court failed, however, to create satisfactory ways of ensuring that 
the remedial state action was satisfactory.888 The potential use of the SAHRC to perform this 
task was discussed in the Grootboom judgment, but not adequately done in practice. 
Similarly, in any future court order relating to the right to food, it is submitted that the order 
itself must contain provisions which ensure that the court is able to determine whether there 
has been compliance by government with its order. Nthai sensibly suggests that effective 
enforcement of such an order requires the court to indicate how monitoring of compliance 
will occur, timeframes for compliance and what should be contained in a report on the 
                                                 
886  For example, Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) [1998] 1 All SA 525 
(E). Other case examples, especially in the Eastern Cape of such a tardy response by government to court 
orders are discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation and in much more detail by Plasket. Plasket 
“Administrative Justice and Social Assistance” 497 to 501. 
887  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3 and 10. 
888  The court did indicate that a court can require the state to give an account of its progress in implementing 
those measures. Grootboom para 42. However, this point was not taken far enough, in that no indication 
was made of a report-back to the court of the implementation of the order.  
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measures taken to follow the order.889 Without such provisions the value of the court order 
itself is highly questionable in that in theory the right to food may be taken forward but in 
practice those affected would continue to suffer.  
 
7.4  EDUCATION 
 
Ntlama argues that in addition to a lack of monitoring, a lack of awareness of the legal 
process and a lack of financial means are other reasons for socio-economic rights not being 
given affect to.890 This sentiment is echoed in a report of the South African Human Rights 
Commission which indicates that the difficulty in addressing socio-economic rights violations 
is compounded by widespread ignorance of what such rights entail.891 Ntlama’s above 
comment could relate to both a lack of basic legal education in affected communities and 
insufficient resources for organizations like the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) to assist such 
indigent individuals. In relation to the right to food it is submitted that there is a need for 
widespread education on all aspects of the right, including enforcement and monitoring of 
judgments, and for NGO’s like the LRC to be properly funded to be able to assist such needy 
individuals throughout the legal process. It is submitted that improved education does indeed 
hold the key to various aspects of the right to food. The South African Human Rights 
Commission indicates that the state’s duty to promote the right to food includes widespread 
education on the ambit of the right.892 What follows are some envisaged ways in which 
improved education may result in better fulfillment of the right to food in South Africa. 
  
Chapter 3 indicated that the ambit of the right to food includes food of a nutritionally 
adequate quality and quantity for a person’s physical and mental well-being. Adequate 
education is required to know what good nutrition entails. Vidar correctly identifies education 
as one of the key links in a chain of satisfactory nutrition in that a lack of education may 
negatively affect one’s right to food.893 Brand points out that education allows a person to eat 
                                                 
889  Nthai “Implementation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa.” 41 
890  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio- Economic Rights” 3. 
891  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to have Access to Sufficient Food  Fourth Economic 
and Social Rights Report 2001/2002 (2003) 37. 
892  The South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food  Fifth Economic and Social Rights 
Report Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 7.   
893  Vidar “Towards Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food” 13. 
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more nutritiously by knowing the nutritional value of particular foodstuffs as well as how to 
store and prepare the food so as to maximise the nutritional value received.894
 
Associated with the previous paragraph is the need for education on the link between poor 
nutrition and food insecurity and HIV/ Aids susceptibility. Engh’s research shows that food 
insecurity and malnutrition increase the susceptibility of contracting HIV and the more rapid 
development of HIV into Aids.895 Chapter 3 showed how notwithstanding improved 
HIV/Aids medical treatment the scourge of the pandemic remains and worsens. It is 
submitted that more widespread knowledge of the use of good nutrition as a means to counter 
HIV and Aids can, together with the improved roll-out of anti-retrovirals, play a positive roll 
in the fight against HIV and Aids. 
 
This concluding Chapter has already noted how improved provision of arable land to those 
susceptible to food insecurity and hunger is an obvious way of improving access to adequate 
food in South Africa. However, for such land redistribution to have a meaningful role in 
improving food production and hence decreasing food insecurity for such people, it is 
necessary for the recipients to be properly trained in the appropriate farming methods and for 
them to have the requisite farming implements and technology. Such land holders obviously 
also require the requisite training to properly use the technology and equipment. 
 
By creating greater capacity to earn a reasonable income, education can be said to promote 
the right to food in that the money earned can be used to procure satisfactory food. Being 
properly fed is also necessary for creating an environment conducive to learning. A hungry or 
malnourished child, if she attends school at all, is unlikely to learn properly. The existing 
school feeding scheme, called the National School Nutrition Programme, only involves the 
provision of primary school learners in particular identified poverty-stricken areas with a 
standardised nutritious meal at school.896 Furthermore, there is no provision in government 
feeding programmes for high school learners nor, with the exception of Gauteng’s 
                                                 
894  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 164. 
895  Engh “Developing Capacity to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right 
to Food in South Africa” 3. 
896  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3 and 28. 
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Community-Based Nutrition Programme,897 for pre-school learners. It is trite that meaningful 
learning is very unlikely to occur when learners are hungry or malnourished in the 
classroom.898 It is submitted that to properly meet the right of children to basic nutrition in 
section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution, such schemes need to be extended to any hungry or 
malnourished learners. 
 
It is submitted that the government’s current school feeding scheme could be expanded in a 
number of ways to do better feed hungry learners and in so doing realize their right to food as 
contained in sections 27 and 28 of the Constitution.899 The need for an expanded programme 
finds support in the “Right to Food Report” of the SAHRC which showed that 151615 fewer 
learners benefited from the scheme in 2002/2003 in comparison with the previous year.900 
The fact that many school-going children are hungry or malnourished is shown by alarming 
statistics that 101152 children in South Africa were hospitalised for severe malnutrition in the 
SAHRC’s 2002/2003 reporting period.901
  
The National School Nutrition Programme can be criticised for taking an over-simplified 
approach to the selection of schools to benefit under the programme. The current criteria used 
in this selection process contemplates the previously disadvantaged status of a school, 
primarily on the basis of its locality.902 It is submitted that a more investigative approach 
needs to be taken to identify all learners requiring feeding at school. As a starting point the 
programme needs to be extended to high schools. For primary and high school learners the 
more analytical selection process envisaged would adopt more individualised mechanisms for 
ensuring that all hungry or malnourished learners are fed at school. In relation to the latter 
point it is stressed that particular learners in a school may be hungry or malnourished despite 
other learners in the same school being adequately fed.   
                                                 
897  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 31. 
898  Not surprisingly, research has shown that hunger and malnutrition negatively affect mental and physical 
health as well as productivity. Olivier; Smit and Kalula Social Security: A Legal Analysis 546. 
899  Such learners benefit from the right to basic nutrition in s 28(1)(c) due to their status as children, in 
addition to the right to food for all in s 27. 
900  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
901  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
902  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 679. 
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 The SAHRC Report cited earlier also indicated that during the reporting period there was a 
three month period in the Eastern Cape when the National School Nutrition Programme did 
not run at all.903 Such non-delivery of services must clearly be avoided at all costs, and when 
it does occur, can and ought to be the subject of an urgent court challenge.  
 
7.4.1  PARALEGAL ADVICE OFFICES 
 
Adjunct to the proposed role of improved education on the right to food is the role of 
community-based paralegal advice offices in this process. Advice offices which are staffed 
by paralegals, amongst numerous other functions, provide indigent clients (especially in rural 
and poor areas) with rights education and basic legal assistance.904 The geographical location 
and nature of the work which advice offices perform makes their paralegal employees well 
suited to run workshops on the ambit of the right to food as well as government food 
programmes available. Plasket recognizes the useful educative and assisting role of advice 
offices by noting that: 
 
“They are also more in touch with the real problems of people than lawyers can ever hope to 
be.”905
 
However, paralegals in advice offices need to receive adequate training and backup 
themselves before they are able to properly disseminate this information to members of the 
community and assist further. Furthermore, paralegals are often involved in lobbying 
government to amend laws and policies in ways that facilitate positive social change.906  
 
The Rhodes University Legal Aid Clinic (RULAC) in Grahamstown, in the Eastern Cape, 
provides a method of paralegal education and co-operation which can serve as a model for 
other parts of the country. What RULAC has done is to set up a network of relationships, 
which it terms clusters, between itself and advice offices in the Eastern Cape and amongst the 
                                                 
903  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) 3. 
904  National Community-Based Paralegal Association. Accessed at www.paralegaladvice.org.za on 
21/01/2007. 
905  Plasket “Accessibility Through Public Interest Litigation” in Corder and Maluwa (eds) Administrative 
Justice in Southern Africa (1997) 124. It is hard to think of a problem more real to people than that of 
having insufficient access to food. 
906  Ibid. 
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advice office themselves.907 RULAC assists the advice offices in three main ways. Firstly, 
week-long certificates of competence are currently offered to paralegals on areas of law 
frequently encountered by the offices. Secondly, on-site visits are made to the advice offices 
by RULAC staff members to assess competence in areas of training received and to assist the 
advice offices with their clients’ problems. Finally, linked with the second role, the paralegals 
are able to contact RULAC professional legal staff, telephonically or in a similar fashion for 
advice in urgent matters.908 Such a relationship between university legal aid clinics, or 
similarly placed legal service providers, and advice offices could appropriately be applied to 
promote and protect the right to food in the following envisaged ways. Firstly, paralegals 
could receive training on the extent of the right to food, the existing food programmes 
available and protection of the right to food. Once trained, the paralegals would also be 
endowed with greater knowledge to lobby government to introduce some of the new 
programmes and laws identified in this research as ways of improving the realization of the 
right to food, such as the Basic Income Grant and food framework legislation. The on-site 
visitation of advice offices and other contact between the organizations would assist in 
identifying potential applicants for court challenges on government’s existing food policies or 
unacceptable roll-out of government programmes. It is therefore submitted that with the 
necessary training and logistical support paralegals in advice offices can play a meaningful 
role in the realization of the right to food. 
 
The above discussion contemplates the role of advice offices, specifically, in raising 
awareness in communities on the right to food. That is not to say that improved awareness of 
the right to food cannot be raised by other organizations or programmes. For example, the 
Street Law programme has launched massive rights awareness initiatives of many years.909 
Coomans and Yapko call for an educational right to food campaign to be launched on a large-
scale in the media. They note how an analogous campaign was launched by the Treatment 
Action Campaign in relation to anti-retroviral treatment of HIV and Aids.910 Such initiatives 
often face the challenges of people not knowing what their rights are, and even when they are 
aware of their rights, a lack of money to protect those rights via legal channels. Ntlama 
incisively suggests that these problems can be tackled through improved organization of 
                                                 
907  Rhodes University Legal Aid Clinic. Accessed at www.ru.ac.za/academic/faculties/law on 22/01/2007. 
908  Ibid.  
909  Street Law, South Africa’s Website. Accessed at streetlaw.org.za on 22/01/2007. 
910  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 33. 
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interested groups and by fundraising.911 Whilst Ntlama does not explain these solutions 
further, they could involve collaboration between non-governmental organizations for a more 
united approach to socio-economic rights enforcement, and the raising of money to fund 
strategic litigation. 
 
7.5  POSSIBLE NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES 
 
This concluding Chapter has thus far limited itself to ways of better realizing government’s 
current approach to South Africa’s food challenges: be it through a court challenge or 
through novel interpretations of other rights and programmes in ways which better promote 
the right to food. What follows are two new policies which, it is submitted, will improve 
access to sufficient food for those in great need. 
 
This discussion will be limited to framework food legislation and the Basic Income Grant as 
various other measures, such as a better utilization of social relief of distress grants, have 
received adequate discussion in earlier chapters. The need for further discussion on social 
relief of distress grants grants is also reduced since the creation of the Draft Procedure 
Manual for Social Relief of Distress.912 It is nonetheless worth reiterating the crucial role 
which the social relief of distress grants can have in allowing food provision in times of 
emergency. The urgent need for food provision in times of emergency is recognised by the 
seemingly inadequate measures government has in place at present. 
 
7.5.1  THE RATIONALE FOR CALLING FOR NEW PROGRAMMES  
 
There is research to show that food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition are experienced in 
South Africa.913 In light of the fact that there is enough food in this country to sufficiently 
feed everyone, government’s existing response to this country’s food challenges would 
                                                 
911  Ntlama “Unlocking the Future: Monitoring Court Orders in Respect of Socio- Economic Rights” 3. 
912  Accessed at www.gov.za on 1 November 2006. November 2005 and February 2006 drafts of the 
Procedure Manual for Social Relief of Distress exist. 
913  It has been estimated that 36% of the South African population (which equates to more than 14 million 
people) are vulnerable to food insecurity. Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by 
Policy Alone- A Need for Framework Legislation” 664. About 20 to 25% of South African pre-school 
children and 20% of primary school learners are chronically malnourished. Engh “Developing Capacity 
to Realise Socio-Economic Rights. The Example of HIV/Aids and the Right to Food in South Africa” 5. 
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appear inadequate. It is on this basis that the proposal of framework legislation on food is 
made. 
 
This research has noted the glaring gap in the existing social assistance grant network for 
those who are unable to find work yet do not qualify for one of the existing grants based on 
age or ill-health. It is in this context that the introduction of a Basic Income Grant (BIG) is 
called for. 
 
7.5.2  FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION 
 
The large number of issues raised in this dissertation, many of which warrant further research 
of their own, show how complicated the issue of realizing the right to food actually is. 
Chapter 5 discussed the possibility of a more co-ordinated and comprehensive response to 
South Africa’s numerous food challenges which could be the subject of framework 
legislation. This section will briefly highlight some of the main arguments in favour of 
creating food framework legislation before systematically proposing how this could 
successfully operate in reality. 
 
Coomans and Yapko argue that framework legislation on food in South Africa is called for in 
light of what they consider to be a lack of coherent law and policy on food. They also deem 
existing food programmes to be inadequate, especially the inaccessibility of such 
programmes to those in most need.914 It is submitted that such legislation is called for 
notwithstanding the improvements in the state’s response to the food challenges evidenced by 
the National Food Security Bill and the Integrated Food Security Strategy discussed in 
Chapter 5. It is worth repeating the description of framework legislation as aiming to provide 
a single, all-encompassing and co-ordinated means for implementing national policy and 
strategy relating to a particular right.915 Framework law on food should cover the complete 
range of matters associated with the right to create a holistic, harmonized response to its 
challenges.916 A final, and I would argue definitive, endorsement for introducing framework 
                                                 
914  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 31. 
915  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 670. 
916  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 20. 
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legislation on food is the Constitutional Court’s recognition in Grootboom of framework 
legislation as a reasonable method for effective and inclusive realization of a right.917 When 
one considers that the Grootboom case acknowledged the significant strides made by 
government in terms of policy formulated to meet housing needs, then the acknowledgement 
of framework legislation as a means of socio-economic rights enforcement is even more 
applicable to enforcement of food rights where government policy appears to be less well co-
ordinated. 
 
It is easy to support the aforementioned academic conceptualizations of framework 
legislation. However, going beyond these generic descriptions, it is much more challenging to 
provide greater detail on the actual form which food framework legislation in South Africa 
should take. Brief submissions on the four accepted parts of framework legislation (namely 
evaluation, drafting, implementation and monitoring) will be made.918  
 
The evaluation stage needs to identify all aspects of the right to food. This must be done as 
the framework legislation, by definition, involves a holistic response to the issues. Such an 
analysis will be protracted and is likely to have significant costs both financially and in terms 
of man-hours. An example of the challenges posed at this first phase would be the need for a 
detailed analysis of the extent of food security, hunger and malnutrition in South Africa. It is 
impossible to create workable solutions in the framework legislation itself without knowing 
the extent of the challenges faced. A necessary consequence of the massive scale of the 
evaluation stage is that were government to decide to introduce framework legislation for 
food, its creation would be a lengthy process. 
 
It is suggested that the greater input from the public and particular interested parties should 
be sought in the drafting stage of the process. This accords with the submission of Coomans 
and Yapko that civil society has a central role to play in policy creation and planning.919 A 
key part of the drafting (and the process as a whole) is to translate the right on paper into food 
on the tables of all living in South Africa. The creation of guidelines and targets must form a 
                                                 
917  Grootboom (supra) para 40. 
918  Khoza writes that these are the four generally recognized stages of framework law. Khoza “Realising the 
Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework Legislation” 672. 
919  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 24. 
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central tenet of the legislation.920 Such guidelines and targets could cover such things as the 
quantities of particular foodstuffs required to meet South Africa’s needs. 
 
Linked with the creation of targets is the implementation of the legislation. Implementation is 
aided by the framework legislation itself which provides specific methods of implementation, 
including powers, policies and implementation benchmarks.921 It is in this context that there 
is a potential weakness of framework legislation being less well placed than the executive for 
dealing with policy issues.922 Somehow the legislation will have to make provision for 
changing circumstances, including state resource limitations which could arise in the 
future.923
 
Khoza argues that the monitoring stage is made significantly easier due to the set targets in 
the framework legislation.924 This dissertation has earlier called for monitoring to be done by 
an independent and impartial body which has the means to gather information on compliance 
on its own. To repeat, the monitoring organ should not be reliant on government departments 
to report on their compliance with set rules.925 The proposals made earlier in this Chapter on 
monitoring, creative judicial remedies and effective enforcement of judgments apply mutatis 
mutandis to the monitoring of, remedies for non-compliance with, and enforcement of, 
framework legislation. This last submission is made on the basis that the requirements of 
framework legislation on food are analogous to a court order vis-à-vis “ordinary” food 
legislation or programmes.   
 
                                                 
920  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 22. 
921  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 673. 
922  Coomans & Yapko “A Framework on the Right to Food- An International and South African 
Perspective” 24. 
923  The creation of food framework legislation would obviously not remove the (necessary) state resource 
limitation caveat found in s 27(2) of the Constitution. 
924  Khoza “Realising the Right to Food in South Africa: Not by Policy Alone- A Need for Framework 
Legislation” 673. 
925  See the proposals made in Chapter 6 relating to the SAHRC better performing its monitoring role. 
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7.5.3  THE BASIC INCOME GRANT 
 
It is acknowledged that the Basic Income Grant (BIG), proposed by the Coalition of South 
Africans for a Basic Income Grant,926 has been rejected as an option by the current South 
African government.927 However, the lack of social assistance to procure food and other 
necessities for those who do not fall into the existing social assistance system provided by the 
state, surely calls for a reconsideration of this stance.928
 
The introduction of BIG will admittedly be a mammoth task requiring the allocation of 
significant funds in the national budget; something which government has to date considered 
neither affordable nor feasible to implement.929 However, it is submitted that the potential 
advantages of introducing BIG outweigh these challenges. The fact that government should 
reconsider its current rejection of BIG is supported by the research findings of organizations 
and bodies particularly well placed to comment on social security social and assistance 
interventions. For example, the Taylor Commission recognized the potential of BIG, more 
than any other potential social protection initiative, to alleviate the worst consequences of 
poverty and unemployment and to advance development.930 Furthermore, the findings of the 
SAHRC are that BIG should continue to be considered as a means to fight poverty, especially 
for those of a working age.931 It is submitted that the introduction of BIG would go some way 
towards the state meeting the SAHRC’s calls for urgent state intervention to ensure food 
provision in severe situations.932 It is argued that unemployed individuals who receive no 
form of social assistance quite clearly find themselves in what can be termed severe 
situations. BIG could also be considered an urgent state response to the needs of other food 
insecure persons, whose ability to feed themselves may be hampered by climatic and other 
natural disasters as well as man-made crises such as political volatility and being the victims 
                                                 
926  The Coalition of South Africans for a Basic Income Grant.  Accessed at www.drc.org.za/docs on 5 
December 2006. 
927  BIG was rejected by Finance Minister, Mr Trevor Manual, in his 2004 Budget Speech. Accessed at 
www.gov.za/speeches on 30 March 2006. 
928  See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of arguments for and against the introduction of BIG. 
929  BIG Financing Group Breaking the Poverty Trap: Financing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa 34 to 
45. 
930  “Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa.”  Draft Consolidated Report (2002) 62. 
931  South African Human Rights Commission The Right to Food Fifth Economic and Social Rights Report 
Series, 2002/2003 (2004) ix. 
932  The South African Human Rights Commission, The Right to have Access to Sufficient Food, in 4th 
Economic and Social Rights Report 2001/2002 (2003) 7. 
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of crime. There is therefore a need to lobby government to introduce BIG as one aspect of a 
multi-faceted response to realizing the right to food along with other basic needs.  
 
7.6  FINAL COMMENTS 
 
This concluding Chapter (and the dissertation as a whole) has considered a possible court 
challenge of the constitutionality of existing food law, policy and implementation in South 
Africa. It has also considered an additional multi-faceted approach to realising the right to 
food indirectly via any avenue which is likely to positively impact on the enjoyment of the 
right. From the aforementioned proposals it appears as if Brand is absolutely correct to call 
for a multi-pronged approach to better protect, promote and fulfil the right to food.933 To be 
most effective the state’s approach to the right to its right to food challenges should have 
legislative, administrative and judicial elements. In other words, firstly laws need to be 
created to better meet the right to food; secondly such laws must be properly implemented 
and finally such implementation must be properly enforced by the courts and other such 
bodies. A failure at any of these levels could well mean that the state’s current food response 
fail a constitutional challenge.  Such a multi-faceted response to South Africa’s food 
challenges could well be encapsulated by way of framework food legislation.   
 
In South Africa effective means need to be developed to close the gap between having the 
right to food in theory and realisation of the right in practice. Realising the right to food 
forms part of a broader challenge in this country of meetings all social and economic rights 
for the many people for whom they remain elusive.934 This research has suggested what the 
right to food entails and existing and proposed ways to better achieve this crucial right. Due 
to the importance of the right, and various other rights being the dependent on it for their 
realisation, South Africa’s food challenges should be urgently prioritized.  It is also submitted 
that the realisation of the right to food is pivotal to South Africa’s continued status as a 
benchmark worldwide for respecting, protecting and promoting human rights. 
                                                 
933  Brand “The Right to Food” in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 178: Citing 
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